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I. ABBREVIATIONS 
Most of the abbreviations in the text and footnotes are 
self-explanatory. 
"P.I." stands for Philosophical Investigations. 
- 
In the text "§ " refers to section numbers in P.I., Part I, 
and "p" or "pp." refers to page numbers in P.I., Part II. 
"Essays" or "Essays, Ed. Pitcher" refers to Pitcher, George, 
(editor), Modern Studies in Philosophy, A Collection of critical 
essays. Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations. 
Macmillan, London, Melbourne, 1968. 
2. 
ABSTRACT 
After an introduction I start by giving a brief outline of 
Wittgenstein's account of language about private sensations, the 
expressive use hypothesis, that sentences:aboutprivate sensations, 
e.g., "I am in pain", replace the natural primitive expressions of 
sensations. The expressive use is seen as analogous to the perform-
ative element in Austin's performative utterances. 
There are besides the private language arguments proper, other 
reasons against private language, and I initially argue against these. 
Firstly others can know I am in pain. However, some account 
still needs to be given ,of , the fact that others still do not have my 
private feeling of pain. 
Secondly "I know I am in pain" is seen as a Rylean category 
mistake, but this depends on whether "I am in pain" is only in the 
expressive (use category of utterance. 
Thirdly another of Wittgenstein's points is like the Rylean 
distinction between sensation and observation, which makes it seem 
as though sensations cannot be known. I argue against this. 
A fourth Wittgensteinian reason against private language is 
an argument about the rules of "know" and "pain", these rules making 
"know" logically redundant in "I know I am in pain". I see the 
plausibility of Wittgenstein's appeal to rules here as resting upon 
our natural bias towards the incorrigibility thesis. I argue that 
the incorrigibility thesis does not yield a premiss strong enough to 
support Wittgenstein's argument. I then give reasons against the 
incorrigibility thesis, which makes the appeal to rules implausible, 
because the rules are not in accord with normal usage. Against the 
incorribility thesis I cite both Austin and theelectroencephalogram 
argument, and then argue that the logical exclusion of doubt about 
incorrigible statements rest upon an empirical claim that there are 
no circumstances which preclude taking a statement as incorrigible. 
Wittgenstein's final move of shutting out doubt does not remove the 
problem. 
One of the problems of dealing with Wittgenstein's elimination of 
"I know" from "I know I am in pain" is that he has two main reasons 
for this. The Blue Book contains mainly the reason that it is all a 
matter of rules. But the private language arguments of the Investi-
gations yields as a solution the expressive use hypothesis. So the 
second reason is that of the Rylean category mistake. This can lead 
to confusion. 
Next I examine the expressive use hypothesis more closely. To 
be consistent, if "I am in pain" is an expression of pain then "I" 
must also be an expression, and notbe a reference to a person. 
Wittgenstein gives several reasons against "I" referring, but I d6 
not find them conclusive. 
I do not think that Wittgenstein later abandons in any clear way 
the expressive use hypothesis, but I give some reasons against it. 
Patients do need to observe and describe sensations. Words used to 
describe pains are borrowed from contexts in which they are descriptive. 
Some sensations have little natural expression, but are communicated 
through circumstances in which they arise. If "I am in pain" as a 
referring expression is not incorrigible, then as an expression it 
is not a criterion for -me being in pain. 
I then examine the private language arguments proper. The first 
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private language argument appears to rely on the unreliability of memory, 
but I argue that this is not the deep aspect, and that the problem of 
public checking to determine correct and incorrect usage is the basic 
point. Ayer's criticism meets this deep aspect. 
I criticise Rhees' position that a private language is unintellig-
ible, as following from an unwarranted definition of "language". 
The second private language argument concerns sameness, and ends 
Up like the memory problem, really being a problem of public checking 
of correctness. 
Wittgenstein holds that the process of public checking comes to 
an end where justifications run out, but seems to be against private 
checking doing the same thing. The end of the two processes is the 
same, "seems right" gives way to "is right". 
The need for public checking is seen as the basic root of Witt-
genstein's reasons against a private language. Some of my criticisms 
are these: 1. Ayer's point that any checking must reach a point 
where something is taken as valid •in itself. 
2. The problem of public checking should hold for expressions of 
sensations too. 
3. The expressive use model does not seem plausible for public 
objects, so why should it be so for private objects? 
4. Public and private objects would be got rid of by assuming that 
they are constantly changing, only no - one notices the change. The 
beetle in the box argument is relevant here. It is hard to see why 
private objects drop out, and if they do it seems that public objects 
could do so as well. 
The conclusions of Wittgenstein's arguments lead him to the 
peculiar position that he can say nothing about private objects not 
5. 
even about their existence. 
I try and clarify the meaning of § 297 - "water boils in a pot". 
By taking the stipulation that a language is necessarily private, 
then the private language arguments work in a cryptic sort of way - 
behaviour in the form ofwriting "S" is ruled out. 
I try and say something about sensations and sensation words. 
To understand someone else's feelings you need not only their behaviour, 
but feelings of your own. What Wittgenstein has shown is that natural 
expressions of sensation are required for public language. This is 
similar to saying that we have to behave towards public objects to 
have a public language about them. 
In the ostensive teaching of sensations words it is unlikely that 
pupils would pick-up the replacement of natural behaviour rule rather 
than the naming rule. _Teaching the names of private sensations is 
often just as hard or as easy as teaching the names of public objects. 
Sensations do not enter our lives in grossly different ways from 
public objects. 
One of the main reasons for Wittgenstein's position is that he 
treats sensations as if more in the realm of sense data rather than being 
nearer to public objects. 
I then make a distinction between contingently and necessarily 
private objects. Contingently private objects merely happen to be 
accessible to only one person, whereas access by others to necessarily 
private objects is logically impossible. I argue that pain is contin-
gently private, not necessarily private. 
Wittgenstein seems to indicate that pain could be exhibited 
if there were pain patches. I indicate that our pains are already 
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something like pain patches on our skin which are contingently private. 
I further argue that for any object anyone can think of it is 
logically possible that someone else has some apprehension of it, and 
so there are no necessarily private objects. 
I try to show that there is a sense in which we have our own or 
particular or individual private experience, but that these experiences 
are not necessarily private in a strong sense, but may be so in a 
weaker sense. However, this still does not give a person a basis 
for having a name for his particular private experience and an6ther 
name for a public or.contingently private object corresponding to it. 
I then try and clarify for myself J.J. Thomson's comparison of 
Malcolm's interpretation of the private language argument with the 
Principle of Verification. She seems to conclude that as the Principle 
of Verification is of doubtful use so too is Malcolmi's interpretation 
of Wittgenstein's private language argument in ruling out a private 
language. 
I feel that in considering the case where it is supposed to be 
logically impossible for others to find out whether or not a word 
applies to someone's private object, rather than the analogy with the 
Principle of Verification being useless to rule out that the someone 
has a private language, we should appreciate the difficulty of showing 
the supposed logical impossibility of others finding out if a word 
applies to someone's private object, and thus the difficulty of show-
ing that someone has a (necessarily) private language. 
I next consider whether all our private items. are contingently 
private rather than necessarily private. For any private item one 
can try and find ways in which it could have been public, but it seems 
to me that any private item could have been public. There are no 
7. 
necessarily private items. . 
There are different degrees of contingent privacy. There are 
private items which one can compare with public objects, and those for 
which there is no public object for comparison. Then there are those 
private feelings which seem unique - only one individual seems to 
have them - and those who do not have anything of the same sort are 
more peculiarly excluded from understanding the other's feelings. 
The judgement that we are feeling the same •sort of thing, e.g., 
a pain, is seen as analogous to the judgement that we are seeing the 
same thing, e.g., a tree. 
The lack of analogy between telling that someone has a gold tooth 
and telling that someone has toothache is seen as harmless in the 
light of toothache being contingently private. As we do not demand 
that we have someone's personal experience of a public object, so 
there is no demand for his.personal experience of a contingently 
private object. 
After a short note on behaviour I list some features of pain 
which mislead us. 
My conclusion is that there is no necessarily private language. 
8. 
III. . .INTRODUCTION 
Wittgenstein viewed public sensation words as expressions of 
sensation, not as names referring to our private sensations. He has 
brought out the important point that natural expressions of sensations 
are as important a basis •fora public language game about sensations 
as are our natural reactions to public objects a basis for a.public 
language game.about them. By assuming the ruling out of expressions 
of sensation he considers the private naming of a sensation itself. 
He is right when he indicates that such a name cannot be correctly 
applied as determined by public checking, but wrong in that a private 
language user can use his own private checking, for the end of public 
checking is similar to the end of private checking. His conclusion 
leads him to deny that our public sensation words name or refer to 
our sensations (which are usually taken to be private objects), and 
thus he embraces the expressive use hypothesis. I think that there 
is some truth in the expressive use hypothesis but that mostly our 
sensation words name and refer - to sensations, in a similar way to 
the way we name and refer to public objects. 
This thesis examines Wittgenstein's reasons against private 
language, and tries to show that we need not accept all of Wittgen-
stein's conclusions. 
But why, one might ask, should one concern oneself with the 
private language arguments of Wittgenstein? 
Firstly there is a whole tradition of philosophy from Descartes 
on which sees no difficulty in the naming of our private sensations. 
The philosophers of this tradition seem to indicate that I know what 
the word "pain" means or what pain is solely by observing my own pain. 
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Locke, for example, says that: "...words, in their primary or 
immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the 
.1 mind of him that uses them „, 	and also "... every man- has so 
inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases 
that no one hath the power to:make others have the same ideas in 
their minds that he has; when they use the same words that he does .2  
If Wittgenstein is right and one cannot name one's private 
sensations in this way then the above view of language needs re-
thinking. 
Secondly, in order to talk about the language involving private 
sensations one is forced to get a clearer view of what sensations 
are, and what sort of privacy they have. One may experiment with 
oneself and try to notice all sorts of sensations one is not normally 
aware of. One notices a slight itch at the back of the scalp, and 
then one at the side of the chest, a slight ache in the left elbow, 
a pressure under the hand on-the desk, a slight ache in the teeth. 
Perhaps it is sensations like these that the hypochondriac notices 
but blows up out of all proportion. One may wonder whether the same 
sensations are had by other people and ask one's wife, for example, 
of her experiences, and discover just how well or badly two people 
can talk together about such things. Is it a contingent matter that 
sensations are private or are they in some sense necessarily private? 
One perhaps tries to name a particular private sensation just to 
see how one goes. Perhapssaysthe name out loud, or writesit 
down, or saysit to oneself -with the resolution to tell no-one else, 
or perhaps instead one picks out another private sensation and calls 
1. John Locke ,An Essay Concerning ' -Human Understanding, Book III, 
Chapter II, 2. 
2. Op.cit., Book III, Chapter II, 8. 
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it the name of the first one, such that a slight itch in the back 
becomes a name for a slight ache in the calf - the ultimate private 
language. 
Of course, Wittgenstein might exhort us to heed that "It shew's 
a fundamental misunderstanding, if I am - inclined to study the headache 
I have now in order to get clear about the philosophical problem of 
sensation".
1 
But when you are interested in the language concerning 
sensations you are also interested in the sensations themselves, and 
where they might fit into one's view of the world. 
Thirdly, a close study of the private language arguments gives 
one a closer understanding of what we are doing when we use public 
language. The background to the private language argument is a view 
of the workings of public language. As the theory of language of 
the Tractatus is set up as a base to deal with further problems, 
so the view of language developed in the early pages of the 
Investigations is used as a base to eliminate amongst other things, 
private language. 
Original thoughts in this area are now difficult and whatever 
one says has probably been written by someone else. However, the 
greatest value is obtained by being captured by the whole subject, 
not so that you mindlessly churn out the Wittgensteinian solutions, 
or that you arrive at original solutions to the problems which are 
right, but such that, as Wittgenstein - wanted, you have thoughts of 
2 
your own. 
1. P.1., I, § 314. 
2. P.1., Preface, viii. 
IV. REASONS AGAINST PRIVATE LANGUAGE 
1. The Expressive Use Solution to Private Language Problems  
Wittgenstein appears to give us his solution to private language 
problems at the beginning of his more concentrated section on private 
language in the Philosophical Investigation. 1 "How do words refer to 
sensations?"
2 
We are to think of the situation in which one apparently 
refers to one's own sensations. The answer is that sensation words 
do not refer to or name sensations at all. They do not describe the 
private sensation. Sensation words in this situation replace the 
primitive or natural expressions of the sensation. By "expression o 
sensation" he means "appropriate human behaviour". Thus the sensa-
tion word does not name some private entity, nor does it describe 
human behaviour, but replaces the behaviour. 
Wittgenstein's example is pain. "lam in pain" replaces crying. 
Thus "I am in pain" is seen as akin in function to "Ouch!". "Ouch!" 
does not name a pain sensation, nor does it refer to pain behaviour. 
It is verbal behaviour associated with pain, expressing pain. 
Presumably "I am itchy" replaces scratching; "I am hot" replaces 
sweating and fanning oneself; "Jam cold" replaces shivering; "I am 
ticklish" replacesgiggling. 
2. Analogy with Performative Utterances  
To borrow a term from Austin,
3 
 there are certain utterances which 
are performative, e.g., 'I do', 'I apologise', 'I promise', 'I will'. 
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Investigations. 
2. P.I., I, § 244. 
3. J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances", in Philosophical papers. 
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They do not admit to truth or falsity, but are actions, operations, 
performed by words. They do not describe some inner state, nor any 
outward behaviour. They are the behaviour. Austin goes on to say 
that the distinction between'performative utterances and statements 
is not clear, and that there are performative elements in the making 
of many statements, e.g. "I am sorry". This statement both describes 
my state and acts as an apology. Another example would be "I cross 
my heart". This describes the action of crossing my heart with my 
finger, and performs a promise. 
Is "I am in pain" a performative utterance in Austin's sense. 
Austin attempts to give grammatical criteria
1 
by which we can distin-
guish performantive utterances, but finds that there are no obvious 
ones.
2 
Performative utterances are often short and ambiguous, e.g., 
we may not know whether "Bull" is a warning or a name. It depends 
upon whether we are in the country or at the show. But there is some 
hope that most performative utterances may be analysable into one of 
two standard forms which Austin gives as "I ... so and so", or "You 
(or he) ... so and so". 'Thus "I order you'to ...", and "You are 
warned that ..." are analysed forms of the usual performative utter-
ances of ordering and warning. Also "I state that ..." may be a 
performative utterance and - this indicates that all statements may be 
a class of abbreviated performative utterances. 
But there are some statements, such as 'hurrah' and 'Damn', 
which Austin feels seem like performative utterances, yet somehow are 
not. Their primary nature is giving vent tojeelings, yet they are 
actions. But we may here remind.ourselves of the platitude that all 
utterances are actions, and indeed Austin concludes Oat-there are 
1. 	Op.cit., p. 228. 2. Op.cit., p. 230. 
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performative elements to all utterances) 
 
Perhaps the statements 'hurrah' and 'Damn' are purely performative, 
in that the words are not used descriptively at all, not even in 
other sentences. Although 'Damn' may be used descriptively, 'Damn' 
being short for 'Damnation'. But when someone swears by saying "Damn" 
or even "I'll be damned", he is not talking about a place, nor divin-
ing what might happen, but is just swearing. This is about where the 
word 'Ouch' fits. It is purely performative, having no descriptive 
use at all 
Austin almost rejects 'Hurrah" and "Damn" as performative utter-
ances because they are not neatly translatable into either of the two 
standard forms of performative utterance given above. I think that 
the reason for this untranslatability is that the words have no 
descriptive use. Thus 'I hurrah', 'I damn',II ouch', are not used 
' as neither are 'He hurrahs', 'He damns', 'He ouches'. (And we must 
think of 'Damn' in its distinctive use as swearing, and not as the 
action of sending or ordering someone to Damnation.) One would rather 
say 'I cheer', 'I swear', 'I' cry in pain' or 'He cheers', 'He swears', 
'He cries in pain'; there one is describing. 
It is interesting to note that when Austin develops further his 
ideas on performative utterances in How to do things with Words he 
still finds that exclamations like "damn" and "ouch" do not neatly 
fall into one of the roughly defined classes afconstative or performa- 
tive utterances, or locutionary, illocutionary or perlocutionary acts.
2 
Also the notion of a purely performative utterance„ except perhaps 
as a marginally limiting case, is abandoned, the performative-constative 
1. Op.cit., p. 238. 
2. J.L. Austin, How to do things with Words, pp. 105 and 132. 
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distinction giving way to more general families of related and over-
lapping speech acts. 1 
However, my purpose in considering Austin's work here has been 
to try and get a clearer perspective on the expressive use analysis. 
Austin's insights make it easier to believe that there is an 
element of 'Ouch' in 'I am in pain', indeed Wittgenstein would have 
it that the two expressions have the same use. But it is not yet 
settled whether 'I am in pain' is more like 'I am sorry', having both 
a performative element and a descriptive element. Certainly on the 
face of it 'I am in pain' seems to be referring to a private entity, 
A 134 i , h1cJ acCord in +o 	cart onlj 	n n 	h inn w o has The 
, pain, and that the statement uttered genuinely by him is incorrig-
ible. But Wittgenstein has obscure but powerful reasons for denying 
that 'I am in pain' refers to anything at all. 
3. Some Reasons Against a Private Language  
The section in Part I of the Philosophical Investigations from 
§ 243 onwards contains not only one or two fairly well demarcated 
private language arguments, but also a number of other reasons against 
a private language. I will deal With these in turn. 
4. Others do Know I am in Pain  
In P.I., I, §.246 to § 252 there occur arguments based on the 
use of the word 'know'.. They consist of a number of scattered reasons 
why someone is wrong when he says '"only I can know whether I am really 
in pain". 
Wittgenstein's first point is that this is wrong in that others 
1. Op.cit., p. 149. 
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often do know that I am in pain. However, there is a difference 
between my saying "I know I am in pain" and "I know he is in pain". 
In the first case I tell from my feeling of pain, and in the second 
I tell from his pain behaviour. I may observe my own pain behaviour, 
but I have never had his feeling of pain. We often know that others 
are in pain but the interesting point is that we only know or have 
our own feeling of pain, and do not know nor have another's feeling 
of pain. Until it is shown that it is nonsense to talk of knowing 
one's own pains, or knowing or having the pain of someone else, then 
I take it that the question is still open - "Can it be only I that 
knows or has what I feel when I am in pain?" 
5. Category Mistakes  
Wittgenstein follows this point up with his second "It can't be 
said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. 
What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain? 
"Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from 
my behaviour - for I cannot be said to learn of them, I have them." 
[He says "cannot ... only" because there is nothing else to learn from 
but my behaviour.] 
"The truth is:it makes sense to say about other people that 
they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about 
myself." 1 
This passage seems to be pointing out that 'I know that I am in 
pain" is senseless in that it is something like a Rylean category 
mistake.
2 
"I am in pain" is not the sort of statement that can end 
"I know that ...". It would be like saying "I know that ouch". As 
1. P.I., I, § 246. 
2. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 17-25. 
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'ouch' is non descriptive it does not name a member of a.category, 
so it does not name a thing which comes into the category of things 
known or things that might be known. But whether Wittgenstein is 
right here will depend •upon whether'I am in pain' can always be replaced 
by 'ouch', and this is yet to be decided. 
6. Sensation. and Observation  
Another way of interpreting this passage is that it is drawing a 
distinction between knowing and having, and that we can be said to 
have pains but not to know them. 'Knowing' is more properly said of 
things which can be observed, and not of sensations which are had. 
Ryle here again is helpful in his distinction between sensation and 
observation) in that it seems (accidentally or not) to be a possible 
expansion of the Wittgensteinea pOint. 
Ryle make a distinction between having a sensation and observation. 
Having a sensation (e.g., a pain or a tickle) is just being aware of 
something, noticing something, whereas an observation is an act whereby 
we put ourselves in a position to have - a sensation. E.g., to observe 
a tree I act by turning my eyes towards the tree and have a sensation, 
a visual impression of the tree. Making an observation involves having 
a sensation of some sort, but to say that we observe a sensation is to 
make a mistake. This Ryle says is the official doctrine that perceiv-
ing involves having sensations, although he would prefer to restrict 
'sensation' to refer to unsophisticated sensations such as pain, tickles 
and itches. 
Observing is a task, a finding out or trying.to .find out something. 
I think that Ryle plausibly further establishes that having a sensation 
1. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Chapter VII. 
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is not the same as observing by pointing out the set of contrasts 
which exist between the two. In a way one wonders how they could pos- 
sibly be alike. E.g., "One can listen carefully, but not have a singing 
in one's ears carefully." "We observe on purpose, but we do not have 
sensations on purpose, though we can induce them on purpose." 1 I think 
the general plan of these contrasts is that observing is an action, 
whereas having a sensation is being in a possessive relationship, and 
words which qualify actions do not usually also qualify possessive 
relationships. 
But to establish that sensations cannot be observed is a different 
thing. Ryle has four arguments in favour of this, and these I shall 
criticise in turn. 
1. It makes no sense to say that sensations are witnessed only 
by others, because I cannot be said to witness my own sensations. He 
says that I feel or have tweaks, but do not discover or peer, or 
watch, or listen to them. Certainly one cannot peer, watch or listen 
to tweaks, pains and itches because those observational words are 
applicable to the impressions associated with the eyes, or ears, and 
not those of the body. But I may discover that I have a pain, in 
that some pains are not noticed when attention is directed elsewhere, 
and they can be discovered by thinking again about them. Ryle's 
contrasts just do not prove anything here. I feel pain in much the 
same way that I watch trees. There is not much difference between 
watching a tree and watching an afterimage between listening to a 
bell ringing and listening to tinnitus. And the difference comes 
in further associated facts with respect to the tree and the bell such 
as existing unobserved, or being perceived by others, which do not 
apply to the afterimage, tinnitus or pains. 
1. 	Op.cit., p. 194. 
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One might think that here then one could not be said to discover 
pains or tinnitus or afterimages because they do not happen to exist 
unperceived. To discover something one might think can only be said 
of the thing to be discovered if it already exists, e.g., Antarctica 
before its discovery, but is not being perceived. This is a putative 
grammatical point about the word 'discover'. But in fact there are many 
cases df discovery where the thing discovered did not exist before the 
discovery occurred. E.g., the discovery by Newton of the formula for 
the magnitude of gravitational force between masses, or the discovery 
of a new synthetic drug. To say that I awoke and discovered a pain 
in my back or a loud ringing in my ears does not break any grammatical 
rules on that account [It may, however, break rules if the private 
language arguments are valid.] 
There is a great temptation in some cases to talk of pain existing 
unperceived. E.g., the situation in which you have a mild pain but 
because your attention is involved in-something else, you only notice 
the pain now and then. The pain is always in the same place, e.g., 
a blister on the foot, and it seems to make sense to say that the pain 
is still there even in the moments whenyo-v24;not noticing it. Or 
think of Buck's case
1 
where the football player deceives himself 
about his pain because he wants to keep playing. Is he in pain even 
though he denies feeling any pain? It seems to make sense to say 
that someone has continuous ringing in his ears, but that he does not 
notice it all the time. It seems as if it were there waiting for 
his attention. 
2. Observational aids and handicaps are said to exist for the 
perception of objects and sounds but not for sensations. This is just 
1. R. Buck, "Non Other Minds", in Analytical Philosophy. 
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false. The sensation of pain in my arm may be enhanced by the 
presence of a boil, or by some other cause of hyperaesthesia, while 
the feeling of the pain may be handicapped by a local anaesthetic or 
nerve injury. 
3. It makes sense to ask what is the spelling of a word, but non-
sense to ask the spelling of a letter. Analogously it makes sense to 
talk of observing an object but nonsense to talk of observing a 
sensation. 
And if spelling a word consists in giving a series of letters, 
does observing an object consist in having a series of sensations? 
But Ryle has already said that observing an object is a trying to do 
something which is distinct from having sensations. So his own analysis 
wrecks the analogy as being an exact one. The analogy is rather like 
a parable. There its meaning has nothing to do with the doctrine 
it is trying to illustrate. It is an illustration, not an argument. 
One might well have concluded - "analogously it makes sense to ask 
what is the movement of an object, but nonsense to ask for the move-
ment of a sensation". Yet we know that sensations move. The pain 
of appendicitis is described as moving from around the umbilicus to 
the right iliac fossa. "Ureteric pain is the well known colic 
passing from the loin to the groin." 1 
4. Ryle's fourth argument against the observation of sensations 
involves an infinite regress. Observation entails having sensations. 
Presuming that a 'glimpse' is a 'neat' sensatiovword, then observing 
a robin involves having a glimpse of a robin, for having a sensation 
is a part of observation. But if we are to observe a sensation, then 
1. H. Bailey and M. Love, A Short Practice of Surgery (1962), p. 1098. 
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so the argument does, we must have a further sensation, such as 
glimpse of a glimpse. This series could go on forever, and yet 
there is no such thing as a glimpse of a glimpse. So it is nonsense 
to talk of observing sensations. 
But even though observing an object involves having a sensation 
it is difficult to see why in observing a sensation one should analog-
ously have a further sensation. Analogously one should have a 
sensation, but surely the one that we are observing will do. The 
further sensation is neither needed and nor does it occur. If observ-
ing involves having a sensation then'in observing a sensation that 
very sensation fulfils the requirement. An analogy has suggested 
itself but it has no application here. 
One may remark upon the element of trying in observation. If one 
is just staring at the window and looking as it happens at the tree 
rather than the horse, or the goat and then perhaps a little later 
at the horse and then the goat again, it is difficult to notice any 
element of trying in these proceedings. The gaze just shifts, I do 
not try to shift it, and I observe the objects, but am not trying to 
find out anything, for all I see is already familiar. So it seems 
that perhaps there are many observations made without the least element 
of trying or trying to find out anything. Ryle does recognise this 
use of 'observe' at the top of p. 198 where he says that it is some-
times used as a synonym for .'pay heed to' or 'notice'. 
With respect to sensations there are many situations where one 
may try to have a particular sensation. Most of us' arehere because 
a couple of people tried to arouse some. particular sensation or other. 
Ryle says "We observe0i purpose, but we do not have sensations on 
purpose, though we can induce them on purpose".
1 
Surely, if we can 
1. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 194. 
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induce sensations on purpose,then;we can try to have sensations! 
The remark in the previous paragraph about merely observing without 
trying applies in many cases of having sensations. But as there are 
cases of trying in observation so there are cases of trying in having 
sensations. Ryle has spuriously emphasised the presence of trying 
in the one case and its absence in the other. Which all goes to show 
that Ryle's distinction between observation and having sensations on 
the basis of trying is groundless. 
The situation as I see it is as follows. Observations of objects 
and sensations can be made. Observation of an object involves having 
some appropriate sensation. Observation of a sensation involves 
having precisely that .sensation. When one observes an object, one 
observes the appropriate sensation, but not just that, for an object 
consists of more than its momentary appearance. 
It appears then that Ryle and Wittgenstein are wrong in that one 
may not only be said to have sensations, one may also be said to 
observe them. That being the case then sensations are things which 
can be known, so the possibility of a private language is not denied 
by falsely stating that sensations can only be had and not known. 
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V. 	KNOWLEDGE AND INCORRIGIBILITY 
1. The Incorrigibility Thesis  
Next I want to talk about the incorrigibility thesis and how 
- this is related to a different argument concerning the use of "know", 
one which is more fully explicated in the Blue Book, but which enters 
now and then in the Philosophical Investigations as a reason against 
pri vate language. 
When a sincere introspective report is made, there •is the view 
that the report is incorrigible or indubitable, i.e., to make a mistake 
is logically impossible. Thus it is sometimes thought that such a 
report is logically necessary. 
However, incorrigibility is different from logical necessity. 
Following Armstrong "a logically necessary truth is true in all possible 
worlds". 1 "I am in pain", could not be sincerely and truly uttered 
in a world where there were no pains, whereas "2 + 2=4" is said 
to be true in all possible worlds. 
But incorrigibility can be defined in terms of logical necessity 
"... a statement is incorrigible if and only if it is logically 
necessary that when the statement is sincerely made, it is true. A 
statement is incorrigible when sincerity entails truth." 2 
It might be thought that although the statement "I am in pain" 
is not logically necessary, the statement "Sincerely I am in pain" 
when uttered, would be:logically necessary, for in a world in which 
there were no pains the statement "Sincerely I am in pain" could not 
1. D.M. Armstrong, "Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?", 
The Philosophical Review, Vol .72, (1963), pp. 417-432. 
2. Op.cit. 
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— 
be sincerely uttered. Well it might not be sincerely uttered, but it 
could be insincerely uttered, so that the statement would be false, 
i.e., making the word 'sincerely' part of the avowal does not produce 
a statement which is logically necessary. Nor does the sincerity with 
which the utterance is made make,the statement logically necessary. 
Rather, it is logically necessary that if the utterance is sincere; 
then the statement is true. For the statement to be logically necessary 
a statement of sincerity itself would have to be logically necessary. 
Similarly the statement "I know I am in pain" is not logically 
necessary, but if it is sincerely made then it is true, at least 
according to the accepted doctrine on incorrigibility. 
2. Wittgenstein's Argument on Rules of "know" and "pain" 
But scattered thinly though the writings of Wittgenstein is this 
further species of argument concerning the use of the word 'know'. 
Roughly the argument is as follows. In the statement "I know that x", 
if 'x' is a substatement which it is logically impossible either to 
doubt or to know, then respectively either 'know' has no function or 
the statement is senseless. 
Perhaps the best statements of this argument occur in The Blue 
Book, pp. 54,55. 1 "When on the other hand, you granted me that a man 
can't know whether the other person has pain, you do not wish to say 
that as a matter of fact people didn't know, but that it made no sense 
to say they knew (and therefore no sense to say they don't know)." 
... "That is, you did not state that knowing was a.goal which you 
could not reath, and that you have to be contented with conSecturing; 
rather, there is no goal in this game. Just as when one says 'You 
. L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books. 
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can't count through the whole series of cardinal numbers', one 
doesn't state a fact about human frailty but about a convention which 
we have made" ...." it is analogous to a statement like 'there is no 
goal in an endurance race'." 1 
"Again, when in a metaphysical sense I say I must always know 
when I have pain', this simply makes the word 'know' redundant; and 
"2 
instead of 'I know that I have pain", I can simply say 'I have pain'. 
Statements of the form "I know that I am in pain" look like 
descriptive or experiential ones, whet-4s Wittgenstein says that they 
"hide a grammatical rule" 3 or are "about a convention we have made"4 . 
"The thing to do in such cases is - always to look how the words in 
question are actually used in our language. u 5  Thus this argument is 
grounded in Wittgenstein's conception of ordinary language as rule 
governed. (Armstrong I think wrongly uses this argument against the 
incorrigibility thesis, see p. 46 of this thesis:) 
So it is said that to speak of having knowledge has a function 
only where to speak of not having knowledge also has a function. 
I now wish to construct an argument using an analogue of Wittgenstein's 
premiss and yielding the conclusion that "know" is redundant in "I 
know I-am in pain" 
If "know" is senseless in "I do not know I am in pain" then 
"know" is redundant in "I know I am in pain". 
If "I know I am in pain" is logically necessary then "know' is 
senseless in "I do not know I am in pain". 
Therefore if "I know I am in pain" is logically necessary then 
"know" is redundant in "I know I am in pain". This is a valid 
1. Op.cit., 	p. 54. • 3. Op.cit., p. 55. 
2. Op.cit., 	p. 55. 4. Op.cit., p. 54. 
5. Op.cit., p. 56. 
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argument of the form 
D (r D D (r D 
3. The Argument does not work with logically necessary statements  
It is a paradox but true that if a philosopher finds statements 
of knowledge which are logically necessary, he cannot without redund-
ancy say that he has knowledge; At first sight I though this argu-
ment was bad because it might work with all logically necessary state-
ments.
1 
Let us try the argument with logically necessary statements 
which are rarely disputed, e.g., "2 + 2 = 4", "Pythagoras' theorem 
follows from Euclid's axioms", "three angles of a triangle sum to 180 011 , 
 
"a bachelor is an unmarriedman". .Paralleling the above arguments 
we have: 
If "knbe is senseless in "I do not know 2 + 2 = 4" 
then "know" is redundant in "I know 2 + 2 = 4". 
If "I know 2 + 2 = 4" is logically necessary then "know" 
is senseless in "I do not know 2 + 2 = 4". 
Therefore if "I know 2 + 2 = 4" is logically necessary 
then "know" is redundant in "I know 2 + 2 = 4". 
This is a valid argument but the premiss "'I know 2 + 2 = 4' is 
logically necessary" is false. For although "2 + 2 = 4" is logically 
necessary it does not follow that I necessaHly know that 2 + 2 = 4. 
1. Lately I have found that Morick has also thought, wrongly I 
believe, that Wittgenstein's argument here is invalid because 
it would work with logically necessary statements. Rather 
I think that though the argument is valid, the failing is 
that there are no statements such as "I know that ..." which 
are logically necessary. 
See Harold Morick, "Wittgenstein and Privileged Access" 
in Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought, 
pp. 366-368. 
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So it is seen that statements which are logically necessary, e.g., 
"2 + 2 = 4" do not fit into Wittgenstein's argument. The statements 
which might do however, are the so-called incorrigible ones, e.g., 
"I am in pain". "I know I am in pain". 
4. Does the Argument work with incorrigible statements? 
For sometimes statements like "I know I am in pain" are taken as 
though they have all the certainty of logically necessary statements. 
But we concluded before that the incorrigibility thesis does not 
result in "I know I am in pain", as logically necessary, but only as 
true or false depending upon sincerity. So the incorrigibility thesis 
will not provide a premiss for Wittgenstein's argument. 
5. Sincerity in Doubt  
One could sensibly say "I am in pain and I know I am sincere 
so I know I am in pain". One could make a case for those times when 
one is not sure whether one is being sincere. E.g., a malingerer may 
think he is being sincere when he says "I know I am in pain" but may 
later realize that he was not sincere, so that what he says turns 
out to be false (meaning more specifically that "I know I am sincere" 
turns out to-be false). As we hinted before my sincerity is not 
beyond logical doubt. 
But in the case where there is no empirical doubt as to my 
sincerity, where it is understood that I am sincere, then nothing 
more is added by saying "I know I am sincere", and so nothing more 
is added by saying "I know Lam in pain", after one has said with 
appropriate sincerity "I am in pain". "Know" here is .not being used 
in an empirical sense where doubt has been excluded logically (in 
which case that use would be redundant), but in an empirical sense 
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in a case where doubt .has been excluded empirically, where there is no 
empirical doubt and "know" does not function to remove it, does not 
add anything concerning the presence or absence of empirical doubt, 
for the doubt is already patently absent. This does not make "I know 
I am in pain" false, nor are any logical rules broken. One is just 
being long-winded, using repetition inappropriately. It is an empirical 
redundancy, not a logical redundancy here. All that the incorrigibility 
thesis can yield is a statement of knowledge where "know" is empiri-
cally redundant. It is not strong enough to yield logical redundancy. 
6. Empirical and Logical Redundancy  
What is a logical redundancy like? Well we know that the defini-
tion of a triangle includes that it is three sided, so if we said 
of some figure X, "X is a triangle and X is three sided" ("X is a 
three sided triangle"), that would be a logical redundancy. The 
words "three sided" are here logically redundant. What if we make 
the rule or definition that pain is what is known? The definition of 
pain includes that it is known. Then if someone says "I am in pain 
and I know it" ("I know I am in pain"), he has made a similar mistake. 
"Know" here is logically redundant. 
What if now someone said "I am in pain and I know the definition 
of pain". He might instead say "I know I am in pain","knole referring 
to his knowledge of the definition, i.e., "I know I am in pain" mean-
ing "I am in pain and I know that the definition of pain involves 
knowing it". Someone could then conceivably say, when actually in 
pain "I do not know I am in pain" meaning "I am in pain but I don't 
know whether the definition of pain involves knowing it". I.e., "I 
am in pain but I don't know what 'pain' means". Presumably he has 
some belief about what "pain" means, otherwise his use of "pain" would 
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would be without any reason. He thinks perhaps that there is a slight 
chance that "pain" only applies to unconscious pains, i.e., pains 
which are not known, so that what he is now feeling and knows he is 
feeling is not a pain although he believes but does not know that the 
definition of pain involves knowing it. 
So when Wittgenstein says "if anyone said 'I do not know if what 
I have got is a pain or something else', we should think something like, 
he does not know what the English word 'pain' means", ' perhaps the 
person is using "know" in the sense of not knowing what "pain" means. 
That such a case should be actual seems to be beyond the realms of 
plausibility, but one must I think allow that by scraping the bottom 
of this particular barrel one can allow someone to say "I know I am 
in pain". 
An infinite regress of knowing seems possible - knowing you are 
in pain, knowing the definition of pain, knowing that you know the 
definition. This is not to say that there is in fact a definite rule 
or definition of pain. 
7. Comparison with the Arguments in On_Certainty. 
Wittgenstein's argument in The Blue Book can be traced on to 
the early passages of On Certainty, 2 where the redundancy of "know" 
is developed to occupy a significant place in that work. There 
Wittgenstein is concerned with the status of such propositions as 
Moore's "I know I have a hand". In § 58 (On Certainty) "I know etc." 
is conceived as a grammatical proposition, i.e., it is one of our 
rules of grammar. This is how we use "know". This is what we call 
knowledge. 
1. P.I., I, § 288. 
2. L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty. 
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But this rule of grammar is not seen as the sole foundation or 
ground from which we judge. Somehow we pick up a general body of 
propositions which more or less all hold together, and these are the 
grounds from which we judge. One such proposition is sometimes 
expressed as "I know I have a hand". 
But Wittgenstein does not agree with this expression, for he says 
"... What we have here is a foundation for all my action. But it 
seems to me that it is wrongly expressed by the words 'I know'." 1 
And the reasons for this rest in the following passages from On 
Certainty. 
"If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is 
not true, nor yet false." 2 
"... About certain empirical propositions no doubt can 
exist if making judgements is to be possible at all. 
Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything l 
that has the form of an empirical proposition one.' 
"Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into 
one another?" 4 
i.e., we find that there is no sharp boundary between rule and empiri-
cal proposition, so that there are cases where "I know" is redundant 
in empirical propositions such as "I know I have a hand". This 
redundancy to be consistent must be said to be neither empirical nor 
logical, for there would be no sharp boundary between these two 
types of redundancy. 
But instead of using the language of redundancy, or saying that 
"I know" is functionless he wants to show that "I know" is functionless. 
E.g., "I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical proposi-
tions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all 
operating with thoughts (with language) - This observation is not of 
1. Op.cit., § 414. 3. Op.cit., § 308. 
2. Op.cit., § 205. 4. Op.cit., § 309. 
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the form 'I know...'. 'I know ...' states what / know, and that is 
not of logical interest." 1 
"What is the proof that I know something? Most certainly not 
my saying I know it." 2 
It is rather the way in which we act which shows that we know 
something. So he says "Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that 
in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of 
language, then you will see it." 3 So at this point we cannot say that 
"I know" is functionless. This is just as bad as saying "I know" has 
a function. These things cannot be described, they can only be shown. 
E.g., "Moore's mistake lies in this - countering the assertion that one 
cannot know that, by saying 'I do know it'." 4 Moore should have pointed 
out how weact with the proposition "I have a hand". 
But he seems to go back a little on this. E.g., "... it seems 
impossible to say in any individual case that such-and-such must be 
beyond doubt if there is to be a language game - though it is right 
enough to say that as a rule some empirical judgement or other must be 
beyond doubt." 5 "Whatever may happen in the future, however() water 
may behave in the future - we know that up to now it has behaved thus 
in innumerable circumstances. This fact is fused into the foundations 
of our language game." 6 There he used "know" in a case which perhaps 
should be.one of those in which the use of "know" is seen to be 
functionless. Or perhaps here the way in which water behaves is 
not as vital a part of the foundations as the fact that I have a 
hand. If water began to behave differently the foundations would be 
cracked, but if I turned out not to have hands where to all appearances 
I still had them, this casts doubt on all observations. Thus he 
1 . Op.cit., § 401. 4. Op.cit., § 521. 
2. Op.cit., § 487. 5. Op.cit., § 519. 
3. Op.cit., § 501. 6. Op.cit., § 558. 
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says "I have a right to say 'I can't be making a mistake about this' 
even if I am in error".
1 
But what if what I have always called my hands turned out to be 
some sort of systematic illusion and in fact I have no hands. Then, 
given that there are no contrary reasons, everything would be in 
question, anything might be the victim of this systematic illusion. 
I could not even say that I knew I had no hands for I might be wrong 
about that also. "Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt." 2 
I said "given that there are no contrary reasons" because one 
could perhaps give good reasons why the illusion only applied to hands, 
that the illusion was an evolutionary advantage, and that it was 
caused by some definite brain structure. In that way one might come 
to say "I know I have no hands". Though the usual sentiment is, "if 
I cannot be certain that I have hands then what can I be certain of? • 
- 
For all that I believe Wittgenstein's elimination of "I know" 
from "I know I have a hand" is still debatable. Firstly it is plain 
that the elimination is not based on a straight out logical redundancy. 
Rather it is a close approximation to logical redundancy. The second 
point arises from the impact of § 519.3 On the one hand "I have a 
hand" is treated as a ground from which we judge and is a statement 
we have a right to hold onto no matter what, and on the other it too 
is not beyond doubt. If it is not beyond doubt then "I know" gets 
a foothold. Thirdly one can envisage situations in which someone 
may say "I know I have a hand" and turn out to be wrong. E.g., some-
one confused after an operation or an accident may have lost his 
hands and yet still aver that he has hands. Or a pianist after an 
1. Op.-cit., § 663. 3. Op.cit. 
2. Op.cit., § 519. 
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accident may stare at his hands and say - "I know I've still got my 
hands". 
In normal circumstances Wittgenstein's viewpoint seems plausible, 
the plausibility depending on whether one is against a sharp boundary 
between analytic and synthetic or not. 
If one can get around private language problems and over the 
expressive use hypothesis then there would be a good case for treating 
"I know I am in pain" along the same lines as Wittgenstein treats 
"I know I have a hand". But one must be reminded that the elimination 
of "know" is different from and much more subtle in On Certainty 
than in The Blue Book and the Philosophical Investigations. 
8. Relationship between the Incorrigibility_Thesis and  
Grammatical Rules  
But in fact in The Blue Book Wittgenstein believes that his 
conclusion follows from a grammatical rule. Statements like "I must 
know that I am in pain", "Only I can •know that I am in pain", look 
like experiential or empirical statements, but are really rules for 
the way in which we use the words "pain" and "know". By examining 
language we find that the rules supposedly are that "pain" only applies 
to that which is known and known by one person. Whether this appeal 
to rules is right or not I do not know, but it is useful to realize 
that the rules would not be of much use if they did not have appli-
cation to the world. This is analogous to the theoretical calculus 
with no application or interpretation - it isuseless. So the rules 
of our language need to be useful in describing the actual world. 
If "pain" meant a sensation of one person only known to others, the 
word would be useless, for "pain" would apply to nothing at all 
In fact the rules were developed with what had to be described in 
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view, so they in fact have good application. This makes one wonder 
whether the appeal to rules really hides an appeal to the way the 
world is, and that Wittgenstein's insight into the functionlessness 
of "know" and "I know I am in pain" does not rest on grammatical 
rules but on the incorrigibility thesis. What I mean is that the 
incorrigibility thesis has only more recently come to be more widely 
questioned, so that if one was previously an adherent to the incorri-
gibility thesis one would have accepted as a fact of the world that 
one could not be wrong about knowing one's own sensations. Then 
when Wittgenstein comes along with his argument about "know" being 
functionless, we are inclined to believe him, not because we suddenly 
notice the rules that he appeals to, but because we believe the 
incorrigibility thesis and the rules would appear to fit a world in 
which the incorrigibility thesis was true. The plausibility of Witt-
genstein's appeal to rules here -rests on our . natural bias towards 
the incorrigibility thesis. But even so we have seen that the incorri-
gibility thesis does not-provide us with the necessary premiss for 
Wittgenstein's argument. 
But in making the certainty of "I know I am in pain" a grammati-
cal point it looks as though perhaps it is logically necessary. Given 
our present rules for the usage of "know" and "pain", "I am in pain" 
is logically equivalent to "I know I am in pain", so "knowl! is logi-
cally redundant. Only how is it to be said that the rules for usage 
of "know" and "pain" are such that there is this logical tie made 
between them. What the rules are is to be found out by observation 
of,theworkings of language. Thus we start by examining the different 
ways in which "I know I am in pain" has a use,, and from this one sees 
what the rules are. So firstly we should find that "know" is redundant 
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and then that will show what the rule is. Wittgenstein talks as if 
the metaphysician is making a rule up, or that what he says "hides 
a grammatical rule",
1 
e.g., "You say that you don't wish to apply the 
phrase 'he has got my pain' or. 'we both have the same pain', and 
instead, perhaps, you will apply such a phrase as 'his pain is exactly 
like mine'."
2 
For him exposing this rule shows that "know" is 
redundant, whereas it is the redundancy of "know" which exposes the 
rule. 
The trouble is that there are situations in which it seems to 
make perfectly good sense to say "I know I am in pain", i.e., in 
which "know" is not redundant, e.g., the problem of stating whether 
you know you are sincere or not. 
9. Austin's Criticisms of the Incorrigibility Thesis'  
Another way in which "know" is not redundant in "I know I am 
in pain" stems from Austin's criticism of the incorrigibility of first 
person present tense sensation statements. Allowing for a couple of 
points, i.e., a man may lie, or be a victim of misnaming concerning 
his sensation reports (this is not an exhaustive list), it is not 
otherwise possible for him to be wrong in his sensation reports. 
To counter this Austin cites cases where we are not sure what to call 
a particular colour, sound, smell, taste or feeling. It is hard to 
find cases where we find it difficult to call a red colour "red". 
"But take magenta: looks rather like magenta to me - but then 
I wouldn't be too sure about distinguishing magenta from mauve or 
from heliotrope. Of course I know in a way it's purplish, but I don't 
really know whether to say it's magenta or not: I just can't be sure 
1. The Blue Book, p. 55. 2. Op.cit., p. 54. 
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Similar examples are also brought up on p. 42 and p.113 of 
Sense and Sensibilia. 2 He gives examples of tastes - 
(a) some quite new taste not like .anything experienced before, and 
(b) a taste not quite like one we know, i.e., a sensory discrimination 
task,' 
It is difficult also to think of having trouble calling a pain 
sensation a pain, and yet when we are being vigorously tickled it is 
sometimes hard to tell whether the tickle is still a tickle or has 
become a pain. "Any description of a taste or sound or smell (or 
colour) or of a feeling, involves (is) saying that it is like one or 
some that we have experienced before: any descriptive word is classi-
ficatory, involves recognition and in that sense memory, and only 
when we use such words (or names or descriptions, which came down to 
the same) are we knowing anything,. or believing anything. But 
memory and recognition are often uncertain and unreliable." 3 
We must remember that to be mistaken about a particular sensation 
being a pain or something else is almost as unlikely as being mis-
taken about whether a colour is a sound, or a sound a smell. Imagine 
being presented with a colour and being asked "Is this a colour or 
a sound or a smell", and then getting it wrong. There just do not 
seem to be any unsharp boundaries between these sensory modalities. 
Perhaps someone in a state of synaesthesia might get confused. A 
straight out pain is just as unlikely to be misclassified. We might 
be unsure about whether it is really an ache or a stab, as we may 
be unsure as to whether a colour is heliotrope or magenta. The tickle 
may become painful, but so may a loud sound, or even a clash of 
1. J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, "Other Minds", p.59. 
2. J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 
3. J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, "Other Minds", p.60. 
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colour, or an odour. In the first case however presumably the tickle 
gives way to the existence of the pain, whereas in the others the 
pain co-exists with the sound, colour or odour. 
"I am in pain" •is such a non-specific statement that it would 
be hard for the genuine utterer to go wrong. For the less we claim, 
the less the chance of error. 
It is like the claim "I see something" - it is made true by see-
ing anything, or "I hear a sound" is made true by hearing any sound. 
We do go wrong in such cases, e.g., I say "I hear a sound", and 
on listening more carefully I might say, "No, I couldn't have after 
all". Such claims are modified with respect to visual objects, and 
they also can be modified with respect to pain, only there are rarely 
occasions on which it is appropriate to do so. 
Perhaps one occasion would be testing for tenderness, where at 
first pressing anywhere on the abdomen results in a pain claim, but 
on further relaxation the recognised tender area becomes more local-
ised, and what was previously claimed to be tender is now denied to 
have been so. 
If I am more specific in my pain claim, e.g., "I have a mild 
burning pain at the top of my stomach" then there are more ways in 
which the claim can be false. The pain might actually be not so mild, 
and it may be really at the bottom of my chest and also slightly in 
the back. 
There is usually not much point then in saying "I know I am in 
pain" as distinct from "I am in pain", for it is usually obvious that 
you must know it. But in cases where the pain is barely perceptible 
one may say with some justification, when the pain increases, "Before 
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I didn't  know I was in pain (it wasn't definite enough to call it 
"pain") but now I know I am". 
In Chapter X of Sense and Sensibilia, Austin is trying to show 
that generally there is no sharp division from the viewpoint of cer-
tainty between statements which are usually held to be incorrigible 
and those which are corrigible. We can be just as certain or uncertain 
with respect to both. E.g., we might say that the so-called incorrig-
ible statemens only refer with respect to the present moment, and 
the corrigible statements refer with respect to all time, and that 
is a way of distinguishing them. There is thus another way for the 
corrigible to be wrong - they may be wrong with respect to future time 
as well as the present. But the so-called incorrigible statements 
may still be wrong with respect to the present. 
Splitting off a class of statements in this way does not make 
them incorrigible. To decide whether a statement is incorrigible or 
not Austin takes an ordinary language stance. A statement is incorrig-
ible if no further proof for it is reasonably needed. For each parti-
cular case we have some idea of when the number of tests required is 
ample, and that certainly the number of tests required is not regarded 
as being infinite. So he comes to the conclusion that descriptions 
of present sensations and descriptions of material objects may both 
be corrigible or incorrigible depending on whether you have the 
number of proofs required. 
But the relevant point in the present context is that first 
person present tense sensations statements are to a large extent in 
the same boat as statements about the physical world. 
10. The Electroencephalogram (E.E.G.) Argument 
More recently there has been another argument put forward against 
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the incorrigibility of sincere avowals about present sensations and 
feelings - the electroencephalogram argument. Two steps to the argu-
ment are made out. 
1. There is no necessary connection between sincere avowals and 
present sensations and feelings. 
_ 2. Situations are imagined where evidence or brain states would 
override the sincere avowal. 
Let us imagine some possibilities of the use of an imagined 
instrument,an autocerebroscope
1 
which could tell me about my brain 
states. I try and correlate my avowals with my brain states. Several 
possible results could occur. 
1. Complete correlation occurs. Sincere avowals of pain for example 
are correlated with a particular type of brain state, and 
shamming, lying and known mistakes are associated with non-
correlation with that particular type of brain state. 
2. There is no correlation whatever. Sincere avowals have no 
particular associated brain state. The autocerebroscope is 
useless as an indicator of correctness. 
3. Correlation occurs most of the time but at times there is a 
breakdown in the correlation. This is the important possibility, 
for the breakdown in correlation may indicate otherwise unknown 
mistakes. 
Now what would make us say that someone had made a mistake as 
indicated by the autocerebroscope. Well if he could now on reflection 
say sincerely that he had made a mistake, then there would be no 
argument that he had not. But if he could not at all say that he had 
1 . P.E. Meehl:ifiMind Matter and Method: (Se e biblio,r4rhy) 
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• made a mistake, but continued to avow that what he had was a pain and 
not a tickle as the autocerebroscope had indicated then we might be 
at a loss as to know what to say. The decision would depend for 
one thing on just how much information about the brain we had. If all 
we had was that the brainstate was that type usually associated with 
tickles I think that we would regard the avowal as having precedence 
over the autocerebroscope and say that sometimes pains are associated 
with brain states which are usually of the tickle type. There need 
not be any necessary connection between mental events and brain states. 
It is as certain as can be by introspection that it was a pain and 
not a tickle, and it is certain by observation by myself and others 
that the brain state was a tickle type. This would be evidence 
against a 100% correlation between a particular mental event (a 
sensation of pain), and a particular brain state (of the pain type). 
Also we are supposing that the subject sincerely believes that he is 
experiencing pain, when the brainstate is that of a tickle. So if 
we are to then say that the subject was mistaken, and instead of 
feeling pain he was feeling a tickle, this tickle would be something 
of which no one at all believed that he felt. Other observers did 
not feel the tickle and the.subject also says he did not feel it. 
The tickle must therefore be an utterly unconscious tickle, and I take 
it that here such notions as unconsaious tickles and unconscious pains 
are pointless, if not nonsensical. 
This result is in accord with Meehl's way of dealing with the 
problem of a brain state in one person giving rise to a raw feel of 
red, and a similar brain state in another person giving rise to a raw 
feel of green. He_imagines an experiment whereby Utopian neurosurgery 
disconnects the brain state, giving rise to a red raw feel, from the 
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tokening mechanism and connects in its place the brain state giving 
rise to &green raw feel. The brain state and the green raw feel are 
presumed to both have causal consequences for the tokening mechanism, 
so that the subject responds to this novel stimulus, indicating that 
he is tempted to say "red" but that in fact he must say "green" because 
it is green that he is experiencing. 
Meehl does not believe that any such circumstance would arise, 
because he believes in the "same cause, same effect" principle. He 
would look for and believe that there was some reason for the same type 
of brain state giving rise to two different types of raw feel. The 
finding of a reason gives the autocerebroscope autonomy over the avowal. 
Meehl's introductory case on mistokening ends with the finding of just 
such a reason. A brain biopsy is performed and a defect found in the 
connection between the brain state giving rise to the raw feel, and 
the tokening mechanism. "These mistokenings 'seem right' at the time 
..." for "... to 'seem wrong' a mistokening must occur farther along 
the intracerebral causal chain . 11 1 ; 
Having found such a defect the possible additional cause of 
the mistokening, i.e., that really a different raw feel did arise 
from the same brain state type, thus making it not a mistokening, 
could be ruled out by Occam's razor. 
We have then the hypothetical result that an autocerebroscope 
plus a Utopian brain biopsy could give us good reason for rejecting 
the incorrigibility of a person's statement about his own raw feels. 
Perhaps "sometimes my raw feels seem to be green when they are in 
fact red".
2 
Being able to imagine this case becoming actual estab-
lishes that there is no necessary connection between sincere avowals 
1. Op.cit., p. 119. 2. Op.cit., p.119. 
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and present sensations and feelings. Of course when in fact we have 
plenty of cases of mistokening raw feels, the above result is of 
pretty small moment, as if one said "it is possible that there are 
dogs" when everywhere dogs are abounding. Only if such mistokenings 
are rare does the E.E.G. argument start to have force. 
The autocerebroscope then is not front line support in the case 
against incorrigibility. Most of the cases of mistakes that it would 
show up are already shown up by memory, and so the instrument is not 
needed. E.g., the case of "the man in a train wreck who fails to 
size up properly his own feelings, believing himself to be in pain 
when, actually, he is only feeling sorry for himself") On reflection 
he remembers that he was confused and not in pain at all, but only 
feeling sorry for himself. Or the example of the drunk patient, 
having a history of self deceptive malingering, who when he crashed 
his car at night picked himself up, staggered all over the road and 
jumped into the blackberries yelling, "I:m dead, I'm dead". On 
reflection he would probably remember that at the time he was having 
sensations of one sort or another and that therefore his statements 
amounting to denial of consciousness permanently were false. 
The autocerebroscope may however be of some use as an aid to 
memory, acting as a jolt to our memories, making us remember, or giv-
ing us a reason for trying to remember where before we had none. Or 
in situations where we cannot remember what happened, e.g., after the 
development of amnesia surrounding the time of an accident the auto-
cerebroscope record may be our only evidence for the occurrence of a 
mistake. 
1. G. Sheridan, VI, "The electroencephalogram Argument AOainst 
Incorrigibility", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol .6, 
No.1, January 1969, p.62. (He heard of this case from Professor 
Urmson.) 
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11. Sheridan's Objection to the E.E.G. Argument  
Sheridan considers an objection to the E.E.G. argument against 
incorrigibility. "A Wittgensteinian might readily reply that the 
presence of evidence of the sort just mentioned would constitute a 
preHuding circumstance, a circumstance in which a person's avowal 
would not normally be taken as criterial evidence of his sensation."
1 
Now Meehl gives a list of precluding circumstances - lying, mis-
speaking, aphasia, slovenly language training, previous misreading 
a German-English dictionary, ? "having a Freudian slip, being drugged, 
obeying a post-hypnotic suggestion".
3 
Sheridan - against his own 
position reduces the impact of the E.E.G. argument to another item 
on this list. 
Meehl suggests that the list so far cannot be claimed to be 
complete, so the incorrigibility thesis reduces to the triviality 
"An egocentric raw feel tokening is legitimate unless something causes 
it to be made illegitimately". 4. Sheridan indicates that the Wittgen-
steinian reply may be that we distinguish between countervailing 
evidence to a person's avowal, and evidence which precludes us from 
taking his avowal as criterial. Thus autocerebroscopic data alone 
may be countervailing evidence,'and so the avowal remains criterial, 
whereas evidence of brain malfunction precludes taking the avowal as 
criterial. This sort of approach seems to be in line with what I 
said before about Meehl's treatment of the problem of one brain state 
type giving rise to different raw feels red and green in different 
persons, where the avowal remained criterial. For these, there was 
only the countervailing evidence of the autocerebroscope. Sheridan 
1. Op.cit., 	p. 66. 3. Op.cit., p. 132. 
2. P.E. Meehl, Op.cit., 4)„110. 4. Op.cit., p. 133. 
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then concludes that probably the E.E.G. argument is stronger if it 
restricts evidence to autocerebroscopic data (countervailing evidence) 
and leaves out the brain malfunction (precluding evidence). 
Rather than this I think we are left with a dilemma. On the one 
hand the autocerebroscopic data alone are only countervailing evidence 
and thus the avowal remains criterial or incorrigible. On the other 
hand the brain malfunction precludes us taking the avowal as criterial 
or incorrigible. 
But surely the important point is that the claim that an avowal 
is incorrigible or criterial depends upon another claim which is corri-
gible, viz., that there is no precluding evidence. To establish that 
one would have to establish that the list of possible precluding 
evidence is comOlete and that none of the members of the list applied 
in the particular case. 
12. An Empirical Claim is the Basis for the Logical Exclusion of  
Doubt  
The same point can be got at in a different way. The sceptical 
arguments against the logical possibility of empirical knowledge can 
be countered by the antisceptic by an appeal to the use of the word 
"know". When "know" is used in the context of knowing - such and such 
an empirical fact ("Men have landed on the moon", or "the speed of 
light is approximately 186,000 miles per second") such knowledge is 
not supposed or expected to have the certainty which concerns logically 
necessary statements. It is not in everyday parlance expected that 
empirical knowledge has the certainty of mathematics or the certainty 
of definitions (e.g., a triangle is a plain figure 'bounded by three 
straight sides) or the supposed incorrigibility of first person 
sensation statements !!I am in pain". 
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The knowledge that I have a hand is not known with the certainty 
of mathematics, definitions or first person sensation statements, 
but to talk of it not being knowledge because of a logical possibility 
of being wrong or an extremely unlikely empirical possibility of 
being wrong, is not in accord with our normal usage of the word "know". 
Also the certainty of first Person present tense sensation state-
ments is not known with the same certainty as mathematics or defini-
tions. We break off this class of statements from other empirical 
statements because one kind of mistake is not possible. Logically 
if no claims are made beyond the present state of affairs, then mis-
take in that area is ruled out, i.e., if no claim then no mistake. 
But we have seen that there are many other ways in which first person 
present tense sensation statements can be wrong, and this is some-
thing we find out empirically. 
I said that "if no claims are made beyond the present state of 
affairs then mistake in that area is ruled out". But it is an 
empirical claim that in these cases no claims are made beyond the 
present state of affairs, so the logical point here obviously rests 
upon an empirical claim. Logic alone has not precluded mistake. 
Could we be wrong then in our empirical claim (that no claims are 
made beyond the present state of affairs)? I suppose it is logically 
possible to be wrong here, or that there is a minute empirical possi-
bility of being wrong. (E.g., perhaps the other mistakes possible 
are possible because they are claims beyond the present state of 
affairs). But that does not stop us saying "I know I am in pain". 
But neither does it give the ground for saying that logically doubt 
is ruled out here and so to speak of knowledge in this context is 
senseless. The doubt is ruled out in the first place empirically and 
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the logical point rests on this. 
13. Shutting Out Doubt  
Wittgenstein's final move now is that "Doubting has an end" 1 
and "But, if you are certain, isn't it that you are shutting your eyes 
in the face of doubt? - They are shut." 2 In Malcolm's words "There 
is a concept of certainty in these language games only because we stop 
short of what is conceivable"
3 
 Of course the reasonable thing to 
do is to stop doubting, but it is hard to see why this should make 
an avowal incorrigible or criterial. 
Need we say that endless doubts preclude the concept of another's 
being in pain. Malcolm4 indicates that the endless doubter would have 
no criterion of another's being in pain. But he might be able to 
imagine criteria, e.g., the avowal said in appropriate circumstances 
and all his doubts removed. He has criteria of anothers being in 
pain as he has criteria for something being a unicorn. Just as we 
have the concept df a unicorn without there ever being an actual one, 
so we can have a concept of another being in pain without him ever 
being in pain. 
What are we to say when we shut our eyes in the face of doubt 
and take someone's avowal as criterial, and then find out that he had 
a brain malfunction. According to the Old concept of- pain he was in pain, 
and that still must stand. So we will have to have a new concept of 
pain which involves as acriterion having precluded brain malfunctions.. 
So in a way Wittgenstein has allowed for new doubts by allowing 
1. 	II, p. 180. 2. P.-T., II, p. 224. 
3. Modern Studies in Philosophy. A collection of critical essays. 
Wittgenstein The Philosophical Investigations, Editor, 
George Pitcher, p. 88. 
4. Op.cit., p. 89. 
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for new concepts. But we might reply to him as he replied to us on 
a different occasion - There is "no objection to adopting a symbolism 
... What, however, is wrong, is to think that I can justify this 
choice of notation."
1 
In other words, trying to shut out doubt by 
fixing criteria does not remove doubt. 
14. Criticism of One of Armstrong's Points  
Armstrong uses Wittgenstein's argument against the function of 
"I know" in "I know I am in pain" to support his argument against 
incorrigibility. I think this is a wrong use of the argument for 
Wittgenstein does not want to establish that "I am in pain" is corri-
gible, but that the claim of incorrigibility is really a claim about 
rules, e.g., "... it means nothing to doubt whether - I am in pain! ... 
we shall think something like, he does not know what the English word 
'pain' means .. u 2. Also I have indicated that this claim possibly 
and spuriously rests upon •the incorrigibility thesis itself. 
If "I am in pain" is corrigible as Armstrong is trying to establish 
then "know" should have a function in "I know I am in pain". But the 
corrigibility of "I am in pain" is supposed to rest on Wittgenstein's 
thesis that "know" has no function in "I know I am in pain". So if 
"know" has no function here, then know does have a function here - 
which is nonsense. So Wittgenstein's argument does not support Arm-
strong's against incorrigibility. 
15. The Incorrigibility Thesis does not support Grammatical Rules  
The main purpose of Wittgenstein's appeal to rules was to explain 
away the metaphysical. The incorrigibility of avowals was supposed 
I. The Blue Books, p. 66. 2. P.1., § 288. 
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by the metaphysician to be a basic truth about reality, a basis on 
which to build. Wittgenstein's appeal to rules was supposed to make 
the metaphysician's claim not a claim about reality but a claim 
about language. 
But we saw first that the incorrigibility thesis was not itself 
strong enough to make Wittgenstein's appeal to rules plausible, and 
then later that the incorrigibility thesis itself was false. Thus the 
original stimulus to Wittgenstein's appeal to rules in the context 
of the incorrigibility thesis has been rendered harmless. 
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VI. THE EXPRESSIVE USE HYPOTHESIS 
1. The Expressive Use Analysis as a basis for the Senselessness  
of "I know". 
Of course if Wittgenstein's analysis of "I am in pain" as an 
expression analogous to natural pain behaviour were right, this too 
would be a ground for saying that "know" has no function here. At 
least it would have no normal referring function. Its only function 
could be emphasis in the form of additional pain behaviour, "I know 
I am in pain" perhaps being more impressive to others than just "I 
am in pain". 
2. Criticism of Cook. 
Cook in his article "Wittgenstein on Privacy' tries to show what 
Wittgenstein meant by-saying 'J know I am in pain" is senseless. He 
does this by pointing out the case where it would be pointless for 
someone to say to someone else "I know it is raining" as opposed to 
just "It is raining", i.e., the case where the informer is in as good 
a position as anyone would normally want to tell if it was raining, 
and the other person could see that he was in that position. This 
sort of pointlessness he says would be a case of senselessness. It 
would however still be possible to convey something by "I know" if 
the person who he is informing was not in a position to see how certain 
the informer was. It is different with "I am in pain" however, for 
no one can doubt that the 'informer is in the position to tell that 
he is in pain .  So the addition of "I know" . here —is really senseless. 
1. Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations. Ed. G.Pitcher, 
pp. 286-323. 
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Cook's second example is that of comparing "I feel a pain in my 
knee" to "I feel a stone in my shoe". We want to say, he says, that 
the man with a pain in his knee must know he has a pain, whereas 
there is a possibility that there is not a stone in his shoe. But 
this is the wrong contrast he says. The contrast is that it makes sense 
to speak of ignorance and knowledge, doubt and certainty, in the case 
of the stone in the shoe, but it is - nonsense to speak in this way of 
the pain. He says that he has only tried to clarify Wittgenstein's 
point and that to argue for it he would have to somehow show the 
"incorrigibility" (in inverted commas) of first person sensation 
statements such as "I am in pain": 
There seem to be two main ways of taking the sentence "I am in 
pain": 
1. "I am in pain" refers to a pain, 
2. "I am in pain" is an expression of pain. 
If we use "I know" in the first case it seems possible to misclassify 
an experience such as pain. There are experiences which one may not 
be certain as to whether it is a pain or a tickle, or both. One is 
certain here that one is having something, but whether to call it a 
pain or not is doubtful. There is also the case where the pain is very 
slight. Sometimes here you may not be certain whether you have the 
pain or not. A slight pain may not be noticed at first. However, in 
the case of a full blooded pain it is unreasonable to doubt that it 
is pain. Here one could say that one is certain that one is in pain. 
But it is just this expression of certainty that Cook says Wittgen-
stein is denying. As the expression of uncertainty is said to be 
senseless, so too then is the expression of certainty. 
Now Wittgenstein is denying not only that the word "pain" names 
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a private sensation, but also that the sentence "I am in pain" is a 
proper descriptive,Sentence at all. -,The words "I am in pain" rather 
are words which replace the natural primitive expressions of pain. 
One reason then that Wittgenstein says that "I know I am in pain" , is 
senseless is not that the word "pain" refers to a private item about 
which the expression of doubt is senseless, but rather that "I know 
am in pain" is grammatically misleading. It is something like saying 
"I know that ouch". 
Cook then is saying that first person sensation statements are 
somehow "incorrigible" and that it is this which makes expressions 
of doubt and certainty about them senseless. I have argued that in 
any case it is conceivable to doubt whether one is in pain or not. 
But I think Cook's attitude is ambivalent. On the one hand he talks in 
terms of showing, not proving "incorrigibility" and that this might 
be done in a Wittgensteinian fashion by an analysis of grammar. On 
the other he feels that counter-cases of someone making a mistake about 
being in pain need answering. The Wittgenstein of The Blue and Brown 
Books is responsible for this ambivalence. For the counter-cases can 
easily seem to assume that "pain" refers to a pain, as "rain" refers 
to rain, and the answers,seem to be that you just cannot be mistaken 
about any such pains we refer to. 
But the answer should be that "pain" does not refer to pain, so 
mistakes are ruled out by the grammar of the word "pain". (There might 
be a further question as to the appropriateness of the expression of 
-.9 In other words, Cook is here in danger, as Wittgen-
stein was, of arguing for incorrigibility for reasons other than 
grammatical ones. As if the case of pain was like the case of it 
raining only in the case of pain one can argue that empirically or 
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logically there is no situation in which when in pain I do not know 
I am in pain. I think considerations like these are important, but 
if you are taking Wittgenstein's other line (expressive use), they 
should not be, for he stops at the expression of sensation and says 
that knowledge and doubt do not apply to that. (Empirical questions 
would become important again if it be allowed that you can ask questions 
about the appropriateness of the.expression.) 
3. A Paradox in Wittgenstein  
If Wittgenstein thought that "I am in pain" was incorrigible 
because all empirical doubts had been excluded, or because of the 
rules of "know", then he would be in a paradoxical position with regard 
to the private language arguments. The paradox is that on the one 
hand "I am in pain" is incorrigible, and on the other hand "I am in 
pain" cannot be said to be correct, for the concept of correctness 
just does not apply. This is because of the absence of public checking, 
although he makes it look as though it is a memory problem. Wittgen-
stein gets out of this paradox by showing that "I am in pain" is 
incorrigible because the concept of "correct" does not apply to 
expressive behaviour. Which really means that it is not incorrigible 
at all, only that it looked as though it was because we were not 
clear about its grammar. 
4. Possible Analogy between the Analysis of Thought and Pain  
How can one reject Wittgenstein's private language arguments 
and still retain his rejection of knoWing that one is thinking by 
apprehending inner speech or other imagery? For if we reject the 
private language arguments then perhaps we should say that we know 
what we are thinking by a recognition of an inner private item. One 
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might say "I know I feel hot" and similarly one might say "I know that 
I just had the thought that a concrete slab in the ground is cheaper 
than conventional flooring" or "I know that I had the thought of the 
opening bars in Mahler's 3rd". Declarations of sensations and thoughts 
seem to be on a par, both are descriptive of what private events 
just occurred. 
But Wittgenstein sees thinking as being a much wider concept than 
description of inner events. We tell that others are thinking not by 
apprehending their inner processes, but by seeing their words in an 
appropriate context. The behaviour and environment must fit the words, 
and if they do not then we are being deceived, not that it is ever 
easy to tell. 
We often tell in our own case that we are thinking not by an 
inspection of an inner process but by nothing at all. We just know 
straight off, as we sometimes know our intentions not from any 
occurrence in the mind, but just straight off. Wittgenstein does not 
reject that inward speech and imagery do occur, but only that recogni-
tion of such things are the sole basis for attributing thoughts to 
someone, even ourselves. For Wittgenstein the meaning of "thinking" 
is given by the use. There is no essence to thinking. It is not the 
inner process alone. It'is doubtful whether the inner process could 
count in the concept at all, to be consistent with Wittgenstein's 
private language reasons. But at least now the concept of thinking 
is more general, to cover more than just the occurrence of a private 
item. So now we realize that I may be mistaken when I say "I know 
that I was just thinking such and such", for further reflection may 
make me realize that one was thinking something else, e.g., of 
Mahler's 2nd. instead of Mahler's 3rd. symphony. 
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May not the analysis "I know that I am in pain" show that 
similar mistakes are possible? What I wanted to say was this. That 
there were those who held that by private access to their thoughts 
they could hold that a sincere statement describing just those thoughts 
must be true. Through Wittgenstein's analysis it is found that the 
truth of a self made statement describing one's own thoughts often 
depends upon behavioural criteria as well, or perhaps entirely, or 
perhaps on no criteria at all. Here we have not changed thought, 
nor the meaning of the word "thought", but have by analysis elucidated 
some of the criteria for the truth of statements about thoughts. 
So if someone now says "I know what I was just thinking" this 
turns out to be a statement which is not incorrigible as first thought 
but as true or false depending perhaps on appropriate behavioural 
criteria. So it turns out that "I know" here has a use. 
How is the person who says "I know I am in pain" then supposed 
to know that there is not another Wittgensteinian analysis of "pain" 
analogous to the analysis of "thought". For if there was one then 
he could quite well be wrong in saying "I know I am in pain". Indeed 
it is held that the truth of "I am in pain" depends upon one's 
behaviour or disposition to behave in a certain way. If you are 
smiling and happy it is not a pain but a pain-like sensation. 
5. The Expressive Use Analysis must extend to "I". 
To help support the expressive use analysis I suppose one could 
extend the reasoning leading to seeing "I know" as redundant or 
functionless in "I know I am in pain". One could go on in a Wittgen-
steinian fashion - what does "I" refer to here? Surely not to myself, 
for who else could be having the pain if it is me sincerely saying 
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that I am in pain. If there is no one else that could possibly be the 
I but myself, then "I" as a referring word in "I am in pain" is 
redundant, understood and functionless. What about "am"? It appears 
to refer to the present moment. But if sincere then it could not be 
otherwise than the present moment so "am" is redundant. "In" has no 
referring function .here anyway and "pain" is similar to "I", in that 
the sensation could not be other than Oain if I am sincere in what I 
say. So it Loo. should be eliminated. The referring function of 
"I know I am in pain" has been shown to be nonexistent, and so it 
remains to say what function it has. Well, expressive use is all that 
is left. 
Wittgenstein does make moves of this type in The Blue Book where 
he makes it clear that the possibility of error concerning whether 
it is I or someone else who feels the pain when I say "I am in pain" 
is ruled out logically, by,the rules of our grammar. 
"On the other hand, there is no question of recognising a person 
when I say I have toothache. To ask "are you sure that it's you who 
have pains?' would be nonsensical. Now, when in this case no error 
is possible, it is because the move which we might be inclined to 
think of as an error, a 'bad move', is no move in the game at all . 
This ideals then mysteriously linked to the statement that the 
word "I" here has no normal referring function to the person but that 
it functions as part of a moan. 
"To say, 'I have pain' is no more a statement about a particular 
person than moaning is. 'But surely the word 'I' in the mouth of a 
man refers to the man who says it; it points to himself; and very 
often a man who says it actually points to himself with his finger.' 
1. The Blue Book, p.67. 
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But it was quite superfluous to point to himself." 
We get the idea that by saying "I am in pain" the "I" is only 
serving to attract attention to himself, that it does not refer to 
himself. 
A good case could be made out for error being ruled out logically, 
a case which may weaken if certain other considerations are taken into 
account. One may be uncertain that I am I. 
ImaOnelaChristian martyr about to be crucified. He may believe 
that he himself is about to feel the same pains as Christ did. He may 
even imagine himself to be Christ, so completely does he identify him-
self with Him. As the nails go in he says "I am in pain" and means 
that He, Christ, is in pain, for that is who he thinks he is. But in 
fact it is not Christ in pain, but the martyr, so he was wrong when 
he said "I am in pain". Here there is a question of recognising a 
person. 
It is true that one can imagine himself to be someone else having 
certain feelings. UsuaIlSr;one is not completely under the spell of 
one's imaginings, but it is possible that one could be deluded com-
pletely. Sometimes in certain situations one can wonder whether it 
is me who is here. On first arrival in a strange place one has only 
heard of one might wonder,"Is it really me who is now in Singapore?" 
Analogously "Is it really me undergoing this agony?" 
Thus here I do not think that error is ruled out logically, but 
if it was then "I" becomes logically redundant. This means that the 
function of "I" whatever it is is already catered for by someone say-
ing in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate behaviour "Am 
in pain". But this does not mean that the whole circumstances - 
1. Op.cit., p. 67. 
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surroundings, behaviour and linguistic behaviour - do not contain a 
reference to a. person, whether a person is a mind or body or a human 
being. The existence of this referring function is still to be 
decided, but if it does exist then "I" still has this referring function, 
whether logically.redundant or not. The fact that error has been 
ruled out, by that fact alone we cannot say that "I" does not refer 
to a person. 
The same applies to the argument concerning "know". If "know" 
is logically redundant here that does not mean that "know" has no 
reference when used in "I know I am in pain", rather the reference of 
"know" is already part of the reference of "I am in pain", for it is 
held, falsely I believe, that the grammar of "pain" is such that when 
I say correctly "I am in .pain" then by definition I know I am in pain. 
Wittgenstein gives us several reasons for the adoption of the 
expressive use analysis of "I" in "I am in pain". Firstly, he elimin-
ates the I along Humean lines "... that of which I said it continued 
during all the experiences of seeing was not any particular entity 
"I", but the experience of seeing itself".
1 
But this sort of elimination of the I does not show that "I" 
does not refer to a person. It just shows that a person is not some 
experience accompanying all other experiences. 
Then he tries to show that the idea of a real I that inhabits my 
body is connected with misunderstanding the grammar of "I". "I" has 
two uses, one as object, e.g., "I have a bump on my forehead", and 
one as subject, e.g.,"I have toothache". He then says that error is 
possible with respect to the use of "I" as-object, but not with uses 
of "I" as subject. But we said before that this impossibility of 
1. The Blue Book, p. 63. 
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error has nothing to do with the.expressive use analysis. When I say 
"I am in pain" I am not informing myself that it is me who is in 
pain, but telling others. (Although in coming out of a state of bewild-
erment I may say "Yes it's me who is in pain, who is feeling this".) 
For others my statement shows that it is me and not someone else who 
is in pain. 
Then he says "I" does not mean "the person who is now speaking". 
But tHisis only a corollary of the expressive use analysis, for there 
"I" does not mean anything, whereas "the person who is now speaking" 
presumably does. 
Next it is said that "The mouth which says 'I' ... does not 
thereby point to anything") Yet "I" serves to attract attention 
for others, and to distinguish me from other people. It seems to be 
a verbal quibble to say that "I" then does not point to me, does not 
refer to me. 
Now although "The man who cries out with pain, or says that he 
has pain, doesn't choose the mouth which says it" 2 , that does not 
make "I" not refer to himself. 
Then we are reminded that a person may feel pain in another 
person's body. "I" then may be used to refer to my body, but that 
does not mean that when I usually use "I", I do not mean this person. 
Another reason given is that "by 'I', I don't wish to pick out 
one person (from amongst different persons)". 3 Well, for myself I do 
not, for it is obvious to me, but for someone else my statement about 
myself is useful in picking one out from amongst others. Wittgenstein 
1. Op.cit., p. 68. 3. Op.cit., p.68. 
2. Op.cit., p. 68. 
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says that this is a special use, but there seems to be no conclusive 
reason for why this is so. 
As "I" used as subject does not refer to a person's bodily 
characteristics, neither does it refers to an ego or a mind. If we 
say it does, Wittgenstein indicates that this use of "mind" is not our 
normal use of it. 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein asks "why need the pain have a 
bearer at all here?!"
1 
By eliminating the idea that it is the soul 
or the body which has pains we are inclined to think that "I" can 
refer to nothing at all. But Wittgenstein's important conclusion seems 
to be that "Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that 
it has pains" .2 
Now it may be asked what in all this does in fact show that "I" 
used as subject does not refer to a human being, myself. We have a 
list of peculiarities and the idea that "I" used as subject is like 
moaning, but there seems to be no conclusive connection between them. 
There is a tension in Wittgenstein between emphasising facts 
which escape notice because they are always before our eyes, and 
_ 
exTosing Widespread false ideas of language. Here the tension is 
towards the latter. 
6. Does Wittgenstein Reject the Expressive Use Hypothesis? 
• It is important to see that if Wittgenstein is to say that "I 
am in pain" is like a natural expression of pain, thenhe has to explain 
away the apparent referring functions of "I" and "pain". We have - 
seen how he tries to do it with "I". Now how does he go with "pain"? 
Let us begin by getting clearer on what Wittgenstein said about the 
1. P.I., I, § 283. 2. P.I., I, § 283. 
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analogy with' natural pain behaviour. He is concerned with how words 
refer to sensations. 
"Here is one possibility: words are connected with the 
primitive, the natural,-expressions of the sensation and 
used in their place. A child - has hurt himself and he cries; 
and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations 
and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain 
behaviour the verbal expression of pain replaces 
crying and does not describe it." 1 
Here the child is being taught to refer to his own sensations, 
when to say "I am in pain". Only the word "refer" here is cryptic, 
for we have the result that my words do not refer to my sensations 
at all. Nor do they refer to the natural behaviour associated with 
sensations. Rather they "replace", "are connected with", "are used 
in the place of", the natural expressions of the sensation. They are 
a new pain behaviour. 
In'"Private Experience' and 'Sense Data' ", Wittgenstein essentially 
puts forward the same views. 
"Roughly speaking: the expression, 'I have toothache' stands for 
a moan but does not mean 'I moan'." It is "a substitute for moaning", 
"replaces moaning". - He . goes on "Of course 'toothache' is not only 
a substitute for moaning - but it is also a substitute for moaning". 3 
Presumably he means part of the function of "toothache" is also 
to describe the behaviour-of another person having toothache. The 
analogy between moaning and "toothache" is made more explicit on 
p.258. "You wouldn't call moaning a description!. But this shows 
you how far the proposition 'I have toothache' is from a description, 
and how far teaching. the word- 'toothache' is from teachingthe word 
'tooth'.
114 
This is similarly expressed, but with the emphasis on 
1. P.I., I, § 244. 
2. The Private Language Argument, Edited by O.R. Jones, 1971. 
3. Op.cit., pp.257,258. 4. Op.cit., p. 258. 
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"I" in The Blue Book. "To say 'I have pain' is no more a statement 
about a particular person than moaning is. 
On p. 274 of"Private Experience' and 'Sense Date",we find that 
"I have toothache" does not describe my behaviour. "In order to 
be able to say that I have toothache I don't observe my behaviour, 
say in the mirror. And this is correct, but it doesn't follow that 
you describe an observation of any other kind. Moaning is not the 
description of an observation.'
,2 
 This is not to say that I could not 
if I wanted to describe my behaviour. There is nothing to stop one 
doing that. That would be what Wittgenstein would call an abnormal 
or unusual use of "I have toothache", akin to "He has toothache". It 
is just that "I have toothache" does not refer to that behaviour. It 
is a substitute for that behaviour. 
This is not to say that the type of behaviour I exhibit is not 
important. If I said "I have toothache" and observed to my surprise 
that I had behaved as if I had none, then I would try and find out 
why there was this inconsistency. I must have been lying perhaps. 
So the type of natural behaviour still remains important to the 
correctness of the unnatural verbal behaviour. Kurt Baier 3 cites a 
case of someone who has had a prefrontal leucotomy, and says he is 
in pain when he has none of the normal behaviour of someone in pain. 
Here we might be at a loss as to what to say. A pain-like sensation 
without the behaviour appropriate to that particular sensation just 
would not be pain. It is said that morphine alters the appreciation 
of pain so that it is no longer unpleasant, while the sensation itself 
1. The Blue Book, p. 67. 
2. "Private Experience' and 'Sense Data"%The Private Language 
Argument, Edited by'O.R. Jones, pp. 274, 275. 
3. Kurt Baier, "Pains" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 40, No.1, May 1962 (PP. 1-23), p.23. 
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stays the same. We would say that he was no longer in pain. (Note 
that this does not deny the existence of pain-like sensations with 
no pain behaviour.) For in § 534 of ZetteZ Wittgenstein says "Only 
surrounded by certain normal manifestations of life is there such a 
thing as expression of pain". 
In The Brown Book he talks about "artificial devices" - presumably 
words purporting to refer to emotions. 
"... we think of the utterance of an emotion as though 
it were some artificial device to let others know that 
we have it. Now there is no sharp line between such 
'artificial devices' and what one might call the natural 
expressions of emotion." 1 
Here we are left with the feeling that the artificial devices may refer 
to the emotions and in ZetteZ we find "No. 'Joy' designates nothing 
at all. Neither anyinward nor anyoutward thing." 2 This seems to 
indicate that Wittgenstein often wavered in the direction of the 
referring model, but refused to accept it. We should note that Witt-
genstein began his explanation of how words refer to sensations with 
the words "Here is one possibility". 3 Does this mean that there are 
other ways that words refer to sensations? e.g., that words name 
or describe the sensation. 
In the middle part of Part I of the Investigations he seems to 
hold to the expressive use hypothesis, e.g. § 256 "How do I use words 
to stand for sensations? - As we ordinarily do? Then are my words 
for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation?" 4 
The general trend of this passage shows that the answer to these questions 
is "Yes", i.e., my words for sensations are ordinarily tied up with 
my natural expression. In § 288 we find "if I assume the abrogation 
1. L. Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, p.103. 
2. L. Wittgenstein, 1 ettel,:§ 487. 
3. P.I., I. § 244. 4. Op.cit., § 256. 
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"1 of the normal language game with the expression of a sensation... 
But in Part II of the Investigations Wittgenstein talks of fear, 
pain and grief and seems to indicate that sometimes "I am afraid" 
can be a description of a state of mind. He begins section (ix) 
with a note on observation, the main point of which is that "I do 
not 'observe' what only comes into being through observation. The 
object of observation is something else". 2 This is similar to Ryle's 
viewpoint on observation, one that I criticised earlier. Neverthe-
less the important thing conceded here is that one can reflect on 
one's pains and say as a result of observation "A touch which was 
still painful yesterday is no longer so today".
3 
Yet he is still 
against observing an ongoing pain and saying as a description "I am 
in pain". That is still a cry, a moan. But that pain could, I think 
Wittgenstein would allow, be compared with a previous pain and des-
cribed thus "A touch which was still painful yesterday is less so 
today". Here do we make an observation of yesterday's pain and 
compare it with today's? Do we also then observe today's pain for 
the purpose of comparison? Wittgenstein's answer is that it depends 
upon the context. But I still get the impression that he still 
holds onto the expression of the sensation as the beginning of the 
language game. "What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensa-
tion by criteria: but to repeat an expression. But this is not the 
end of the language game: it is the beginning." 4  We do not find out 
what I am referring to when I say "I am afraid" by observing what 
accompanied the speaking. Expressing fear shows what fear is. 
His concluding paragraph of Section (ix)is "But if 'I am afraid' 
1: § 288. 3. Op.cit., p. 187. 
2. P.1., II, p. 187. 4. P.I., I, § 290. 
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is not always something like a cry of complaint, and yet sometimes is* 
then why should it always be a description of a state of mind". 1 
In other words, '"I am afraid" may be a cry or a description depending 
upon the context, the game being played. 
Nevertheless I still find Wittgenstein quite unclear here. On 
the one hand "I am afraid" is a description of a state of mind, but 
"In a concrete case I can indeed ask 'Why did I say that, what did I 
mean by it?' - and I might answer the question too; but not on the 
ground of observing what accompanied the speakingond my answer would 
supplement, paraphrase, the earlier utterance" 2 There is a refusal 
to allow that one can observe one's ongoing fears and pains, and yet 
now he allows that one can describe them. For he has already told us 
that observing is "Roughly: when he puts himself in a favourable 
position to receive certain impressions in order (for example) to 
describe what they tell him".
3 
It is difficult to see how one can describe one's pains and fears 
without observing them. The general trend of Wittgenstein's thinking 
here seems to make description dependent upon observation. If "A 
description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that 
of time for instance)" 4 then surely "I have toothache" could qualify 
as a description -the ache is distributed in the space of the tooth. 
It seems doubtful that Wittgenstein would allow this, for one would 
here not be observing •in Wittgenstein's sense. It is like casting a 
glance at an inward and ongoing sensation, at something which is too 
much like what comes into beingthrough observation, only there is no 
object of observation with respect to which.we.can try to put ourselves 
1. P.I., II, p.189. 3. P./., II, p.187. 
2. P.I., II, p.188. 4. P.I., II, p.187. 
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in a favourable position. In line with this approach he indicates 
that saying "Red" or presumably just "ache" would not qualify as a 
description, which is in line with his definition of a description here, 
for these words do not represent a distribution in a space. On the 
other hand "a cry, which cannot be called a description, which is 
more primitive than any description, for all that serves as a descrip-
tion of the inner life") 
 
Donagon
2 
takes this passage to mean that Wittgenstein largely 
abandoned his expressive use hypothesis. I have tried to indicate 
that although this abandonment is far from clear cut, if Wittgenstein 
has conceded that "I am afraid" may sometimes •be a description of a 
state of mind then he may also have to concede that we can if not 
observe, at least describe our present sensations. 
Malcolm takes the view that Wittgenstein by stressing the expres-
sive function of pain utterances was stretching ordinary language to 
illuminate "the hidden.continuity between the utterances of that 
sentence and - expressions of pain .3  
No one now denies that there is some truth in the expressive use 
hypothesis, •at least with respect to pains. When I say "I have tooth-
ache" the purpose of my utterance is rarely to describe where my ache 
is. It may be used to evoke sympathy, or to get treatment for it, 
or to let others know why I'm looking dreadful and not moving my 
mouth much. The main reason for this I suppose is that pains affect 
our normal functioning; and we have a strong desire to be rid of them. 
Giving accurate descriptions of their character and place has purpose 
1. P.I., II, p.189. 
2. Alan Donagon, "Wittgenstein on Sensation", in Wittgenstein, The 
Philosophical Investigations. 	Ed. Pitcher. 
3. Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", in 
Wittgenstein, Th Philosophical Investigations, Ed. Pitcher, p.83. 
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in medical textbooks but for the sufferer his main purpose is to gain 
relief. His descriptive account, if any, is for that end. So the 
verbal expression of pain may be a cry, it may rarely be purely a 
description, or it may be both. 
Sheridan
1 
and Donagon
2 
give the example of a patient telling the 
doctor the details of his pain. In this situation the help that you 
are going to get depends upon the accuracy of your description. It is 
vital for the patient that he describes his pain accurately, i.e., 
the words function largely as a report. Sheridan also makes the point 
that the words used to describe the pain "sharp", "dull", "throbbing", 
are derived from other contexts in which their use is descriptive. 
As "stabbing" is used to describe the action of stabbing so it is 
borrowed and used to describe the type of pain brought about by such 
action. 
What about sensations other than pain? For the majority of sensa-
tions there is much less obvious natural behaviour expressing them. 
One can find examples on either side. With tickling there is giggling; 
with feeling hot, sweating and fanning oneself; with itching, scratch-
ing; but with a sense of vibration, a feeling of warmth, having an 
afterimage, there may be no characteristic behavioural response. The 
latter cases, however, do arise in a particular surrounding. Vibration 
may be felt in the presence of machinery, warmth while lying in the 
suni having an afterimage after looking at a bright light. These 
sensations are communicated by pointing out the circumstances in which 
they arise. If there was no characteristic behaviour, and no particu-
lar circumstances then the sensation could not be.communicated. The 
1. G. Sheridan,"The E.E.G. Argument Against Incorrigibility",op.oit. 
2. A. Donagon, op.cit. 
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expressive use hypothesis helps us to see this. But it is stretching 
it too far to say always "I have sensation such and such" replaces 
the behaviour and, or, circumstances in which that sensation is had. 
It is interesting to note that the expressive use hypothesis 
is supposed to get us out of problems of one's own present sensation 
reports being incorrigible, and how such reports are criterial for 
others in ascribing pain to me. Malcolm i indicates that it is non-
sensical to ask how does one-know when to cry, so it is analogously 
nonsensical to ask how one knows to say "I am in pain". We need to 
remind ourselves of the reasons against taking avowals as incorrigible 
and note that the relevant difference between the natural and the 
verbal behaviour is that the natural behaviour is less voluntary than 
the verbal. But this need not stop something going wrong with brain 
mechanisms, nor stop the man in the train accident displaying inappro-
priate natural behaviour. The "incorrigibility" of the natural 
behaviour still depends upon the corrigible statement, "My brain 
is functioning normally". 
So the incorrigibility of avowals does not follow from the 
expressive use hypothesis, and it follows from this, that others taking 
my avowals as criteria for my being in pain, no longer stands. 
Wittgenstein's adoption of the expressive use hypothesis stems 
from the apparent senselessness of doubting whether one is in pain. 
But also as support he has further powerful arguments against the 
possibility of referring to or naming or describing some private item 
called "pain". To an examination of these argument I now turn. 
1. Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds". In Essays, 
Ed. Pitcher. p. 383. 
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VII. THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 
1. The First Private Language Argument - Memory  
On introducing the private language arguments Wittgenstein makes 
clear just what sort of private language he is attacking. He is not 
against the fact that a person can "write down or give vocal expression 
to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for 
his private use".
1 
We can do that in our ordinary language, it is a 
language game we normally play. What he is against is that those 
words giving expression to inner experiences name or refer to private 
items, that the words of a private language "refer to what can only 
be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. 
So another person cannot understand the language". 2 The word "cannot" 
here,in -dicatesthat the private language he is against is one which 
is necessarily private, one for which it is logically impossible for 
someone else to understand. The contingently private language is 
allowed for because it is "tied up with/,mi , natural expressions of 
sensation",
3 
and thus may be understood by someone else. 
The private language problem seems to be set up easily enough. 
"But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensation, 
but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate names with 
sensations and use these names in descriptions - " 4 ("Associate" is 
in italics because Wittgenstein does not believe that such an associ-
ation can be set up.) He has -to "assume the abrogation of the normal 
language game with the expression of a sensation".
5 
So in § 258 Wittgenstein puts up the case of the private diarist, 
1. P.I., 	I, § 243. 3. P.I., I, 	§ 	256. 
2. Op.cit., 	§ 243. 4. P.I., I, § 256. 
5. P.I., I, § 288. 
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who tries to associate the sign "S" with the recurrence of a certain 
sensation. The first point that is made is that an ordinary ostensive 
definition will not be possible here. Why? Because one cannot in 
the ordinary sense point to a sensation. One does not, by concentrating 
his attention on the sensation point to it. This is reiterated in 
§ 411 - "Here confusion occurs because one imagines that by directing 
one's attention to a sensation one is pointing to it") I get the 
impression that by "pointing" he means directing my material arm at 
a material object. Thus in § 398 one can as little own the visual 
room as point to it. The material room may not have an owner, but 
the visual room cannot have an owner, i.e., no one may be pointing to 
a material room but no,one can point to the visual room. In § 400 
the visual room is likened to a new sensation.' Thus private sensations 
are put already into a realm where pointing cannot reach them. For 
instance on p.50 of The Blue Book2 one does not point to the pain but 
to the place of pain; "the act of pointing . determines a place of 
pain". If "I wish to indicate the place of my pain, I point".
3 
 Direct- 
ing one's attention to a sensation does not then point to the sensa-
tion, but to the place of the sensation. 
I am not sure of what to make of this distinction between point-
ing to a sensation and pointing to the place of a sensation, but it 
seems from the nature of the case that the private diarist should not 
be able to physically point to the place of the sensation, for that 
would count as behaviour expressing the sensation, which has been 
ruled out here. All he should be allowed to do is to concentrate 
his attention inwardly.- But where does that get him? This leads to 
1. P.I., I, § 411. 
2. The Blue Book, p.50. 3. Op.cit., p.68. 
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the second point, the problem of memory. 
"But 'I impress it on myself' can only mean: this 
process brings it about that I remember the connexion 
right in the future. But in the present case I have 
no criterion of correctness. One would.like to say: 
whatever is going to seem right to me is right. 
And that only means that here we can't talk about 
'right'." 1 
The point here is that memory stands unsupported in establishing 
the connection between the sensation S and the word "S". There are no 
other orriferia for the correct application of "S". In the public case 
we have the testimony of other people,dictionaries, and the like. But 
in the private case memory is not backed up by anything. And memory 
concerning public items is amply shown to be wanting, e.g., "Imagine 
that you were supposed to paint a particular' colour "C", which was the 
colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined.-
Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than on 
another; would you not sometimes say: 'I must be wrong, the colour 
is certainly the same as yesterday  r? •This shows that we do not always 
resort to what memory' tells us as the v erdict of the highest court 
of appeal."
2 
So memory, already unreliable in the public case, is 
being trusted with the job of remembering the rule "'S' names 
sensation S". "But might I not be mistaken, can my memory not 
deceive me? And might it•not always do so when - without lying - I 
express what I have thought within myself? - " 3 
In § 265 we find that "justification consists in appealing to 
something independent". 4 Once again memory is called into question. 
Firstly I try to remember the train's departure time, and then to check 
this memory, I form a mental image of the timetable. But this is not 
1. P.I., I, § 258. 3. P./., II, p. 222. 
2. P.I., I, § 56. 4. P.I., I, § 265. 
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an independent justification for memory is still the final court of 
appeal. " - No; for this process has got to produce a memory which 
is actually correct. If the mental image of the time-table could not 
itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness 
of the first memory?"
1 
An independent justification would consist 
in producing a time-table. 
But with sensations there is no dictionary to produce. On attempt-
ing to make the rule "S' means sensation,Sflone could try and remember 
the sensation Sseveral times and after each time say "that is called 
'S''. Then on a new presentation of a sensation one might name it "S", 
and to check this call to mind sensation S and the words "that is called 
'S''. This is very much like the case of the imagined time-table 
except that there is no real time-table to back it up. It is true that 
looking up a table in the imagination is not the same as looking up 
a table, impressions of rules are not rules
2
, but the nature of 
the case is that all there is to go on is memory. 
It is interesting to note some things that Wittgenstein says 
about justification. Firstly if a justification is required for the 
use of a word'then it must be something public, so that my memory 
alone is rot enough to justify the use of the word "S". The use of 
"S" "stands in need of justification whith everybody understands". 3 
"For if I need a justification for using a word, it must also be one 
for someone else." 4 My memory, which is fallible, is no justification 
for someone else, not even myself. 
But the other - end of the scale of need for justification finishes 
with a sort of bedrock justification. "If I have exhausted the 
1. P.1., I, § 265. 3. P./., I, § 261. 
2. Cf. P.I., I, § 259. 4. P.1., I, § 378. 
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justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then 
I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do'." 1 Justifications 
may go on, but cannot go on forever, so in the end one must just stop 
asking, and act. One must shut one's eyes in the face of doubt. As 
wth explanations further justifications are only needed to prevent 
misunderstandings 2. 
But Wittgenstein also indicates that sometimes there may be no 
justification for the use of a word. "The primitive language game 
which children are taught needs no justification; attempts at justi-
fication need to be rejected:" 3 This it seems is the . bedrock from 
which all justifications start: We just say "This is simply what I 
do". He indicates that our sensation . language . is . similar to a primitive 
language game. "What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensation 
by criteria: but to repeat an expression. But this is not the end 
of the language game: it is , the beginning."4 This is preceded by "To 
use a word without a justification does not mean to use it without 
right" . 5 
Summarising this, if sensation words are thought of as replacing 
primitive natural expressions of sensation, then such uses need no 
justification, but if sensation words are thought of as referring to 
private items, then a justification is required which in the nature 
of the case is not satisfied because all there is to go on is an 
unreliable memory. 
But there is room for another trend here. One might say that in 
the use of a sensation word to refer to a private sensation the justi-
fications reach an end when we rely on our memory. To be sure, it is 
1. P.I., I, § 217. 3. P.1., II, p. 200. 
2. Cf.P./., I, § 87. 4. P.1., I, § 290. 
5. P.1., I, § 289. 
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unreliable, but what else is there? There is no other justification, 
so a weak one will have to do. 
Although Wittgenstein regards memory as unreliable, in § 386 he 
does seem to place some reliability on memory. "But I do have confi-
dence in myself - I say without hesitation that I have done this sum 
in my head, have imagined this colour. The difficulty is not that I doubt 
whether I really imagined anything red." But the difficulty is the 
problem of "the translation of the image into reality". One still 
cannot ask "'What does a correct image of this colour look like?"' 
This passage indicates to me that no matter how much confidence 
I have in my memory, no matter how reliable it is, I still cannot 
tell whether my image is correct.. "The deep aspect of this matter read-
ily eludes us.n
2 
 It has eluded us because having an unreliable memory 
is not the deep aspect. Rather no matter how good one's memory is 
for private objects, -there is no public check that the memory is 
reliable, and this public checking is required for correct usage. The 
deep aspect is that public checking is required to make a distinction 
between correct and incorrect memories. 
We shall now consider Ayer's 3 objection to the argument on 
unreliable memory. Taking the example of the time-table he points 
out that on production of the page of the time-table he still has to 
trust his eyesight, recognise the figures, and if he consults others, 
remember what their words mean. At some point we must terminate at 
some act of recognition, and this is as much a problem with the public 
objects as with private ones. 
Take Wittgenstein's example of the.colour C produced by the 
P.I., I, § 386. 2. P.I., I, § 387. 
3. A.J. Ayer, "Can there be a Private Language?" in Essays, Ed.Pitcher. 
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combination of chemical substances X and Y. You still have to rely 
upon your memory thatTyou.really have X.and Y, and not some other 
substances. You have to remember that X and Y are called "X" and 
called "Y". "... since every process of checking must terminate in 
some act of recognition, no process of checking can establish anything 
unless some acts of recognition are taken as valid in themselves." 
The idea that there is a Cartesian demon foiling every deliverance 
of memory is as much a problem in the public case as in the private 
one. Ayer's Crusoe alone on an island invents names for his sensations 
and birds etc. If he makes a mistake Ayer says there is a slightly 
greater chance that he will detect it in the case of a bird, for the 
bird may reappear, whereas once a sensation is had, that's it. But 
Ayer takes this back, for we do say that the same sensation has return-
ed, and we do have to rely upon memory to say the identical bird has 
returned. It seems doubtful that for Crusoe he would be more likely 
to detect mistakes in the case of material objects than in the case 
of his sensations. In fact the identification of a pain seems much 
easier than identifying a bird. 
'Ayer's point is that somewhere one must stop asking whether a 
memory is correct or incorrect and just take it as correct. One could 
go on checking for ever, so it is practical to stop somewhere. This 
is a problem in the public world as well as the private. Ayer is 
happy for the process of checking to go on ad infinitum, but for Witt-
genstein it stops. Reasons give out. It is strange that Wittgenstein 
- is quite happy to terminate the chain of justifications with public 
objects, but with private objects his attitude is different. The chain 
of justifications ends, but not in the private case with saying "'This 
1. Op.cit., p. 257. 
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is simply what I do'." 1 E.g., why do I have the rule "This is called 
'red'?" Answer - this is what I do. (cf. "'I have learnt Englishl." 2 ) 
But why do I have the rule "This is called 'pain'"? Answer - that would 
be a private rule and "it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately '". 3 . 3 
Rather, I just repeat the expression of pain.
4 
So the justifications 
end in a different way in the private case. For it is said that there 
is no distinction between correct and incorrect here. You cannot ask 
either then whether it is - the correct expression of pain or not. It 
is just what we do. So how does the expressive use hypothesis help 
here? It does not, so we might as well say that pain is called "pain" 
and say that that is what we do. 
With respect to § 202, even with public rules one has to eventu-
ally think one is obeying a rule. The reasons give out. So any public 
checking ends in the same way as private checking which puts them on 
a par. 
Now I have indicated that although Wittgenstein appears in 
several places to place great stead on the unreliability of memory, 
it also appears that this.was not in a straightforward way the "deep 
aspect" of the matter. But Ayer's valid criticisms here do deal with 
Wittgenstein's deep aspect. 
Kenny 5 criticises those who take Wittgenstein's argument as based 
on scepticism about memory, and I presume that he would count Ayer 
amongst them. Their argument he says ends with the problem of being 
sure that you have the correct private item which you are calling ,"S". 
In contrast to this Kenny says that it is not a problem of knowing 
if it really is S.but knowing what I mean by "S". The trouble with 
1. P.I., I, § 217. 3. P.I., I, § 202. 
2. P./., I, § 381. 4. P.I., I, § 290. 
5. Anthony Kenny, in The Private Language Argument, Ed. O.R.Jones. 
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this is that to settle whether it really is S, one has to settle 
what I mean by "S". To settle what I mean by "s" I can look up a 
table in the imagination, which leaves us trying to decide whether the 
private memory image of an S really is an S, which gets us back where 
we started. The public case too ends up in this way, and for both we 
should say, "my spade is turned") Kenny's point that it is a problem 
of what I mean by "S" is seen therefore to still be a problem of 
memory. 
Ayer seems to skip over another point that Wittgenstein was get-
ting at. Crusoe has . criteria for identity of sensations and material 
objects but Ayer notes "his criteria of identity may be different from 
our own; but it is reasonable to suppose that they will be the same".
2 
Wittgenstein's second main private language argument concludes that 
far from its ever being reasonable to suppose that my criteria for the 
identity of my private objects are the same as your criteria for your 
private objects, I cannot even suppose that I have criteria for ident-
ity of my own private objects. The notion of "same" in my supposed 
private language just does not get a grip. 
Rhees criticises Ayer's views 
"This is not a question of whether I can trust my 
memory. It is a question of when it makes sense to 
speak of remembering; either a good memory or a 
faulty one. ... There is just no rule for what 
is the same and what is not the same; there is no 
distinction between correct and incorrect;"3 
Thus it makes no difference what I say, for I say nothing. Rhees backs 
this up by an appeal to the general nature of language, rather than 
specifically considering the problems of memory, identity and correct-
ness, and it might be well to consider the impact of Rhees' article now. 
1. P.1., I, § 217. 
2. A.J: Ayer, "Can there be a Private Language?", in Essays, Ed.Pitcher, 
p. 261. 
3. R. Rhees, "Can there be a Private Language?", in Essays, Ed. Pitcher, 
p. 273. 
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2. Criticism of Rhees. 
Ayer imagines Crusoe to be isolated from' other human beings 
from birth, and inventing a language of his own, the words of the lang-
uage being names of things such as birds and sensations. The idea is 
that sensations in this situation are just as easy to name as birds, 
and thatjt is hard to see that the introduction of Man Friday into the 
environs would either make it more difficult for Crusoe to name his 
sensations or to somehow take away the meanings of Crusoe!s words for 
sensations.. 
Rhees criticises Ayer here. He says that for Ayer's Crusoe it is 
unintelligible to think that he could invent a language for himself. 
For language is a social phenomenon. More than one person is neces-
sary for the existence of a language. For language to have meanings, 
for it to be understood, for the notion of mistake to make sense, the 
words of the language must be used in a social context, with different 
people playing different roles. The activity of Ayer's Crusoe may 
be as similar as you like to a Crusoe who was isolated after he had 
learnt ,a language, and yet Ayer's Crusoe would not be using a language 
while the trained Crusoe was. We would regard Ayer's Crusoe as we 
would regard a tape recorder or a machine. 
This seems to me to be an incredible position, and yet it is 
also taken up by A. Manser.
1 
He says there are two points in Rhees' 
argument - "first, language must play a r6le in some way of life, 
second, it must involve public rules".
2 
That Ayer's Crusoe does not use words in some-61e of life is 
shown by such facts as these: 
1. Anthony Manser, VI. "Pain and Private Language", in Studies in 
the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Edited by Peter Winch. 
2. Op.cit, p.168. 
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"Why not? He calls the edible bird ha, and when 
he sees the inedible one he says "ba" and kills 
it. 
"That is not a mistake in following the meanings of 
- words. He could have made the sage mistake without 
using words at all." 1 
Well, presumably anyone with a public language could make the 
mistake of killing the wrong bird, whether he has misidentified it or 
not, or even if he used no words. But does this show that his words 
had no use at all, or that no mistake in naming occurred? His killing 
of the bird depends upon his saying "ba". The mistake in naming causes 
the mistake in killing, and thatmas the use of "ba" in this case. 
If he had not said "ba" it is most likely that he would not have 
killed the bird. 
I am here appealing to common sense. There is no logical tie 
between saying "ba" and killing the bird. It is an empirical one, 
and a.most likely tie too. But of course the answer will be that no 
matter how plausible you make the appearance of using a language, 
how much his words appear to play "a role in some way of life", still 
it cannot be called a language because of the second point that there 
are no public rules, no public checking by other people. 
Now it is most difficult to see why this public checking is 
required. The claim is that without a basis of public checking the 
private language has no rules, the user of this language does not 
follow rules, the expressions have no meaning, no use, and are not 
understood, and no notion of . mistake can arise. Now from Rhees' article 
I find it desperately hard to see why this is so, for it seems rather 
to be put forward merely as .a statement of fact, rather than something 
to be argued for. Ayer has said "After all some human being must have 
1. R. Rhees, op.cit., p. 283. 
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been the first to use a symbol".
1 
He says thatJt is !2conceivable" 
that a lone person could invent a language for himself, that this may 
be "psychologically impossible", but not self contradictory. Against 
this Rhees says that the notion is unintelligible. 
Now it is strange to find that what Rhees is talking about is not 
to be found so much in the middle section of the Investigations (§ 243 
onwards). It is scattered throughout, but is also in rather more 
concentrated form in the first few pages of the Investigations. What 
is in these sections must be read with the private language arguments 
in mind, for then we see the purpose re private language of much that 
is said in them. That is, not all that is said is a straight cut 
criticism of the Tractatus, nor just an account of how the public 
language game gets going. 
Firstly it should be noted that the most primitive language game, 
that in § 2, alreadrhas two people builder A and builder B. Witt-
genstein does not start with one person inventing a name or even a 
word for his own use. The beginning is a primitive social situation. 
The words of this primitive language game are not names, for a child 
being taught the language game "cannot as yet ask what the name is"F 
Wittgenstein works towards the idea that the concept "name" cannot 
be applied to the noises of a character like Ayer's Crusoe, but that 
it applies to noises uttered in social situations. "Naming is some-
thing like attaching_a label...to a thing." 3 That is part of it. But 
a noise becomes a name when that label begins to have a use. The 
mere act of naming does not thereby show the use to which we are to 
put the name. Wittgenstein even takes this to the point of contra- 
diction - "nothing has so far been.done, when a thing is named. It 
1. A.J. Ayer, op.cit., p. 259. 
2. P.I., I, § 6, and cf. § 27. 3. P.I., I, § 26. 
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has not even got a name except in a language game".
1 
In other words, 
labelling together with a social use are the requirements of a name. 
It takes a particular social training for a child to ask "What 
is that called?" He does not just spontaneously create a concept of 
a name for himself, but is. taught the concept of a name by learning 
to use names. A later developmental stage is the language game of 
inventing a name for himself. This can only occur after he knows how 
names are used, when he knows what to do with a name.' Ayer's Crusoe 
then has neverundergone any social training, does not know how to use 
a name, so that any "name" he invented for himself would just be a 
noise. 
Wittgenstein draws on analogy between naming and chess here. 
Naming the king does not show what the rules governing the moves of the 
king are, and analogously it does not show what the rules governing 
the use of the word "king" are. One must know how to play chess, and 
also how to use a language. 2 Otherwise, what would you do with the 
king, and analogously what would you do with the word "king". Knowing 
how to use a name,knowing the rules for its use,..is expressed as show-
ing "the post at which we station a word" 3 which is later reiterated 
in the private language area at § 257 together with the idea summing 
up the earlier parts of the Investigations - "one forgets that a 
great deal of stage setting in 'the language is presupposed if the mere 
act of naming is to make sense".
4 
Examining the way language gets going and is taught is meant to 
show that a being like Ayer's Crusoe could not invent a language with 
names, rules, meaning and understanding_ This is why Rhees says that 
the idea of anyone inventing language is unintelligible, and that "it 
1. P.I., I, § 49. 3. 29. 
2. Cf:, P.I., I, § 31. 4. P.I., I, § 257. 
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is absurd to suppose that the marks he uses means anything; even if 
we might want to say that he goes through all the motions of meaning 
something by them".
1 
The concepts "language,. "meaning", "rule", 
"name", and "understanding" just_ do_ not apply to the noises of Ayer's 
Crusoe. 
This is where that non sequitur, § 52, comes in. (It is not 
really a non sequitur for it follows private language type comments 
in § 51.) If one is convinced that the spontaneous generation of a 
mouse cannot occur, then At is pointless to examine the grey rags and 
dust it appeared to .come Out of. Similarly a language cannot arise from 
a single, totally asocial being. If it appears to have done so, then 
one can say that it has not, no matter what the case looks like. 
The question is - Is this type of reasoning fatal to the idea . of 
a private language? 
"But first we must learn to understand what it is that opposes 
2 such an examination of details in philosophy." - This is done by 
examining our concepts of "language", "name", etc., by seeing how such 
words are used by us. "... if the words 'language', ... have a use, 
it must be as a humble a one as that of the words 'table', 'lamp', 
'door'." 3 By carrying out this examination we do not find that the 
concept "language" is bounded by strict rules, but that it is a "family 
of structures more or less related to one another".
4 
Although an 
inexact concept, our examination has purportedly shown us that certain 
features are part of the concept and that these exclude others. There 
must basically be learning and training, and these concepts involve a 
social situation. The concept "language" does not apply to a being who 
has never been part of a social situation. And if the concept "language" 
1. R. Rhees, op.ait., p. 278. 3. P.I., I, § 97. 
2. P.I., I, § 52. 4. P.I., I, § 108. 
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does not apply to him, then he logically cannot have a language. So 
it is superfluous to carry out an empirical investigation on Ayer's 
Crusoe's noises to see if they are language. 
Similarly we might examine the concept "mouse". Mice are creatures 
resulting from parent mice, not arising "by spontaneous generation out 
of grey rags and dust".
1 
The concept "mouse" excludes spontaneous 
generation. So if a mouse-like creature did come into being as des-
cribed by Wittgenstein, then it would not be called a mouse, but some-
thing else. Whatever it is it is not a mouse, no matter how mouse-like 
it is. But would not .one be inclined to remark here "Now you are only 
playing with words". 2 For one would say that given the concept 
"mouse" it is logically impossible for the creature to be a mouse, but 
that there is no logical impossibility that a mouse-like creature could 
arise by spontaneous generation. 
Wittgenstein's attitude in § 52 seems to differ from that of 
§ 80, where he discusses the possibility of a chair which appears 
and disappears mysteriously. Here the rules for the use of the word 
"chair" do not cover this situation, so as yet we do not know whether 
to call it a chair or not. This does not stop us using "chair", but 
neither does it exclude the possibility of a chair appearing and dis-
appearing mysteriously. If we applied this case analogously to the 
mouse, it would seem that , in fact the rules for the use of "mouse" 
are not tight enough to exclude the spontaneously generated mouse-like 
creature from being called a mouse, although not tight enough , to say 
that it is a mouse either. There are just no rules to cover this case. 
This is another example of tension in Wittgenstein - between having 
some measure of exactness in our concepts, and not being everywhere 
1. P.I., I, § 52. 2. P.I., I, § 67. 
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bounded by strict rules. 
So now having passed from the chair to the mouse I go back to 
language. The noises of Ayer's Crusoe are mysterious. They have arisen 
spontaneously with no training by others. His use of these noises 
may seem very much like our own use of words. But what are we to say 
of his noises? Are they names in a language, with meaning? The 
answer is that the rules we have at the moment do not cover this situ-
ation. That we can apply the words "language", "name", "meaning", 
here is neither excluded nor agreed upon. It comes down to making a 
decision -- to call it a language or not. But whatever the decision 
it does not alter the fact that it is logically possible for Ayer's 
Crusoe to make noises very much like our own, and this makes the 
decision look unimportant. To refuse to call his noises a_language 
is playing with words.' 
3. The Second Private Language Argument - Sameness  
In a second private language argument Wittgenstein centres his 
arguments around the use of the word "same". It will come out that 
many of the points made concerning memory will appear again with 
identity. In fact it is difficult •to separate the two arguments, 
for they are often inextricably mixed. For example, in "'Private Ex-
pertencel and 'Sense Data" a person tries to name a colour for himself. 
"But how does he know that it is the same colour? Does he also recog-
nise the sameness of colour as what he used to call sameness of colour, 
and so on ad infinitum?" 1 
In the Investigations also Wittgenstein talks of. recognising 
sameness. "'Before I judge that.two images which I have, are the same, 
1. "'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data'%The Private Language 
Argument, edited by O.R. Jones, p. 245. 
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I must recognise them as the same' .
1
. It is not difficult to connect• 
up "same" and "memory" by running along the chain of words "same", ,:F 
"identity", "identify", "recognise", "recognition", "memory", 
Now the notion:of sameness comes from the public language game. 
Wittgenstein considers a case where a pupil's use of "same" does not 
correspond to our own. In § 185 the pupil obeys the rule "+1" and 
arrives at the series of cardinal numbers. When he reaches 1000, we 
order him to carry on in the same way but to use the rule "+2". He 
goes on 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012, ..." and no matter what we say he 
says he is going on in the same way. It is natural for us to under-
stand the rule "+2" in a certain way, but reactions can be different. 
Here we say the pupil does not mean by "same" what we mean by it. 
It is because of our natural reactions, our common behaviour that we 
all have the same concept of "same". 
When a pupil has not got the concept "same", "I shall teach him 
to use the words by means of examples and by practice. - And when I 
do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself".
2 
The 
pupil is encouraged to act with the examples in the correct way. There 
is the possibility that his reactions will be different from ours, 
but usually they are the same. There is not an endless series of 
explanations to explain why I react the way I do. "My reasons will 
soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons." 3 The public 
teaching ends then in our use of words being correct ultimately with-
out reasons. That is the way we act. 
The private language problem of sameness arises when I try to 
say whether any two of my private sensations are the same. This comes 
1. P.1., I, § 378. 3. P.1., I, § 211. 
2. P.1., I, § 208. 
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out best in the following passage: 
"What is the criterion for the sameness of two images? 
- What is the criterion for the redness of an image? 
For me, when it is someone else's image: what he 
says and does. For myself, when it is my image: nottling 
... And what goes for 'red' also goes for 'same'." I 
That is, I have no criteria for the sameness of my two images. This 
is followed up in § 378 by the point that I have no reason to suppose 
that "same" is used correctly in this context. 
Before I judge that two images which I have are 
the same, I must recognise them as the same'. And when 
hAtTha 6. 	how am I to know that the word 'same' 
describes what I recognize? Only if I can express my 
recognition in some other way, and if it is possible for 
someone else to teach me that 'same' is the correct 
word here. 
For if I need a justification for using a word, it must 
also be one for someone else." 2 
But of course in the nature of the case I cannot express my recog-
nition in some other way. If I try and compare the inner images to 
outward colours, I still have to say that the images are the same 
as the material colours. 
Someone else cannot teach me that "same" is the correct word here. 
I am the only one who has the two images, so whatever I say, "same", 
or "different" no one can check me. Whatever I say, if I think it is 
correct then it is correct. So to say that my use of "same" is 
correct is to make a mockery of language. For to use language there 
must be a distinction between correct and incorrect usage. Here I do 
not need a justification at all for there is none. I have no criteria 
for sameness here. If I try to say they are the same then they are 
the same. 
Here I still have the right to use "same", but it is akin to an 
1. P./., I, § 377. 2. P.I.„ § 378. 
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expression of pain, rather than the naming of a feature of the world. 
What seems strange here is that "red" and "same" are used as names with 
respect to public objects but with respect to private images Witt-
genstein must say that they are not names in the same sense. He does 
not deny that "pain" is a name for example,
1 
but it is not a name in 
the same sense that "book" is aflame-  "we call very different things 
'names, 
"2  
. What seems strange is that "pain" and "same" should be 
names in the same sense with respect to private objects. For at least 
"same" is used to describe public objects, whereas there are no public 
pains. We have only one model for words associated with private 
items, the expressive use model. 
The idea of having no criteria for the colour of an image occurs 
elsewhere. "But how is he to know which colour it is 'whose image 
occurs to him?' Is a further criterion needed for that?" 3 The 
answer is "no"; - you say your image is red without criteria. 
"How do I know from my image, what the colour really looks like?" 4 
Answer - I do not know from my image, I get the knowledge of the 
correct colour from the public language game. 
Why is it that "same" is important to the private language argu-
ment? One reason is that if one cannot refer to a private relation-
ship of sameness then neither can one refer again in the same way to 
a private object such as pain. Comparisons of pain sensations or red 
images involve comparisons of •sameness. To call a book "red" I might 
just say straight off "the book is red", but to justify that I have 
to decide whether the colour the book has is the same as the colours 
I have previously and rightly called "red". Similarly to justify 
1. Cf., P.I., I, § 244. 3. P.1., I, § 239. 
2. P.I., I, § 38. 4. P.1., I, § 388. 
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calling the private sensations S, "S", I have to decide that the 
present sensation S is the same as sensations I have previously called 
"S". This relationship of sameness is a private one, and recognising 
.■■ 
that relationship is logically basic to saying on the presentation of 
a sensation again that it is S. "The use of the word 'rule' and the 
use of the word 'same' are interwoven."
1 
So if one has succeeded in naming a private sensation S on one 
occasion, if one is to use that name on a second presentation of the 
sensation one must recognise that the new sensation is the same as the 
old. Even if you succeeded in making the rule "sensation S'is called 
"S", Wittgenstein would hold that you could not use it because you 
have no notion that you are correctly recognising sameness of private 
objects. 
But presumably if you succeed in making the rifle "sensation S 
is called 'S'", 'hen you would succeed in making the rule, "the 
relationship of sameness is called 'same'". And it is clear that both 
the naming of S and the naming of sameness are rejected by Wittgen-
stein on the same grounds, that there is no correct or incorrect naming 
and recognition in both cases. So my attempt to make either the prob-
lem of naming sensation S or the problem of recognising sameness more 
basic to the private language arguments fails. 
But one might think that unlike redness, we have an infallible 
paradigm of identity, the identity of a thing with itself. So surely 
we can get a notion of sameness going in the private case. But Witt-
genstein replies "Then are two things the same when they are what 
one thing is. And how am I to apply what theqone thing shews me to 
the case of two things?" 2 In other words, the concept of "same" 
1. P.1., I, § 225. 2. P.1., I, § 215. 
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applies to two or more things, not to . one thing, so one thing will not 
produce a paradigm of sameness. "'A thing is identical with itself' 
- There is no finer example of a useless proposition."
1 
Wittgenstein has another way of expressing the impossibility of 
a private ostensive definition of "same". He says "Always get rid of 
the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly 
changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory 
constantly deceives you".
2 
This move occurs in other places. In 
§ 270 it does not matter whether I identify the sensation right or 
not. In § 271 a person is imagined to regularly call different . things 
pain, although his use of "pain" is otherwise like ours. In § 293 
he imagines that the private beetle in the box might be constantly 
changing. So I cannot name the private object correctly. 
So with my two red images I assume that their sameness is con-
stantly changing, so that they are now the same, and now not, only I 
do not notice the change. To say then that I am correct in saying 
they are the same is wrong, for they may not be the same. No one can 
check whether I am wrong or not, not even myself. 
Now it is interesting to see that the argument concerning same-
ness and the argument concerning memory 'both end up with the same point, 
that because there is no public check on the supposed naming of the 
private object it makes no sense to speak of that naming being correct 
or incorrect. So it would seem that both arguments should stand or 
fall together (unless there are other reasons that I do not know of 
for one rather than the other). 
1. P.1., I, §216. 2. P.I.„ p.207. 
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4. Correctness  
This problem of applying the term "correct" meaningfully is 
expressed in different ways in many places. In the public case we do 
have a right to use the term "correct". • In §145 Wittgenstein consid-
ers a pupil learning -to continue the series of natural numbers. How 
far doeshe have to continue the - series before we have the right to say 
that he knows how to do it correctly. Here he says there is no limit. 
Similarly, how many times does a pupil have to use a word as we do 
before we can say that he uses it correctly. There is no limit here, 
that is, there is •no distinct number of times which once reached we 
have the right to say "correct". But that is not to say we never 
have the right. We do say correctly of the pupil "he is reading" but 
you cannot state which was the first word he read unless you define 
a limit.' 
When a pupil has learnt to use a word correctly he finds out that 
he is correct by being told "that's right" by his teachers. Then he 
might be able to invent names for public objects and say that he has 
applied the names correctly. But to justify this he will ultimately 
appeal to what he has been publicly taught is correct. "Why do you 
say you 'are correct here." The reasons end with "That is what we call 
'correct'". 
With respect to private objects Wittgenstein reiterates many 
times that a person has no right to say whether his usage of a term 
is correct or incorrect. He has never been taught to use the terms 
"correct" and "incorrect" in his private language, so he cannot appeal 
to the reason "That's what we call 'correct'". All he can say is 
"That is what I call 'correct'". He can only think that he is correct. 
1. Cf. P.I.„ § 157. 
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"And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule.. 1  
■.1 
In the private case "whatever is going to seem right to me is 
right. And that only means that here we can't talk about iright".'. 2 
This is similarly expressed in § 201 "if everything can be made out 
to accord with the rule, then it can be made out to conflict with it. 
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here".
3 
This con- 
trasts with the public case in which we distinguish between "seems right" 
and "is right". As there is no such distinction in the private 
language, "is right" would not have the same meaning as in the public 
case, for it would just mean "seems right". 
We should however clarify CastAede&laim that for Wittgenstein 
it is impossible to make mistakes in a private language. If we postu-
late that such mistakes are possible then they may be occurring unwit-
tingly all .the time, i.e., I cannot tell if I have made a mistake or 
not, so for me I cannot correctly apply the word "mistake". For a 
private language user it is logically impossible for him to say he 
made a mistake, for the notion of "mistake" does not apply in a 
private language. 
Casteieda sees the problem of possibility of mistakes, i.e., of 
saying meaningfully that you are correct or incorrect as the private 
language argument. He examines Malcolm's
5 
unpacking of Wittgenstein's 
argument, a reductio ad absurdum, and concludes that Wittgenstein must 
show that in the private case there cannot be an appeal to something 
independent to check correct usage or not. 
1. I, § 202. 2. P.I., I, § 258. 
3. P.I., I, § 201. 
4. Hector -Neri Casteleda, in The Private Language Argument, 
Ed. O.R. Jones. 
5. Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", 
in Essays, Ed. G. Pitcher. 
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If a private language is to consist only of sign "E", Castarieda 
says that private languages are impossible. He seems to accept this 
on two counts, although he says he is making the same point. Firstly, 
a language as a necessary condition for being a language,has a 
systematic structure, and Wittgenstein's private language has none. 
Secondly, assuming that a systematic structure is not a necessary 
condition of a language, Wittgenstein's private language argument works. 
Presumably this is because there can be no independent checking with 
such a simple private language. 
But to give a private language a fair go he assumes that it should 
have "(a) connectives, (b) inferential terms, (c) copulas, (d) quanti-
fiers, (e) numerals, etc." 1 Then a private language user can correct 
himself "in essentially the same way as we normally correct our 
linguistic errors".
2 
He gives a list of the things we can resort to, 
to check our application of private terms, and this results in a 
controversy between Castalieda and Chappell , 3 the upshot of which is 
that CastaVeda continues to uphold Ily.the Oinciple that you cannot 
require a private language to meet conditions which are not required 
for a public language.. 
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so a private language user should be able to do the same. The mere 
logical possibility of the existence of a public check is no actual 
guarantee that an isolated speaker of a public language is speaking 
correctly. And the private language user needs not pickup the concept 
"correct" from a public language game, for he may gain it by means of 
a drug, or he may be born with it. 
1. Castaileda, op.cit., 
2. Castalleda, op.cit., 
3. V.C. Chappell, The Private Language Argument, Ed. O.R. Jones. 
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Another example is what Castarieda calls an "infinity, of doubts". 
The correct application of a term may depend upon the correctness of 
another, and that of another and so on. But the certainty that I 
have used a term correctly in the public language game is also subject 
to an infinity of doubts. Here I think Wittgenstein would say that in 
the public case one must shut one's eyes to doubt, but then why not 
for the private case too? 
This latter argument is very similar to that of Ayer's, when he 
is talking of recognition. It is assumed by Rhees and others that Ayer 
is merely talking about the reliability of one's memory, and not 
whether one can use the terms "correct" and "incorrect" with respect 
to one's recognition of private objects. But although "the deep 
aspect of this matter readily eludes us", 1 it would be difficult to 
discuss memory of private items without dragging in the deep aspect 
too. Ayer's answer is that the process of public checking must 
terminate in some act of recognition, which can be taken as valid in 
itself, and that there is no reason why the process of private checking 
should not be the same. The checking could go on ad infinitum but it 
is practical to stop somewhere.. We noted that for Wittgenstein the 
process of public checking would not go on ad infinitum„but ends when 
doubt goes beyond what is reasonable. The doubts soon come to an end, 
the process of checking soon ends, reasons give out. If you still 
think there is a doubt when you have exhausted the finite process of 
checking then you shut your eyes to the doubt. The removal of an 
infinite process of checking•here makes Ayer's case look even easier. 
For if the process of checking comes to an end in the public case, 
then there should no no reason why,it should not come to an end in the 
private case too. 
I. P.I., I, § 387. 
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Thus in the private case of calling sensation S by the name "S". 
or recognising the relationship of sameness of two images, I arrive 
at a point where I say that there is no more checking left to do, 
and that therefore I seem as right as I'll ever be, so I conclude that 
I am right. A point is reached where "seems right" becomes "is right". 
Similarly in a public case of calling an object 0 by the name "0", 
or recognising the sameness of two objects, I reach a point where it 
is unreasonable to do more checking. As many people as you please 
tell me that object 0 is called "0", but how do I check that they 
really are people and that they are saying "0",.and so on. It seems 
to me that they are saying that I'm right, so I seem as right as I 
can be'. "Justification by experience , comes to an end. If it did 
not it would not be justification. ° A point is reached where "seems 
right" becomes "is right". 
Nor need the boundary between "seems right" and "i s right" be 
a distinct one, and neither has the boundary disappeared altogether. 
There is still room --fer"is right" and "seems right" in both public 
and private cases. 
5. The Need for Public Checking  
One of the paradoxes of the -investigations is that checking 
comes to an end in the public:case, but does not come to the same 
end in the private one. At least the end should be the same in both 
cases, so why is it not? The answer is not easy to find. It starts 
with the nature of Wittgenstein's approach to Philosophy, that philo-
sophical problems are to be rendered harmless by an empirical study 
of the functioning of language. When we get a clear view of how words 
are used, the problems disappear. The Cartesian view, and the views 
1. P.I., I, § 485. 
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of the British Empiricists, and phenomenalists involve the idea of a 
private language, and Wittgenstein tries to remove the problematic 
conclusions of these views by comparing the function of our words for 
public objects to the function of our words used for sensations, 
the latter being said to be private objects. 
To understand how we use words he goes back to examine how we 
begin to use words, how we are trained to use them. The use of words 
must be correct or incorrect so Wittgenstein now takes up position 
on the vantage point of himself as teacher asking himself whether the 
pupil's use of words is correct or incorrect. Then the easy way of 
characterising the difference between public and private language is 
that to check the pupil's use of a word for a public object the teacher 
looks to see that he is referring to the correct object, but to check 
the pupil's use of a word for a private object, there is no object 
for the teacher to check on, for it is quite beyond his experience. 
I say it is the easy way because it is not clear that Wittgen-
stein would agree at all with this characterisation. For at times 
the use of a public word is not checked by just checking to see if it 
is the right object. In dealing with ostensive definitions of words 
used for public objects he says that "an ostensive definition can be 
variously interpreted in every case".
1 
And whether a pupil has under-
stood the definition is not determined just by looking at the object, 
but by seeing "the use that he makes of the word defined". 2 Here 
the use of the word seems to be more important than the correctness 
of the object. Still, it is logically impossible to have the correct 
use if you have the wrong object. 
The teacher cannot judge that the pupil has correct use if there 
1. P.I., I, § 28. 2. P.I., I, § 29. 
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has been only one occasion of that use. "But how far need he continue 
the series for us to have the right to say that? Clearly you cannot 
state a limit here. ° But there is an indistinct boundary which is 
crossed. 
When he comes to consider private objects, the teacher is not 
teaching any more, but is an observer of a pupil inventing words for 
his private objects. The observer cannot in the nature of the case 
tell whether the pupil has the right object. So he is left with 
observing a regular use. But to be a regular use there has to be a 
regular object, so the observer cannot tell whether the pupil's 
private use is correct or not. So the indistinct boundary is never 
reached in the private case. 
Basically Wittgenstein's view is that language is a public 
institution, learned in a social situation, and the use of all the 
public words has to be publicly checkable. Our words for sensations 
are public words, so they too must be publicly checkable. Private 
objects cannot be publicly checked so if sensation words refer to 
private objects, those words too cannot be publicly checked. So 
sensation words do not refer to private objects. Another role has 
to be found for them - the expressive use. So public checking of 
sensation words ends in a different way from that of words referring 
to public objects, for these two types of words have quite different 
uses. 
I would like now to place some of my criticisms of Wittgenstein's 
attack on private language more concisely. 
Firstly, I accept Ayer's criticism that for a person to check 
1. P.I., I, § 145. 
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whether his word for a public object is correct or not ends up with 
the sort of checking that Wittgenstein attributes to the private 
diarist. The same point is reached in both private and public areas 
of checking, the point where a check is taken as valid in itself, and 
where "seems right" is replaced by "is right". So private checking 
and public checking have the same basis. 
Secondly, the expressive use model does not get over the problem 
of private checking. One might try to deny that "correct" and "true" 
can apply to natural expressions of sensation, but it would still be 
correct to say that the natural expressions are appropriate or inappro-
priate. So that I could go through a process of private checking to 
judge whether my expression of pain was •consistent with what I had 
previously regarded as appropriate or not. I would also decide an 
end to my checking. But what Wittgenstein decides is that the end of 
this private checking is the beginning.
1 
 This seems to be a decision 
to regard any natural expression as appropriate no matter what. 
With the expressive use model for "pain" the possibility of 
mistake is supposed to be ruled out, whereas if the referring model 
is retained mistake would be possible in referring to private objects 
as it is when we refer to public objects. It is said that with our 
natural expression of'sensations there is no room for intellectual 
error. According to this view crying would be neither true nor false. 
One could not cry in pain wrongly. When we replace our natural expres-
sions of sensations with the expressive use of words, then with those 
words no intellectual mistake is possible. 
But is seems to me that the mistakes possible when me -conSidered 
1. Cf. P.1., I, 290. 
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the truth or falsity of the incorrigibility thesis could apply to the 
expressive use model.. E.g., in the E.E.G. experiments we might find 
that the autocerebroscope shows that a subject occasionally makes a 
cry when the brain state is that of a tickle rather than a pain. The 
finding of a fault in the brain may show why this happens. The mis-
take may not be an intellectual one, but it might be said that the cry 
was false, or that it was not a true cry, or that the subject was 
wrong in crying then. 
When it comes to replacing the natural expression of sensation 
by words used expressively a further error could occur. For could not 
one replace the natural behaviour by the wrong words, e.g., someone 
says "I am in pain" when his behaviour is consistent with being• 
tickled and later he says he was not in fact in pain? 
So it is difficult to see how replacing the referring model for 
"pain" by the expressive use model really alleviates problems of 
incorrigibility. As Wittgenstein holds to the incorrigibility thesis 
why not say that the beginning of the language game is an incorrigible 
referring rather than an incorrigible expressing? For similar prob-
lems attach to both. If "I am in pain" is a statement about my pain, 
then I can either legitimately ask the question as to whether it is 
correct, or not legitimately ask that question, and if "I am in pain" 
is an expression of my pain, then the same applies to questions of 
appropriateness. Deciding about . theTeferring or expressive status 
of "I am in pain" only brings about a deciding that hardly matters 
between using "correctness" or "appropriateness". 
A similar point, starting in another way, is as follows: "an 
expression. But this is not the end of the language game: it is the 
beginning." 1  So if a sensation occurred which had no natural 
1. P.1., I, § 290. 
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expression (if I had the right to call it a sensation, which I do 
not have1 ), then a public language game would not get going at all. 
Suppose one day a sensation occurs and I think "S". Would that not 
count as an expression of S? Then we have the beginnings of a language 
game. The private language game could begin with a private expression. 
It is important to see that writing down "S" could be construed not 
only as an attempt to ass6ciate 'S' with the accusation, or to name 
the sensation, but also as an expression of the sensation. 
Now we must wonder whether it is ever sensible to ask "Was that 
the right expression for that sensation I just had?" Surely it makes 
sense to say "I just said 'I am in pain' then, but that was wrong for 
it was a tickle which I expressed wrongly as a pain". When one 
starts to talk of expressing a sensation wrongly who can tell but 
myself - if it is the whole behaviour which is expressed wrongly and 
not just a part of it - that I have wrongly expressed it? When I lie 
I know that I am lying. "You knew you were lying", "I knew that tt 
was a lie" have uses. I can tell when I do not express a sensation 
correctly. So that problems about remembering "the connexion right 
in the future" do not occur with remembering the expression right in 
the future. One's justifications do come to an end with the expres-
sion, one just uses the expression with ri ght.? But if this is so 
with expressions then it is hard to see why it should not be so with 
association, namings, etc. 
Malcolm says "... the sensation behaviour. They are the 'outward 
criteria' (580) with which the sign must be connected if it is to be 
a sign for a sensation at all, not merely if it is to be a sign in a 
common language" ..."sensation behaviour, ... is what makes it refer 
1. Cf. P.1.„ § 261. 2. P.1., I, § 289. 
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to a sensation."
1 
But making a mark and having sensation behaviour are physical 
public events, so it is hard to see how one should be less of a creator 
of a bond of reference than the other. Of course his mere making of 
a mark does not tell us anything about the sensation. It, the sensa-
tion, is not put into relationship with anything else but the mark, 
if the making of the mark is not in any way related or unrelated to 
other public events. I cannot put myself in any special position or 
situation that he was in so that I might have the sensation. No 
duplication of his special surroundings for myself is possible if I 
do not have any idea about what special surroundings are appropriate. 
But then if I knew what the surroundings were and had a sensation the 
name could be public, not private. 
But for him there need not be any particular sensation behaviour, 
nor any particular surrounding for the occurrence of the sensation. 
He need not know whether it is related or unrelated to anything other 
than the mark. All he need do is recognise the sensation and give it 
the same name as before. He relies upon his memory. 
Thirdly, the expressive use model could be extended to words 
which on the face of it have the referring model of use. "How does 
a human being learn the names of objects?" we might ask. There are 
characteristic expressions of being aware of a book. A child turns 
its eyes in the direction of the book, extends its hands and picks it 
up, fumbles, opens it and looks at it. When the child has been taught 
the word "book" and has learnt to use it in different situations, may 
he not have learnt a new book behaviour? These expressions one might 
say are the beginnings of the language game. For I do not identify 
1. N. Malcolm, "Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations", in 
Essays, Ed. G. Pitcher, p.97. 
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the book by criteria, but repeat my expressions of being aware of 
a book. ("No criteria here" - that sounds strange, but it might be 
just because red patches and pains are more simple than books.) 
But can I not say "I know I am aware of a book"? "No" we might say, 
on this model that just means "I am aware of a book" and that that is 
an expression replacing natural behaviour. 
It all sounds pretty implausible, doesn't it? So why should it 
sound so plausible for sensations? But how do the teachers know that 
the pupil is aware of a book. They see his behaviour and they are 
aware of a book themselves, and that is all. If they are trying to 
teach him to refer to books by the word "book" how are they to know 
that he has got the use of the word right? Here there is no demand 
that they make more sure than they can be that he is aware of the 
book. They take it that he is. This is where they begin. But that 
does not stop the referring model so why should it in the case of 
pain? For the only difference in the two cases is that the teachers 
may not at the time be feeling pain themselves. 
Fourthly, thb public object as well as the private would be got 
rid of by assuming that it is constantly changing, only no one 
notices the change. I start with myself. "I cast a sidelong glance 
at the private sensation" 1 and name it "S". If I do not notice it 
constantly changing then really I am calling different things by the 
same name "S", when I think it is the same thing. I think I am correct 
when I am not. And there is no one to correct me. I have no way of 
deciding whether I correctly use "S" or not. So there is no way of 
deciding whether "S" refers to the private sensation. 
The case is different we might think if I call public object 0 
1. P.I., I, 274. 
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by the name "0" but I do not notice it constantly changing. (E.g., 
the flashing colours of Canopus) For then other people who notice 
the change could correct me. And indeed this is a different case. 
But what if other people do not notice the change also. This is just 
a change in the number of people not noticing the change, from one to 
many, so it differs from the case of one person not noticing the change 
merely by being less likely to actually occur. But if it does occur 
the case is just like the first, so we have no way of deciding whether 
we correctly use "0" or not. So there is no way of deciding whether 
"0" refers to the public object. 
What if the private item named "E" was in fact constantly chang-
ing, only I was unaware of this change? If any practical consequences 
followed from the changing, then I would be aware of the possibility 
of the changing. But with no practical consequences following from 
the changing, then what does it matter if there is that changing. 
As in the nature of Wittgenstein's case there is no hope of finding 
out further that you anewrongAhen it is hopeless to worry about it. 
If you feel that "["is the correct name and there is no possibility 
of being proved wrong, then you must be right. 
We have asked whether the objects in the public world are 
constantly changing. Suppose that the colours of objects appear to 
us to be stable, but in fact they are constantly changing. As long 
as no practical consequences follow from this then it does not matter. 
It would be different if to others colours began to constantly change, 
whereas for me'all was the same. Then there would be a clash to be 
resolved. (If everything became a.chameleon.) 
In both the public and private case we must reach a point where 
it is sensible to give up doubt. An hallucination which is as good 
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as reality is reality. 
Here we see another example of tension in Wittgenstein - tension 
between feeling that doubts in the private case are real doubts and 
that doubts in public cases are unjustified. 
6. The Beetle in the Box Argument  
The beetle in the box argument of § 293 is relevant here. There 
is no agreement amongst authors on what is the conclusion of this argu-
ment. Nor do I think it is clear what the conditions of the argument 
are. I suppose that the size and weight of the boxes must be the 
same, or else the person with a match box might have good reason to 
think that the person with a coffin carried a different sort of beetle. 
I presume that although everyone's beetle may be different, no one has 
anyway of telling whether his beetle is different from the others. 
So what we said about the contents of our boxes and the way we behaved 
with them would have to be the same. If I said that my beetle was red 
with six legs and you said yours was green with eight legs we would 
have reason to believe •that our beetles were different. These pro-
visions bring the argument in line with the actual case of attempting 
to name sensations, e.g. §271, where each of us could be calling 
different things by the same name but all of us so far as we can 
tell, use the word in the same way. 
Now it is clear that the beetles might be anything at all, 
constantly changing, all different, or even nothing, but it is not 
clear, whateverf006-14 -Wdrops out of consideration" or "cancels 
out", why it has'no place in the language game. For.if my beetle 
stopped changing, became different, instead of nothing became some-
thing, or instead of something became nothing,.i.e., if it did actually 
drop out or cancel out, then my behaviour would change. For each 
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person the object still has a place in the game. If the beetle 
dropped out, people would throw away their boxes and never use "beetle". 
What drops out of consideration is not the object, but I am left with 
the feeling that something must drop out. Perhaps it is that the nature 
of the case excludes us finding out that our beetles are different, 
so considerations of whether they are the same or different have been 
dropped out of the case. If the provisions of the case are such that 
it is possible for some new technique to be discovered for seeing 
into other people's boxes, then considerations of whether our beetles 
are the same or not still have a place. 
Let us try and set up a parallel to the beetle in the box argu-
ment for public objects. Suppose everyone's box is transparent and 
everyone says what a beetle is by looking at any beetle. Suppose 
everyone had something different in his box, or that the beetles were 
constantly changing, or that all the boxes were empty, and now we 
stipulate that these facts have no effect on the way people behave 
with respect to beetles, for they all think they have the same sort 
of beetle, that they are not constantly changing, and that they are 
not nothing. If we construe the grammar of the word "beetle" on the 
model of object and designation, it is hard to see that the beetles 
drop out of consideration as irrelevant. The word "beetle" designates 
what they think a beetle is. 
According to Donagon, 1 Wittgenstein made a mistake in saying that 
the object drops out in the case of sensations, for the existence of 
that which accompanies natural pain behaviour is cardinal to the 
meaning of pain words. "What is irrelevant is not the existence of 
the object, but what it happens to be."
2 
But we can imagine a person 
1. Alan Donagon, "Wittgenstein on Sensation", in Essays, Ed. Pitcher, 
p. 347. 
2. Op.cit., p. 347. 
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who only behaves as we do when in pain when he has nothing, and when 
he has what we would call pain, he behaves as if not in pain and 
has been taught to say "I am not in pain". So if "pain" was to desig-
nate a private object that object could be nothing. What is hard 
to see is why even a nothing should drop out. 
Pitcher rightly •avers that Wittgenstein is "denying a particular 
thesis about language; namely that the word 'pain' names or designates 
this something. that the person feels", 1 but goes on to say that for 
Wittgenstein in - our actual language "The private sensations whatever 
they may be play no part at all". 2 Cook3 criticises him on this, 
saying that the object only'drops out if you "construe the grammar 
of the expression of sensation.on the model:6f 'object and designation'"1 
.;aolcitheobject does not drop out if the model is expressive use. I 
find it hard to see that changing the model makes apy difference to 
the dropping out. But that aside, Cook then says that to give an 
account of the public language game with sensation words we must 
"reject the view that sensations are . private. In Wittgenstein's words 
we must reject 'the grammar which tries to force_itself . on.us here i 2 
(P.I., 304)." But these two rejections obviously do not amount to 
the same thing. If sensations are public why bother with the expres-
sive use model, for Public ostensive definition could then be used, 
so that you would have the model "object and designation". 
For Malcolm the private object "can have no part in determining 
whether the person who has it understands the word". 6 This may be true, 
1. George Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 298. 
2. Op.cit.,p. 299. 
3. John W. Cook, "Wittgenstein on Privacy", in Essays, Ed. G. Pitcher, 
p. 321. 
4. P.I., I, § 293. 
5. J.W. Cook, op.cit., p. 322. 
6. N. Malcolm, op.cit., p. 79. 
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but it does not go against the model of object and designation. That 
you have no idea of what someone else might be naming does not mean 
that he is not naming a private object. 
Winch
1 
emphasises the difference between the Tractatus view and 
the Investigations view of the relationship between object and name. 
In the Tractatus a simple correlation is set up between object and 
name. The Investigations ass how this correlation is set up. How 
do I know which object the word is supposed to correlate with? To 
find out that we have to see the use of the word in a variety of 
situations. The grammar or the use of a word gives the lie to the 
object it names. Thus the use that a word has is seen to be primary 
and so the object drops out of consideration as of secondary importance. 
Here is the analogy with the beetle in the box. • Alist concentrating 
your attention on X and saying "X" does not name an object whether the 
object is private or public. The reference to an object is not just 
problematic in the private case. The object in the public case drops 
out as well, only here because it is of secondary relevance, whereas 
in the private case it drops out because public inspection of it is 
not in the game. Winch then says "For this reason it seems to me that 
it might be a symptom of confusion to insist too vehemently and for 
too long that 'pain' is not the name of an object. Of course it would 
be equally confused to insist too vehemently and for too long that 
'pain' is the name of an object." 2 "Pain" can name an object, and just 
which object is shown by the language games into which "pain" enters. 
I think that Winch is stretching it a bit if he thinks that 
Wittgenstein would agree with him. Wittgenstein wanted to deny that 
1. Peter Winch, "Introduction: The Unity of Wittgenstein's 
Philosophy" in Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
2. P. Winch, op.cit., p. 18. 
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"pain" is the name of a private sensation. But he does show that there 
is another parallel to the beetle in the box argument for public 
objects. 
The public object does have a part in determining whether a person 
understands a word. If the pupil uses "slab" for blocks instead of 
slabs he is naming the wrong objects. But what if I think he is correct-
ly using "slab", only where I see slabs he sees something else, then 
he is still naming an object although I have no idea what it is. So 
long as I always think he is using a word for a public object correctly, 
what he is really naming makes no difference to me. 
If Wittgenstein was right about private objects he could also 
say "Always get rid of the idea of a public object in this way: assume 
that it constantly changes but that no one notices the change because 
their memories constantly deceive them") 
 
7. Wittgenstein's Difficulty of Talking About Private Objects  
Wittgenstein is in a peculiar position with respect to the private 
language problem. For if you cannot refer to private objects, how 
can you state a reductio absurdum? How can you postulate a private 
language and reduce it to absurdity? 
Wittgenstein "would like to say" that sensations are private, it 
is just that nothing can be said of them as private objects, so he 
has to "show" that sensations are private by an examination of grammar. 
For him nothing can be said about private objects, not even that they 
exist. That is why when he mentions them he usually uses italics. 
Nor does he deny that sensations are private objects. "The conclusion 
was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about 
which nothing could be said." 2 But that only follows if we accept 
1. Cf., P.I., II, p. 207. 2. P.I., I, § 304. 
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the beetle in the box conclusion. 
One of Wittgenstein's problems is not to make it look "as if 
there were something one couldn't do. As if there really were an 
object, from which I derive its description, but I were unable to 
show it to anyone -" 1 His move is to yield to this urge and use it 
as a picture, and then to see if there is any application for the 
picture. 
There is still trouble for him in even getting a picture for any 
word from our public language has a public use. So in § 261 he cannot 
call "SP, the sign for a sensation, for "sensation" has a public use. 
The same goes for "something". "So in the end when one is doing 
philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit 
an inarticulate sound."
2 
(But "sensation" here should not refer to a 
public object either - rather it is an expression of sensation.) The 
temptation in using the picture is to say something about the existence 
of private objects. The conclusions of his argument preclude him 
from doing this. 
It would be wrong to agree with Castartieda that Wittgenstein was 
attacking "the idea of a private object". 3 He was attacking "the 
grammar which tries to force itself on us".
4 
One should also be careful in :agreeing with Chappell that Witt-
genstein "is not trying to show something about language, but rather 
about sensations or mental phenomena. Linguistic considerations are 
the means, but an understanding of the latter is the end." 5 He was 
against these philosophical views which construed sensationsas 
P.I., I, §74. 4. P.I., I, § 304. 
2. P.I., I, § 261. 5. Chappell, op.cit., p.168. 
3. Castatteda, op.cit., p.138. 
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private objects about which we could be certain, and tried to dispel 
these views by an examination of language. He was not trying to show 
something about sensations as such, but about philosophical views of 
them. "It shows a fundamental misunderstanding, if I am inclined 
to study the headache I now have in order to get clear about the 
philosophical problem of sensation."1 
1. P.I., I, § 314, and cf. § 274, § 370. II, p. 204. 
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VIII. 	.PRIVATE EXPERIENCE 
1. Water Boils in a Pot  
Much more is made of § 297 than appears to be literally in it. 
"Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot 
and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if 
one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in 
the picture of the pot?" 1 
The pictured steam does not come out of the pictured pot, so 
"comes out of" must be wrong here. Steam coming out of a pot is pic-
tured, but the picture loses something of reality, for a static 
picture cannot have as part of the picture the motion of anything 
coming out. A movie film would be needed for that, but even then the 
motion is an illusion. 
But apart from that the last sentence I suppose means just what 
it obviously says. There is no "something boiling", i.e., water boil-
ing in the picture. But neither is there steam coming out, nor a pot. 
In this metaphor water boiling is pain, steam coming out is pain 
behaviour, the pot is the person's body. A picture or a movie film 
of someone in pain has no pain in it. Language too is like a picture. 
.2 
He is in pain"; He has something  "'Yes, but there is some- 
thing there all the same accompanying my cry of pain .3  . ; those 
sentences are like pictures, but in saying them there is not displayed 
the pain or the something. (If I try to refer to my pain and say 
"I am in pain", even if that utterance was a picture it would not show 
you what my private object, pain, was.) 
1. P.I., I, § 297 2. P.I., I, § 294. 3. P.I., I, § 296. 
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The person uttering the statements on § 296 is supposing that he 
is conveying information about his pain to someone else. § 297 shows 
that he does not show someone else what his pain is like by uttering 
those sentences, for the pain is not in the picture. The sentence 
"I have a beetle in my box" does not contain a beetle. 
So Pitcher is right here. "The liquid in the pot is no part of 
the picture. 11 Pitcher then goes-on to talk about "language games 
which involve the picture do not contain-references to the contents 
of the pot".
2 
Rather, if you use the picture in a language game then 
that picture does not contain the contents of the pot, i.e., the words 
"references to" should be deleted, for the language game involving 
the picture may contain- references. to the contents of the pot. The 
problem of reference is not the concern of § 297. That is dealt with 
in § 300 and § 301. 
It seems obvious that this does not mean that you cannot talk 
about your pain, or the type of liquid that might have been in the pot 
- as rightly pointed out by -Donagon. 3 Although Donagon's criticism 
of Pitcher does not seem to notice that Pitcher does say - "It would 
"4 
be absurd to start talking about the liquid in the pictured pot ... 
i.e., it would not be absurd to start talking about the liquid in the 
pot. Donagon should not have said "It is true that the pictured pot 
does not contain, as a part, pictured boiling water".
5 
- that is not 
in question there. (Anyway part of the picture could be pictured 
boiling water - if it was drawn from above with the lid off.). Rather 
it is true that the pictured pot does not contain as a part, boiling 
water. 
1. G. Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p.300. 
2. Op.cit., p. 300. 
3. A. Donagon, "Wittgenstein on Sensation", in Essays, 
Ed. G. Pitcher, p. 330. 
4. G. Pitcher, op.cit. p.299. 5. A. Donagon, op.cit., p. 330. 
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Donagon goes on to interpret § 300 and § 301, and says that 
a picture or A9247/,-of pain does not enter into the language game with 
the word "pain". Rather an imaginative representation or 
"of pain certainly enters into the language game in a sense; only not 
as a picture.
1 
The words "in a sense" here may indicate that it is 
not as simple as that even. It is not clear for instance what the 
relationship is between the picture of the behaviour, the paradigm 
of the behaviour, and the words "He is in pain". "He is in pain" is 
partly an imaginative representation of his pain, and it seems to be 
implicit that it is partly a picture of his pain behaviour, although 
the sentence is altogether more like what Donagon would call an 
imaginative representation and not like a picture. It is difficult 
to make out whether Wittgenstein is talking about the word "pain" 
being a picture or an imaginative representation, or whether involved 
in some language game with the word "pain" there -are pictures or 
imaginative representations of pain, used perhaps for teaching. 
But what is said in § 300 is not a repetition of § 297 (water 
boiling in a pot). When Kenny deals with this subject he criticises 
Pitcher for saying that Wittgenstein means "that sensations do not 
enter into pain language games". 2 And Indeed it looks as though 
Pitcher may have said this, for "pain language games do not contain 
references to our private sensatiens, since these, like the contents 
of the pictured pot, cannot be talked about".
3 
For of course there 
are no contents of the pictured pot, so there could not be references 
to them and nor could they enter in. Now Wittgenstein was against 
pain language games containing references to private sensations, but 
not because private sensations are like the contents of the pictured 
1. P.1., I, § 300. 
2. A. Kenny in The Private Language Argument. Ed. O.R.Jones, p. 224. 
3. G. Pitcher, op.cit., p. 300. 
pot. Rather, the referring model is the wrong model, and the expres-
sive use model is the right one. So Pitcher was wrong to say that 
private sensations "play no part in our language games", 1 although 
he is right in attributing to Wittgenstein the point that "nothing 
can be said about them".
2 
Then Kenny says, "What Wittgenstein is denying is not that 
sensations enter into the language game, but that pictures of sensations 
do." 3 But this is what is denied in § 300, not in § 297. 
I think that in § 297 Wittgenstein is denying that sensations 
literally enter into sentences containing the Word "pain" (that is 
not to deny that sensations enter into language games concerning the 
word "pain"). Producing a picture of the pot does not produce the 
pot, and so even if you could picture a sensation, that would not 
produce the sensation. 
2. The Private Language Arguments Work Cryptically  
Perhaps the private language arguments do work in a cryptic sort 
of way. As soon as someone has named or made a noise expressing a 
supposed private sensation, that sensation is related to something 
public, the name or noise, and so the sensation itself becomes in a 
way public, just as someone's pains are made known to us by their 
public behaviour. 
The necessarily private sensation is not to be relatable to 
anything public, or else it becomes not necessarily private. So it 
is impossible to name a necessarily private sensation. This indicates 
that the language game we play with sensations is a public one, not 
1. G. Pitcher, op.cit., p. 300. 
2. Op.cit., p. 300. 3. A. Kenny, op.cit., p. 224. 
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a private one. For a language game to be private, there must be no 
expression, no natural behaviour, perhaps not even a spoken word. 
This still makes no sense of the passages in the Philosophical 
Investigations on naming the sensation S, for there you are allowed 
to write down "S" on a page of a calendar. 
Still it is important that the sensation be related to something 
important if a public language game is to begin. But that is not all 
To understand someone else's feelings you have to have feelings your-
self. 
3. The Need for Experiences of Your Own  
Take Manser's
1 
example of the discovery of the feeling of an 
electric shock. The electric shock, a new sensation, is given the 
sign E. He says this is not a name, but a mere code word for what I 
get from such and such a device, or for the description in terms of 
existing sensation vocabulary. I could communicate my meaning to 
others. 
Communication through the word "machine" seems. alright. I look 
at him and see what he is looking at, i.e., the machine, and he says 
"machine" and I say "machine". Then I put my hand on the machine 
and jump back and say "electric shock", and he does likewise, and I 
. see him and hear him say "electric shock". In this way what he means 
by "electric shock" is just asmysterious or as obvious as what he 
means by "machine". 
But when I talk to a middle-aged man and he has psychological 
problems, the whole of his life is beset by some peculiar attitude 
or feeling or whatever it might be, and no matter how long we talk 
1. A. Manser, Pain and Private Language, in Studies, Ed. Winch. 
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that day I can get no closer to understanding whathe is talking about. 
What am I trying_thunderstand here? . Am I trying to know his feelings, 
have them? Or am I trying to have feelings of my own in circumstances 
similar to his, only I cannot because I am not middle-aged and am not 
a hard pushing successful bulldozing contractor. It is as if I stood 
in front of the machine, put my hands on it, but felt nothing, and 
had no reaction. What is it then. that he is feeling? Here what he 
calls an electric shock is a complete mystery to me. Whatever he is 
naming or expressing I cannot apprehend it. 
So it often happens that others try to communicate some feeling, 
the feeling of experiencing God, the mystical oneness with - the aima-it,!,, 
the feeling of standing on a mountain top, the feeling of fear that 
incomplete knowledge may kill someone, the feeling of responsibility, 
all these I may at one time regard as beyond my ken, and at another 
time I know or understand what is meant. Now, in trying to under-
stand the feelings of a child, I may fail, because I have forgotten 
the feelings I had. 
What seems to be needed to understand what someone else is 
talking about is to latch onto some experience of your own and give 
it the same name as he gives his, whatever it is. Whether we are 
talking about the samething or not depends upon whether we find 
clashes or not. We tend to judge anyone else's feelings and motives 
by our own. 
There is a feeling of no rapport. It is not just the cases where 
someone has an experience but exhibits no behaviour whatever, not 
even saying anything about it, but it is also the case where there is 
as much behaviour as you would want, and yet perhaps even when you put 
yourself in the appropriate situation, you can get nothing at all which 
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might be what he is talking about. 
Where do we seem to end up then? About squares and circles there 
is little doubt that we are referring to the same thing. With colours 
it is a little less certain, for some of us are colour blind. With 
sensations such as pains and aches we are probably as certain as with 
colours. With feelings like experience of God, oneness with the 
atman, and others indescribable there is a lot of doubt, for many of 
us.havenever had the feeling. There is some doubt in all cases. Each 
of us could be experiencing totally different things, and yet communi-
cate as we do now. 
4. The Importance of Wittgenstein's Insights  
But has not Wittgenstein shown something important about our use 
of public sensation words? By just casting an inward glance at the 
private sensation you are not going to - be able to give it a name 
which has a public use. Pitcher agrees that the natural expressions 
associated with sensations are needed to begin public language.
1 
Such 
expressions may even form part of our concept of a sensation, a self 
ascription of pain without appropriate behaviour or disposition to 
that behaviour would not be called pain. 
As soon as my words for sensations are tied up with the natural 
expressions, then my language becomes public. Others can correct me. 
The trouble is that the demand for correct public usage led to a 
denial that a person could have a correct private usage. But not 
only that, for it was consequently shown that the public word for a 
sensation could not refer to-any sensations regarded as private objects 
behind the public natural expression, and that such private objects 
1. G. Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 291. 
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could not be talked about at all. Such .private objects are shown 
not to be part of my concept of a sensation at all 
5. Teaching Expressive Use  
But how does Wittgenstein go when he tries to teach a child to 
replace his primitive natural expression of pain by the words "I am 
in pain"? 
Some people think that "droll" means "funny", others that it 
means "boring" .
1 
 In the case of the ostensive teaching of "droll" 
the situation before us is a play, and it happens to be a bit funny 
but also a little dull or boring. The teacher says that it is droll. 
The pupil has to pick out the features that the teacher is referring 
to. With most words the pupil picks out the right feature, but with 
other words some people pick out some other feature. They also seem 
to get by with their unusual use of the word without other people ever 
picking up the error, so that correction comes to them as a surprise. 
Why did they pick out the wrong feature? Mere sounds of words are 
able to evoke feelings. In the case - of "droll" the mere sound of the 
word evokes the feeling of boredom, depression, dullness. Also it 
happens that things referred to as droll often have, apart from their 
amusement, a fair share of those elements. So we have here a combin-
ation of the emotional feeling that the sound of a word evokes and 
the fact that there are other features which tend to be of the uni-
versally accompanying type. (It would be interesting to know how 
someone found the emotive power of the word "droll" who thought that 
it meant that something was "ecstatically hilarious". Emotive power 
of the sounds of words probably depends upon. emotions associated both 
with our use of these words and words similar in sound to them.) In 
1. Prof. W.D. Joske told me of this peculiarity. 
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these circumstances then one can pick out the wrong features and fail 
to be corrected. 
What of the word "belated"? For a long time I thought that this 
meant "out of breath" or "puffed out". This word has no particular 
emotive power on me, but I failed to see its simple obvious relation-
ship to "late". Possibly I learnt the word at a,time when a objective 
feature like a person , panting was more obvious than a not so well 
spelt out relationship between the expected time of arrival and where 
0 
the hands of the clock actually stood. In any case, many people who 
are late also happen to be short of breath from having run to try 
and meet a dead line. So there is a more or less universally accompany-
ing feature of belatedness which I wrongly took as the meaning. 
Suppose someone is a diffident person and when told he is diffi-
dent he is not sure about what is being said of him. He thinks that 
what is meant is that he is indifferent (the words seem similar any-
way), perhaps to the feelings of others, and too much centred on his 
own thoughts. So he understands wrongly for a while, until one day 
he looks up the dictionary to find that •he merely lacks confidence in 
himself. 
With some words, in the early stages of our-life it is difficult 
to pick out at all which features the word is supposed to refer to. 
How does one know the meaning of being responsible or irresponsible 
until one has actually been conscious of being responsible for bringing 
about some state of affairs such as a mistake in car design which in 
all probability kills a few people, or being responsible for the 
upbringing of a child, or for an argument, or the school magazine. 
One has to feel responsible to.understand the meaning of "responsible". 
One must have a consciousness or an opinion of one's self if one is 
117. 
to know what it means to be conceited, and this only comes at a 
certain age. New experiences are had as we grow, and where they 
cannot be named or described by one's present linguistic armament new 
words are to be learnt, new rules to be acquired. 
All these examples show some of the places where ostensive 
definition may fail, where we may pick up the wrong rules or have 
problems learning the rules. 
Now the interesting thing about picking out the wrong features, 
i.e., gaining the wrong rules, is that in the case of sensations one 
may do just that. In the case of being taught the word "pain" the 
child may tread on a nail, and when the child yells out and withdraws 
the teacher sympathises and says, "You're in pain, here, where does it 
hurt?" Perhaps the child sees someone tread on a nail and cry out 
"Ouch that hurts".: Mother may go to cut his toenails and he says, 
"Ow, it hurts", before •the scissors have even taken the first clip. 
She tells him to grow up. - "It hurt" is not far from "It is painful" 
which is near "I am in pain". These expressions are used in slightly 
different circumstances. I think according to Wittgenstein the rule 
to be learnt would be "don't express your pain by yelling and with- 
drawing, but say 'I am in pain'". One is not to learn the name of 
a sensation here, but the rule which concerns substituting an unnatur-
al expression for a natural primitive one. 
But what is it that stops the child from learning the wrong 
rule, i.e., might he not here pick out a feature of the situation, 
i.e., his private sensation of pain and name it "pain". In fact it 
would be a very sophisticated child ,who rejected the obvious feature 
when he is in pain and learned only the rule of using a more sophisti-
cated expression of pain, or a particularly dull child who could parrot 
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words in the right situation but not learn rules of the naming type. 
I am suggesting then that there is nothing to stop most of us 
from making a mistake in our use of words with respect to private 
sensations. Instead of or besides the rule about how to express pain, 
we also learn the rule which says "pain" is the name of the sensation 
pain. A survey may show that most people are of this opinion. 
If the private language arguments are right then most of us have 
learnt the wrong rules concerning sensation words. Which leaves us 
with a paradox of an area of language where the majority of the speakers 
are using the wrong rules. 
6. Telling that Someone is Apprehending  
Is there a difference between the way we find out whether someone 
is seeing something, and •the way we find out whether someone has a 
sensation? Consider the following examples. 
(a) The Spanish sailor who wrote down that he saw islands 450 miles 
south of Tasmania. Did he see them? No, there are 2000 feet of water 
there. He must have seen an iceberg. 
(a) ; The man in the train accident. Was he in pain? No, there was 
nothing wrong with him, he was not in the pain he thought he was. 
(b) Did Cook see Australia? Yes,it is there. 
(b)' Did the electric shock hurt him? Yes, it hurts me. 
(c) Did he see the punch coming? No, his head was turned the 
other way. 
(0' Did he feel the pain? No, he was anaesthetised, or, he has 
leprosy. 
(d) "Did you hear that?" - "Well I'm not deaf, am I!" 
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(d)' "Did that hurt?" - "My Oath!" 
These examples show that in most cases we find out whether some-
one is in pain or not in just the same way that we find out whether 
someone sees something or not. 
Sometimes we do not in a straight forward way use the argument 
from analogy to understand the feelings of another. E.g., a man has 
a phobia, he cannot stand anyone tapping his fingers on the desk, or 
tapping the desk with a pencil, etc. So he goes through avoidance 
behaviour and says he gets a feeling of disgust and a desire to get 
away. Does he have these feelings? Here we have a •case where we our-
selves do not have the feelings or behaviour in that situation, so 
we cannot use the argument from analogy. But we do not doubt him. 
Compare the pain of a hand in the fire. For fingers tapping substitute 
your hand in the fire, for avoidance behaviour, withdrawing the hand, 
and for the feeling of disgust, the feeling of pain. 
Problems seem to arise when we compare cases like him having a 
book in his hand and him having a pain in his stomach. When he says 
"I've got a book in my hand" I confirm this by seeing the book in his 
hand and seeing his eyes looking at the book, i.e., book-seeing 
behaviour. But when he says "I've got an ache in my stomach" I do not 
confirm this by feeing the ache although I do see his hand on his 
stomach (i.e., pain behaviour). But the reason why I do not feel an 
ache in his stomach is that my stomach nerves are not connected to his 
stomach. If they were so connected in the right way then I would 
also feel the ache. Now if the world was so constructed that I could 
not see the book in his hand, but could see his eyes looking at 
where I think the book is, then I would be as suspicious of his state-
ment that he could see the book as I would be about his reliability. 
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So I would test his reliability by putting other objects that I could 
see in his hand. Similarly with the stomach ache, I would test his 
reliability with respect to other pains. We would both put on tight 
hats and see if he has a headache when I do; I would jab him with pins 
and see whether he has a pain when I do; I would see whether he com-
plained of stomach ache every time he has gastroenteritis as I do when-
ever I get gastroenteritis; I would see if his hand in the flames 
caused him to say he has a pain as I do when my hand is in the fire. 
If he is reliable then I know he has a stomach ache just as well as 
I know he has a book in his hand when I cannot see the book. 
The normal case of the book is wrongly contrasted with the 
stomach ache, and should be contrasted with the case of us both having 
our hands in the fire, or both rolling in the nettles. The stomach ache 
is wrongly contrasted with the normal case of the book, and should be 
contrasted with the abnormal case of the book, or with the case of 
one man seeing a cave of diamonds before an earthquake destroys it, 
or the view of the sides of his nose seen from where his eyes are. 
If anyone remarks that pains just cannot •be handed around from 
one person to another like a book, then I would reply that they can 
be talked of being handed around as little or as much as smells and 
tastes are. One could also reply that books do not appear by a pin 
jabbing my skin, nor by us grasping the terminals of an electric shock 
machine. 
To know that he is seeing a book in his hand or is seeing the side 
of his nose from where his eyes are, I do not demand that I have his 
visual sense data. Nor do I demand that I have his pain experiences 
to know that he feels the pain of the flames too Or thathe has a 
stomach ache. 
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7. Pain Patches  
Strawson
1
hints that the problems of sensation can be explained 
by "the difference between the ways colours and pains enter into our 
lives".
2 
He considers some unrealized possibilities. Firstly he 
considers Wittgenstein's example of pain patches •in § 312 - "the sur-
faces of the things around us (stones, plants, etc.) have patches and 
regions which produce pain in our skin when we touch them".
3 
The pain 
would not be ascribed to the sufferer but to surfaces. 
The second example is that people feel pain in certain regions, 
so they ascribe pain to the region. 
In these cases instead of ascribing pain to persons one ascribes 
it to surfaces or regions. The point of these examples presumably is 
to make it less tempting to ascribe pain to the mind of the person. 
But it does not seem to be noticed that there are already cases very 
like pain patches, e.g., stinging nettles, and flames, which are pain-
ful. There are already lots of things that are painful, e.g., inflam-
mations, bruises, piles, broken legs, etc. Pain stands alongside heat 
swelling and redness in the list of cardinal signs of inflammation. 
There is a distinction between attributing pain either to the body or to 
material things other than the body, ancra further distinction between 
attributing pain either to material things or to the mind. We already 
have enough material things to attribute pain to without having to 
attribute it all to the mind. 
8. Pain and Sense Data  
I think that behind Wittgenstein's attitude to sensations is 
1. P.F. Strawson, "Review of Philosophical Investigations", in 
Essays. Ed. Pitcher, pp. 47-49. 
2. Op.cit.,p. 47. P./., I, § 312. 
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that they are in the same realm as sense data, and that for him they 
are equally problematical. He wants to say that we cannot refer to 
sensations or sense data but that they enter into language in a differ-
ent way. Instead of this I see sensations being in many instances 
much more in the realm of ordinary material objects, and consequently 
that language relating to sensations and material objects is more 
similar than Wittgenstein allows. His emphasis is mainly on the differ-
ences. This leads me to think-that sometimes sensations may be as 
public or as private as material objects. This is not the same as 
Cook's view that sensations are public, 1 for his view denies that 
"pain" refers to pain. 
When a sensation is a private one, that privacy is like the contin-
gent privacy of the destroyed cave of diamonds, not like the Wittgen-
steinian necessary privacy where sensation behaviour is defined out 
of the game. That you do not get a public language game about neces-
sarily private sensations does not mean that you do not get a public 
language about contingently private sensations. I have tried to show 
_ 
elsewhere that even a necessarily private sensation could be referred to. 
(E.g., in my sections on "Correctness" and "The need for public check-
ing". This view is later expanded and qualified in my sections 
"Contingent and necessary privacy" and "Necessarily private objects 
again".) 
When I started reading the pro-Wittgensteinians I often had the 
feeling that they were merely repeating his views rather than making 
them clearer. Now that .I have come to some terms with his views, and 
have been filled with the jargon, I hope that in the places where I 
have tried to state the Wittgensteinian side, I have not fallen into 
1. J.W. Cook, "Wittgenstein on Privacy", in Essays, 
Ed. G. Pitcher, p. 322. 
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the same trap. 
At this point in my work I began to reflect more on the notion 
of a private object, and have gradually produced what I now realize 
to be an expansion of the ideas of the last few pages on the privacy 
of sensations. I was amazed on re-reading what I had written nearly 
four years ago now, to find so much of the basis of my thoughts in 
the following pages. 
I should add too that I had thought one could have a necessarily 
private language, but on further reflection I do not think that one 
will be found. This does not however negate my criticisms of the 
private language arguments so far. 
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IX. ..TYPES.OF.PRIVACY 
1. Contingent and Necessary Privacy  
I wish to make a distinction between private objects of two types, 
those which are contingently private, and those which are necessarily 
private. 
Contingently private objects are objects which for some reason 
just happen to be accessible only to one person. Objects which at 
some time happen - to be viewed only by one person are contingently 
private for that time. A lone person in a room has an exclusive view 
of the objects in it, and is looking at contingently private objects. 
They are also potentially public objects, in that if someone else comes 
into the room, he too mayview them. It is rather difficult to find 
ordinary objects which one would class as public, and yet which in fact 
happen to be always contingently private. A private space such as a 
cave visited only by one person, or a meteor seen only by one person 
for a short time before its destruction would be examples. Thus one 
looks for private places and transitory things. 
Access by others to contingently private objects might be 
restricted by circumstance, in which case access by others is empiric-
ally possible, or the access might be restricted by laws of nature, 
in which case access by others is empirically . impossible. For instance, 
it is empirically impossible for two people to look effectively down 
an ordinary monocular microscope simultaneously. The magnified 
object is contingently private from time to time. First one person 
looks and describes, and then the other. With an extra eye-piece 
two people can look at once, and the magnified object is no longer 
contingently private. 
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Now to consider the definition of a necessarily private object. 
To be consistent this should be one where access by others is logically 
impossible. An object which would fit this sort of definition could 
be the sort of pain Wittgenstein is talking about in The Blue Book 1 
where the two people are sharing a common painful hand, and the gram-
matical rule is made that nevertheless "...'my pain is my pain and 
his pain is his pain'". 2 
One gets the impression that one could have had the whim instead 
n3 to make the grammatical rule "...'we both have the same pain',... 
But we are not told by Wittgenstein just what it is that makes us 
decide on which grammatical rule is to be made. The decision does not 
seem to rest on how the rule fits with other facts about the case for 
he says "(It would be no argument to say that the two couldn't have 
the same pain because one might anaesthetise or kill one of them while 
the other still felt pain.)" 4 For the former grammatical rule would 
fit that fact, and so would the latter! 
Perhaps a better guideline would be to choose the rule which was 
most consistent with other rules governing similar circumstances. 
E.g., if there is a boil on the hand then the respective rules are 
"my boil is my boil and his boil is his boil", and "we both have the 
same boil". Wittgenstein I believe would choose the latter, for he 
does say in the example that "'We feel pain in the same place, in the 
same body...'"
5 
But in The Blue Book Wittgenstein regards pain as a personal 
experience, and problems of. pain language are explained by grammatical 
rules. There appear to be two persons with a personal pain experience 
1. The Blue Book, p. 54. 4. Op.cit., pp. 54. 55. 
2. Op.cit., p. 54. 5. Op.cit., p. 54. 
3. Op.cit., p. 54. 
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each in the case of the common hand, so the rule accepted would be 
the former. 
But if one thinks of a slightly different example then a different 
conclusion is reached. 
A peculiar feature of pain is that it is usually placed at the 
same spot where the stimulated pain nerve fibre ending is. (This is 
not so with phantom pains and referred pains.) In contrast visual 
objects such as a gold tooth are not placed at the eye. 
So that if you detach your right forearm at the elbow and tempor-
arily attach his injured right forearm in its place then it might be 
objected (probably unreasonably) that you are feeling his pain through 
his pain receptors and not your own. To observe his gold tooth you 
just look with your eye, not his detached eyeball transplanted in 
place of yours (although this might be done). Perhaps one could 
further postulate then that when the forearm transfer occurs your pain 
fibres and endings move into his forearm more or less replacing his, 
or lying alongside his. 
I bring up this example because it seems to show up the bias of 
Wittgenstein's example of two people sharing a common arm. He says 
that his pain is his and yours is yours, and his example points to 
this conclusion. With my example one is more inclined to say that you 
are feeling his pain. 
Think if people could regularly place their appropriate pain 
fibres into the appropriate place in someone else's body, e.g., the 
pain fibres of my right index finger into his, or the pain fibres of 
my stomach into his when he has the gripes, I might be able to tell 
whether he really has got a sore finger or abdominal pain. 
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What would one say? "Now, I've got the sore finger"? Or "No, 
he's not malingering, I felt his pain"? It is not my finger, nor 
my stomach, and so this favours the latter. 
Wittgenstein does not deny that one can conceivably feel pain in 
places other than in one's own body, e.g., in a table perhaps, or in 
someone else's tooth.
1 
But for Wittgenstein it is still one's own 
pain, not someone else's. But if he can go so far as this, i.e., feel-
ing pains in other's bodies, why cannot he go a little further and 
feel others' pains? 
I think that which conclusion one reaches here depends firstly 
upon the example one invents, and secondly upon regarding pain in a 
biased sort of way as a personal experience. So pain is not neces-
sarily private. 
In § 253 Wittgenstein says "In so far as it makes sense to say 
that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to 
have the same pain".
2 
I do not think that in this section Wittgen-
stein indicates anything radically different from the passages in 
The Blue Book. He seems to indicate that it makes sense to say that 
two people have the same pain, i.e., pain in corresponding places, 
or in the same place (e.g., Siamese twins). He does not state that 
two people can feel the one pain, and I take it that he would regard 
this situation as one where it does not make sense. 
In the pain nerve transfer case I suppose the pain is in his arm, 
not mine. But suppose we rule that whose pain it is is determined 
by whose nerve fibres are being stimulated, and not by whose arm it 
is. Then my nerve fibres are being stimulated, so it is my pain, and 
his never fibres are being stimulated, so it is his pain also. And 
1. Cf., The Blue Book, p.53 2. P.1., I, § 253. 
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is there one pain or two? 
Or suppose a cup falls on the floor and we all feel pain in the 
table. 
The trouble with Wittgenstein's common arm is that it is not 
really or exclusively mine nor his. It might be regarded as ours, or 
as belonging to neither of,us. 
It begins to look as though whose pain it is is determined by 
which decision about rules you care to make, and this is so in some 
cases. The various cases require new decisions to be made if the old 
criteria result in contradictions. The decision is, however, made 
against our background of language experience. 
Suppose then that you and I have a boil each in the middle of 
our backs. I can see your boil and you can see mine, and suppose 
further for the moment that neither of us is to see the boil on his 
own back. 
Now suppose that we make the rule that your boil is the one you 
see and my boil is the one that I see, so that the boil on my back is 
:,,your_ boil and the boil on your back. is my-boil. Whose boil it is is 
determined by who sees it, and not by whose back it is on. 
Then following the analogy with the pain case (e.g., Hospers
,1
) 
it is logically impossible for me to see your boil. The quotation from 
Hospers' book is: 
"... whose pain it is would be determined by 
who feels it, not by whose body is injured. 
In this case it is logically impossible for 
me to feel yourpein." 
The second part which is the supposed consequence of the rule, it will 
be shown, does not follow., from the first part, which is the rule. 
1. J. Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, pp.298,299. 
2. J. Hospers, op.cit., p. 299. 
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On p. 54 of The Blue Book Wittgenstein characterises this 
impossibility as being explained by a "grammatical statement about the 
use of such a phrase as 'the same pain'. You say that you don't wish 
to apply the phrase, 'he has •got my pain' or 'we both have the same 
pain', and instead, perhaps, you will apply such a phrase as 'his pain 
is exactly like mine"! 1 ; i.e. Wittgenstein is more explicit in ruling 
that one is not to use the phrases "He •has got my pain" and "we both 
have the same pain" here. In the case of the boil then, for Wittgen-
stein, the rule should exclude the use of "he has got my boil" and 
"we both have the same boil". 
Now we must examine what happens when with the aid of mirrors 
I see your boil on my back and you see my boil on your back. What 
was your boil alone on my back is now also my'boil, and what was my 
boil alone on your back is now also your boil. I see your boil and you 
see mine, and the logical impossibility of this has vanished (like 
Alice, through the looking glass!). The same goes therefore for the 
pain case. There is no logical reason why something like a mirror (e.g., 
new nerve connections made) should not be found for the pain case, so 
the logical impossibility goes there too. 
Yet here in Hospers' case the rule is not in fact broken. We are 
still according to the rule. The logical impossibility was made to 
look as though it arose from definitions, and so was harmlessly gram-
matical, but really it arose from what are only empirical restrictions 
in the case, and so is no logical impossibility at all. 
For the Wittgensteinian characterisation, one is forced by my 
case to say "I see your boil", and "we see the same boil", so that 
Wittgenstein's types of rules here must be abandoned. Similarly 
1. 	The Blue Book, "p. 54. 
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Wittgenstein's rules do not apply in my pain case. 
Suppose whose boil it is is (in fact) determined as usual by 
whose back it is on, and let that be enshrined in a rule. Are we to 
say that it is logically impossible for me to have your boil? Suppose 
your boil is cut off your back and sewn onto mine. What was your boil 
is now mine. Or if that is not good enough suppose we become a form 
of Siamese twins with a common back with a boil on it. I have your 
boil and you have mine. 
The facts about pain which mislead us are that he who feels the 
pain almost always has it in his own body, and so whose pain it is 
is in fact usually determined by both who feels it and whose body has 
the pain. But the rule that whose pain it is is determined by who 
feels it does not exclude two people from feeling the same pain. What 
excludes that are empirical facts. 
If such a rule logically excluded two people from feeling that 
same pain, a similar rule (e.g., whose boil it is is determined by 
who sees it), would logically exclude two people from having the 
same boil. 
One thing is not made into two different things by making a lin-
guistic rule. That interpretation of the rule then should be abandoned 
as it can lead to absurdity. 
The rules "my pain is the pain I feel", "my boil is the boil I 
see", and "my boil is the boil on my body" could be interpreted as 
excluding the words "pain" and "boil" from applying to that which is 
the same, felt, seen, or had by two pdople. But such an interpretation 
of those rules does not exclude that which is the same, felt, seen, or 
had by two people from existence, so one wonders what the practical 
use of that interpretation would be. 
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2. Pain Patches  
The idea that it would all be different if people felt pain when 
they were in the region of certain plants etc. contrasts with my idea 
of pain becoming public by changes in our pain perception apparatus, 
in that the former is a more radical change in the concept of pain 
itself, whereas the latter is mainly a change in where we can put our 
pain nerve endings. 
Wittgenstein in § 313 says that one can exhibit pain, but the pre-
ceding passage, § 312, second paragraph, indicates that this exhibiting 
of pain can only take place in a world slightly different from our own, 
a world which has pain patches. His point is that our pains in the 
world as it is are not exhibited "as I exhibit red and as I exhibit 
straight and crooked and trees and stones",' but that they could be 
exhibited thus if the world had pain patches. 
From § 313 one tends to think that Wittgenstein holds after all 
that if one exhibits pains as one exhibits red, then "pain" may be 
the name of a sensation as "red" is the name of a colour. But in the 
light of § 312 this tendency is wrong. In § 312, first paragraph, 
pains are once again lumped with visual sensations (unless Wittgenstein 
has postulated an actual distinction between pain and the sensation of 
pain, which seems unlikely), and the conclusion I think he leads us to 
is that visual sensations are not exhibited, but that red patches are, 
and sensations of pain-are not exhibited, but pain patches could be. 
For me then there is some truth in the pain patch idea of pains 
but the pain patches are on our skin or in a tooth, so that the cases 
of the tooth and the pain (toothache) are similar, only the pain is 
contingently private. 
1. P.I., I, § 313. 
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3. Necessarily Private Objects Again  
Now it might be conceded that two people could conceivably feel 
the same pain •as per the pain nerve transfer case, yet it might still 
be said that even though the two people are feeling the same pain, 
yet each person has his own personal experience of that pain, and it 
is that personal experience which is necessarily private. Much as 
with two people looking at the same loaf, each having his own necessar-
ily private experience of the loaf. 
If one is still convinced that there are these necessarily private 
experiences, then there is a further way in which to get rid of them. 
We might still dream up even a further case other than the common arm 
and nerve transfer examples, say one where my brain is so integrated 
with yours that there is just one experience and two people conscious 
of it. Then perhaps two people can have the same personal experience 
of pain, and so it is once more a question of there ever being neces-
sarily private objects. In face of a complete collapse of the cate-
gory of necessarily private objects I want to leave this conclusion 
open to qualification for I think a useful distinction can still be 
made between contingently and necessarily private objects using a 
slightly looser and weaker concept of necessarily private objects. 
Let us consider an item which is nedessarily private in the 
strong sense, i.e., an item such that it is logically impossible for 
more than one person to have any apprehension of it. No such item 
is found, nor is an instance of it created by definition or grammati-
cal rules. For any item I can think of, it is logically possible 
that someone else has some apprehension of it,. and for any item that 
anyone else can think of, it is logically possible that I have some 
apprehension of it. If two or more people have some apprehension of 
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an item then a public language about it can get going. So for any 
item anyone can think of it is logically possible for it to be 
eeferred to in a public language. This rules out necessarily private 
language in this strong sense. 
I mentioned that there is a looser sense of necessarily private 
items, a sense in which to go against the item being necessarily private 
one has to imagine some sort of brain integration such that two people 
have the one experience of, for example, pain, or red. Such items are 
necessarily private in a weaker sense. One has to imagine what 
intuitively seems much more difficult, i.e., one has to imagine the 
more difficult task of carrying out brain integration rather than the 
less difficult task of carrying out forearm'or peripheral nerve 
transfers to deny that such items are necessarily private in a strong 
sense. (Thus it would be more accurate perhaps to say that such items 
are contingently private ma stronger sense rather than necessarily 
private in a weaker sense.) 
This I think is the sort of privacy Wittgenstein is talking about 
when he says The assumption would thus be possible - though unveri-
fiable - that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and 
another section another") Indeed one occasionally hears people, 
especially artists, wondering whether they see colours just as anyone 
else does. Wittgenstein is against us having another word to name 
our own particular private sensation of red, and with this I agree. 
What I find objectionable is the idea that pains are private like our 
own particular private sensation of red, and that as Wittgenstein is 
against another word for our private red so he is against a word 
naming pain. 
1. _P.1., I, § 272. 
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Wittgenstein has his private language argument reasons for getting 
rid of the two word hypothesis, reasons like drugs which have unpleasant 
side effects, but I think one can quickly eliminate the word for our 
private sensation by pointing out that the so-called particular private 
sensation of red is available to public language in the ordinary way, 
through behaviour, and that what you get is not a private name but a 
public name for a public red object (or, if the case is such, a contin-
gently private red object). When you supposedly name the necessarily 
private object, e.g., one's supposed private sensation of red, what 
you in fact end up with is a public name for, in the case of red, a 
public object, or in the case of pain, for a contingently private object. 
What is not meant here is that one's supposed private sensation 
of red is a public object standing alongside the public red object for 
all to see, or indeed for only me to see. Rather, in the case of a 
public red object if you try to pick out your own particular private 
sensation of red and name it all you end up doing is giving a public 
name for the public red object. 
Similarly in the case of a contingently private object such as 
a pain if you try and pick out your own particular private sensation 
of pain and name it, all you end up doing is giving a public name for 
a contingently private object. 
In § 258 where Wittgenstein imagines keeping a diary of a certain 
sensation, if one thinks of him as looking at a public red letter-box 
and trying to name his own particular private sensation of red, it 
becomes more difficult to follow the drift of the whole paragraph 
to its conclusion. There is no more difficulty in his naming his pri-
vate sensation of red here than there is in his naming the public 
instance of red. But there are not two acts of naming; only one, and 
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all you have is a public name for a public red object. One can still 
wonder about one section of mankind having one sensation of red and 
another section another, but we must also allow this to be said of 
pains, moods, etc., i.e., contingently private things as well, without 
having to say for myself that each object, sensation, pain or mood 
has a duplicate in the form of a necessarily private object. What I 
am against is the elevation or denigration of contingently private 
objects, e.g., some red sensations, pains and moods to the status of 
necessarily private objects. 
There is a temptation to think that with brain integration, 
language is much more public than without it. .I imagine my brain and 
someone else's linked together by the finest threads, so that our 
personal experiences are shared. We both sit looking at a red letter-
box, throw a switch and for me the letter-box turns green and the 
grass goes red. For him the letter-box and grass do the same. We both 
say so. Or I may find that the letter-box turns a colour I have 
never seen before. I name it "x" or "red 1C.1 . He has never seen my 
colour before and calls it "y" or "red o ". 
Is one committed to say that as the colour x, or red, is now 
a new public object, so before it must have been a private object 
of his, and from this lead on to saying that as things stand now each 
of us has a necessarily private language (in the weaker sense) with 
names for necessarily private objects (in the weaker sense)? 
It is difficult to know what to say here. I think one has to 
witness one's allegiance to what we ordinarily call public language 
- that stands firm. The brain link experiment then results in objects 
which have a publicity hitherto unknown, which could perhaps be called 
ultrapublicity. 
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The ramifications of this example could be immense, but the point 
I want to make is that if someone says that what we now call public 
language is really a necessarily private language naming only neces-
sarily private objects, ,then that language is, in view of the possi-
bility of the brain link experiment, necessarily private only in a weak 
sense, i.e., not in the required strong sense. 
Thus there may be a necessarily (weaker sense) private aspect of 
each individual's experiences, a privacy which might only be overcome 
by imagining situations like the brain link experiment. 
I want to explore the brain link experiment type situation a 
little further. I said I can wonder if someone else sees colours the 
same as I do. Discrimination tests only go so far. Someone might not 
be able to distinguish red from green, high tones from low tones, but 
what colour does he see, and what tone does he hear? Presumably the 
colours or sounds would all seem monotonous, but which colour or tone. 
One would have to put oneself in a God's eye position, where one can 
have anyone's experiences. 
Suppose that I find out that what I see as red he sees as my 
green and vice versa. I call the letter-box "red" and that red I see 
I call "red*", ("*" indicates that the word refers to my supposed 
private sensation). He calls the letter-box "red" and that red he 
sees I call "green*". But when I with my God's eye view have his 
experience of the letter-box, I would just say "You're seeing green" 
(not green*). The "*" seems to be a pointless tag. 
Extending this further : I call the letter-box "red", and that 
red I see I call "red*". 
He calls the letter-box "red", and that red he sees I call 
"green*", "x*", "dull red*", or "yorkle*". 
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But using my God's eye view I could equally have said that he 
calls the letter-box "red" and that red he seesI call "green", "x", 
"dull red", "yorkle" or "red**" ("**" indicates that the word refers 
to his supposed private sensation). 
A useful distinction could be made between•what I see when I say 
"red" and what he sees when he says "red" to the extent that I might 
distinguish (with my God's eye view) between the red I see and the 
red** he sees. In that case "red**" might mean "green", "x", "dull 
red" or "yorkle"... But with or without a God's eye view what is the 
use of me distinguishing "red" from "red*"? 
To make this more explicit consider this example. I am seeing 
a red patch. If I am seeing as usual I call it "red". If I am linked 
to his brain- or have a •God's Oe . view, and am seeing the red patch as 
he does, and it looks different from the way I see it usually, I may 
call the red patch "red**". If he is seeing the red patch as I do, 
then he may call it "red*". For me then the patch is either red or 
red**, and for him the patch is either red or red*, depending on the 
method by which we are seeing. 
When I am seeing the patch as usual, there is no distinction 
between "red" and "red*", and when he is seeing it there is no 
distinction between "red" and "red**". 
If I am asked what he is seeing however, I could say red or red* 
depending on which way he is seeing. In that way I have a use for 
"red*". But this is not a use which distinguishes for me my private 
image of red from the red I see normally. 
An example whereby the above situation becomes more practical 
would be in the use of two pairs of glasses with coloured lenses 
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such that when used the colours of objects appear changed. Suppose 
that one pair acts differently from the other, and that I wear one 
pair and someone else the other. Then we rename the colours we see 
about us. After some time we may come to regard the colours and 
names as normal, after which we could swap glasses temporarily, to 
see what the other person is seeing. The problem with names would 
then be similar to the one above. 
I am inclined to say that when I am seeing as usual, the word 
"red" does for both the public red object and my private image of red. 
I am undecided as to how to further characterise the relationship 
between a public red object and my private image of red. It seems 
clear however that the private sensation of red does not drop out as 
the beetle in the "beetle in the box" is supposed to, for if for me 
the private sensation of red did drop out so would for me the public 
red colour of the public red object. 
4. The Private Language Argument'and the Principle of Verification  
The article by Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Private Languages", 1 
exposes Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language 
argument as a disguised form of the Principle of Verification: "... 
a sign 'K' is not a kind name in a man's language unless it is possible 
to find out whether or not a thing is a K".
2 
As this private language 
argument is analogous to and has similar difficulties to the Principle 
of Verification a private language is not ruled out. 
I have tried to spell this out a little more clearly for myself. 
The interesting case is where I can find out whether "K" applies or 
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Private Languages", American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol.1, No.1, - January 1964, pp. 20-31. 
2. Op.cit., p. 29. 
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not. Consider then firstly that the analogy with the Principle of 
Verification is true. Then if, (a),it is logically possible for others 
to find out if "K" applies or not, then I do not have a private 
language. Also if (b), it is logically impossible for others to find 
out if "K" applies or not, then I do not have a private language. 
Secondly, consider that the analogy with the Principle of Verifi-
cation is false. Then if (a), once more I do not have a private lang-
uage, but if (b), then I do have a private language. 
So that the Principle of Verification be true, seems central 
to the claim that one cannot have a private language. 
From the article I agree with the difficulty in establishing what 
is logically impossible. "(..., there is no familiar rule of inference 
which will take you from a contingent premise to the conclusion 'it 
is logically impossible that ...' - except the rule of inference which 
allows you to derive a necessary truth from any proposition whatever. 
And then of course you would have already to know independently that 
the conclusion 'It is logically impossible that ..." is a necessary 
truth.)" 1 (The word "necessary" near the end should probably have 
been left out. If "It is logically impossible that p" is true, or in 
other words "It is necessary that not p" is true, then "Not p" is a 
necessary truth, i.e., not "It is logically impossible that p" is a 
necessary truth.) 
From here on I reason . differently from Thomson. I cannot agree 
with her first objection to the use of the modified Principle of Veri-
fication here.
2 	
Here the emphasis is on whether it is logically 
possible for others to find out whether or not a word applies to 
1. Op.cit., p. 27. 2. Cf.,0p.cit., p.30. 
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another's private object. But if we establish that it is logically 
impossible for others to find out whether or not a word applies to 
another's private object, then by the analogy with the Principle of 
Verification the word is not a kind name. But in the private language 
case it is difficult to see how it is to be established that it is 
logically impossible for us to find out which things are E and which 
are not. For if one person has a private sensation it is difficult 
to find a contradiction in supposing that someone else also has it 
(unless the sensation is necessarily private, which begs the question). 
So if one person has 'a private sensation and calls it "E", it 
is difficult to find a contradiction in supposing that someone else 
is able to check his use of the word "E". In other words it is diffi-
cult to show the logical impossibility of others finding out whether 
"E" applies or not. 
So if it is logically possible for others to find out if "E" 
applies or not then with or without the modified Principle of Verifi-
cation, "E" is a word in a language, but the trouble is that it is now 
no longer a necessarily private language, for it is logically possible 
for more than one person to understand it. 
I take it then that on trying to apply the modified Principle of 
Verification, whether it is true or false, it is difficult to see how 
a language would be necessarily private. This is quite the opposite 
conclusion to Judith Jarvis Thomson's. She seems to conclude that 
there can be a private language, her conclusion being based upon the 
uselessness of the Principle of Verification, and thus Malcolm's 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument. 
5. Are All Private Items Contingently Private? 
In the pain nerve ending transfer case it made sense to speak of 
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two people experiencing the same pain. The question arises as to 
whether it makes sense for all feelings, moods and thoughts,for 
example, that the same thing can be experienced by two people. It is 
imaginable by definition that some of all types of contingently private 
things could be public. What I am trying to see is whether all private 
feelings, moods, emotions and thoughts can be lumped into the conting-
ently private category. 
It makes sense to say that two people are feeling depressed, but 
does it make sense tosay that two people are feeling the same depres-
sion? Depression is not like pain with peripheral nerve endings at 
which the feeling is usually placed. 
One approach might be that for depression as there is no transfer 
analogous to pain nerve transfer, then it never makes sense to speak 
of two people feeling the same depression exactly. Then it looks as 
though one just has to accept that some things are necessarily private. 
But perhaps there are other ways in which depression could be a 
public thing. Another approach may be to regard depression as a feel-
ing often arising in a type of person in particular provoking circum-
stances, and associated with characteristic behaviour, so that two 
similar people in the same circumstances may both be feeling at least 
the same sort of depression and perhaps could be regarded as feeling 
exactly the same depression. A pair of failed bank robbers in the 
dungeon may both feel exactly the same depression. Now one might say 
that A's depression is associated with A, so it is different from B's 
which is associated with B, and if one wants to make this distinction 
there is nothing to prohibit it. But if it does not matter who you 
are, in such and such circumstances you will feel depression, then 
there is not much point in not saying that all in those circumstances 
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feel exactly the same depression. The same depression may even be felt 
by the one person at different times, or by two people one at one time 
and the other at another time. 
A tentative guideline may be that two things are the same if 
there is nothing regarded as significant to distinguish them as being 
different. So as with pain although in most cases of depression the 
depressions are in some significant respect all different, cases are 
imaginable where the depressions are exactly the same. In these imag-
inable cases the depression is no longer contingently private, but it 
public with respect to those individuals feeling the depression. 
There is no organ of depression as there is an organ of sight. 
So one is not able to "look" at someone with depression and "see" 
depression, not even in one's self. Rather one has to put one's whole 
self in the other's depressing situation to feel something like the 
depression he is feeling. If one was able to do this completely then 
one might be able to feel his depression. 
The general question still arises as to how one is to establish 
that all things which are not obviously public are contingently private 
and not necessarily private. Is one to go through each private thought, 
mood, feeling, or emotion one by one and establish that there is a way 
in which they all could have been public, and so therefore they are 
contingently private? For a start one cannot do them all, so some 
will have to do, and from - those infer to all. Now if one finds one 
for which it is logically impossible that it could have been public 
then it is necessarily private. But I doubt that one can establish 
such a logical impossibility. Rather it seems logically possible that 
any private thing could have been public. There is no contradiction 
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in supposing that what is private could have been public. I do not 
see the world as divided into public things, contingently private things 
'and necessarily private things. I cannot see anyway' of establishing 
that there are things which arenecessarily private. 
6. Types of Contingently Private Objects  
There are cases of private items such as the sound of tinnitus, or 
the colour of an after-image, or a picture in the imagination, which 
can be compared to public sounds,'colours and objects. These private 
items contrast with those for which there is no public object with 
which to compare, e.g., pains, tickles. If he is able to compare his 
private item with a public object, it is more accessible to others. 
There is yet another distinction to be made between two different 
types of contingently private,objects. Firstly there are contingently 
private objects such as pains where people may agree that they experience 
the same type of thing, a pain, things of the same sort, pains, but 
never happen to experience precisely the same thing, the same pain 
exactly. If two people experience renal colic they may even say they 
had the same pain, but would not mean exactly the same pain in the one 
place, but would mean the same type of pain, severe, and in corresponding 
places of their body. 
Secondly, there do seem to be contingently private objects such 
as the bulldozing contractor's feeling (cited on p.113) where I cannot 
agree that I have had the same experience or anything similar to it; 
anything of the same sort. The unique feelings of others, the like of 
which I have never had, are, until I have something.of - the same sort, 
more peculiarly private than the feelings we share. 
7. Same and Same Sort  
When I call my pain "pain" and he calls his pain "pain", how do 
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we know that we are having the same sort of thing, and that we are 
calling the same sort of thing "pain". We never in fact have exactly 
the same pain and so never have one thing before us to call "pain". 
It is not like us both seeing the same tree and calling it "tree". 
Neither is it like me seeing two trees and saying that they are 
the same sort of thing and judging that I am calling the same sort 
of thing by the name "tree". It would be misleading to infer that I 
make the judgement that we are feeling that same sort of thing, a pain, 
like that. 
It is not like us both seeing the same tree but it is analogous 
to it. When we both stand before a tree I make the judgement that he 
is seeing the same thing as me by my seeing the tree there and seeing 
him and his behaviour, i.e., his eyes turned towards the tree, him 
feeling the trunk with his hands, him listening to the wind blowing 
its leaves. He exhibits tree apprehending behaviour similar to my 
tree apprehending behaviour. I do not apprehend any supposed private 
tree image of his. 
The situation is similar with pain. He exhibits pain behaviour 
similar to mine. I do not apprehend any supposed private pain image 
of his. The only difference is that I too am not feeling his pain, 
whereas I was also seeing the tree. So I do not say with pain as with 
the tree that we are seeing the same thing, a tree, but rather that 
we have the same sort of thing, a pain. 
The judgement that we are seeing the same tree is not like me 
seeing a tree from two different angles for example and calling it 
the same tree. Nor is it like seeing two identical trees (if there 
be any) and calling them the same. 
This is not to say that my seeing the tree has no importance, but 
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its importance here is no greater than my having a pain in circum-
stances similar to his. 
When he appears to be in pain I can doubt whether he is feeling 
the same sort of thing as I do when I am in pain, so too can I doubt 
that he is seeing the same tree as I when he appears to be looking at 
it. 
In § 302 Wittgenstein says "If one has to imagine someone else's 
pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: 
for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of pain 
which I do feel") In answer to this, the circumstances are such that 
there is nothing else to do but that. To imagine someone else's pain 
one only has one's own model to go on. 
It is different when I imagine someone else's tree. I am able to 
go into his backyard to see it, and then imagine his tree. But when 
I imagine Plato's cave I am in a similar position as imagining Plato's 
or anyone else's pain. I have to imagine the cave which I have not 
seen on the model of caves which I have seen. Plato's cave is not the 
same as mine, but they are of the same sort. 
Finally then, the sorts of things which are traditionally thought 
of as necessarily private are in fact better regarded as contingently 
private and accessible to public language. There may be a private 
aspect to each individual's experience, but in the strong sense there 
are no necessarily private objects, and there is no necessarily 
private language. 
8. Is There a Lack of Analogy Between Gold Teeth and Toothache? 2 
If I am to tell whether A has a gold tooth I look in his mouth. 
If I am to tell whether A has a toothache I do not tell by having 
1. P.I., I, § 302. 
2. Cf., P.I., I, § 312, and The Blue Book, p. 53. 
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his particular experience of toothache any more than I tell that he 
has a gold tooth by having his visual impression of his gold tooth. 
I ask him, observe his behaviour, and perhaps do certain tests, e.g., 
the tenderness of a cavity. 
If his mouth is wired shut I may also just ask him if he has a 
gold tooth or look up his dental •records. 
This lack of analogy does not extend beyond the contingently pri-
vate at all. Of course there is a lack of analogy between the case of 
a public object and a contingently private one, but it is not the sort 
of lack of analogy that Wittgenstein wants. There is no demand for 
me to have his personal experience. 
As it happens I do not have an experience of pain when he has 
toothache and I do not tell whether A has toothache by having pain in 
his tooth. This might - be done by having a case similar to the arm nerve 
transfer case, e.g., the nerves of my jaws are transplanted into his 
jaws. Then I can feel his toothache but even then I do not have his 
particular experience of toothache, peculiar to him as an individual 
and there is no demand that one should have his particular experience. 
Neither is there any such demand in the case of ordinary public 
objects such as gold teeth. 
The linguistic demands made of contingently private objects are 
not to exceed those of public objects. 
9. The Importance of Behaviour 
I have been assuming that someone is capable of behaviour. 
Necessarily if the someone having the twinge was in fact incapable 
of showing its occurrence in - anyway then there would not be a public 
language about it. But then there would not be any private language 
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behaviour either. 
If he is capable of private language behaviour however then there 
can be a public language about his supposed private items. There can 
be a public language about any •private item. Suppose that he has a 
necessarily private item (e.g., Wittgenstein's E) and that he names it. 
This naming behaviour is then the basis for a public language about E. 
What if now I also suppose that his naming behaviour is also nec-
essarily private. No one else is of necessity to have any indication 
that he has named anything. He then has a private language - but it 
has no consequences for anyone else. This is also supposing that 
there is anything which is necessarily private. 
10. Features of Pain which Mislead Us. 
On writing about pain it is commonly said that pain is a subjective 
experience. By - this I suppose it is meant that people vary greatly 
in their response to apparently similar painful stimuli. 
But besides this there are a number of other features of pain which 
may lead one to think of it uncritically as necessarily private. 
The most important feature is that pain is private, probably 
universally private, but as I have tried to show this privacy is 
contingent. 
Also most people dislike pain, so it is not the sort of experience 
that people would want to share, even if they could. Rather the 
individual in pain wants to be rid of it. There are however rare 
cases where someone wants to feel the pain in sympathy with a sufferer. 
The existence of pain is dependent upon its being felt, apart 
from perhaps unnoticed pains. If the existence of a pain was independent 
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of its being perceived, in the way that ordinary physical objects 
are, then it might be the sort of thing which people could share. 
One's memory of pain is poor. One might remember the circum-
stances of pain and one's reactions and remember that it hurt, but one 
is not able to vividly bring to mind the feeling of pain. We would not 
want to even if we could. One's feeling of pain, once it is over, is 
private even from one's self. 
We know of someone else's pain by observing his behaviour, not 
by feeling the pain. The publicity of his behaviour contrasts with 
the privacy of his pain, so that we might think that his pain must be 
private. 
Pains are spatial, but are notmanipulable in the way that ordinary 
physical objects are. They are not transferable from one person's 
hand to another's. 
There is no compact anatomical organ for pain. If we had a com-
pact anatomical organ for pain perception, e.g., a sense organ on the 
tip of the nose which somehow allowed us to perceive pains anywhere 
in the body, then someone else's pain in his body might be the sort 
of thing I could perceive using the compact sense organ on the tip of 
my nose. 
Pain nerve fibres occur throughout the body whereas special sense 
nerve fibres are only in certain parts. Pain is felt either as is 
, usual where the nerve endings. are,though perhaps not where the actual 
stimulated nerve endings are, as in referred pain, or where the nerve 
endings would have been, as - in phantom pains. Pain is not separable 
from this albeit scattered organ, and is attached to a person - as much 
as a person is attached to his own body. If the world was such that 
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the visual objects he sees are the little images on his retinas, then 
as I would find it much harder to see those little images than the 
objects which produce them, his visual objects would be to that 
degree private. 
The cause of pain usually acts on or in the body by direct contact. 
If the cause of pain usUally acted from a distance, e.g., as the feel-
ing of heat is caused by.the fire across the room, then we might have 
learnt to regard pain as a public object at some distance from us. 
Even in cases of shamming and acting pain the ' person supposedly 
in pain is in the best position to know , if he is in pain. That this 
is always so may lead one to regard that this is necessarily so. 
We can imagine a visual object whin has many of the characteristics 
of pain. Suppose that each of us has an object in his visual field 
with several features, that it moves about something like an after-
image, but that it is solid and regarded as part of our bodies as if 
actually attached.by light rays between it and the eye, that it is 
public, but with a property, e.g., of an unusual colour which is 
always private and disliked, this unusual' colour having obvious 
causes and so on. If the analogy with pain is carried far enough we 
have a visual object with all the privacy of pain. 
We could also 'imagine that instead of having the feeling of pain 
in the toe, we instead somehow had a perception of an unusual colour 
or sound in the toe, the colour or sound otherwise having the charact-
eristics of pain. 
Thoughts such as these help to release the grip of pain as a 
necessarily private sensation. 
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11. FINALE  
I thought I could have a private language because I thought 
Wittgenstein's arguments were wrong. Now I think no one ever has 
a necessarily private language - Wittgenstein was more or less right, 
but for the wrong reasons! But now, I should ask, was he right all 
the way? I still do not think he was. 
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